Langford v. StateLangford v. State
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- Before:
- Gray
Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion and Order of
This is an original proceeding wherein Terry Allen Langford (Lang-ford) has petitioned this Court, pursuant to Rule 17, M.R.App.P., and
BACKGROUND
On January 5,1989, Langford entered pleas of guilty to two counts of deliberate homicide, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, and one count each of aggravated burglary, robbery and theft. The Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, sentenced Langford to death for each of the deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnaping counts, as well as to various terms of imprisonment for each of the remaining counts. We affirmed Langford’s convictions and sentences in State v. Langford (1991), 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936.
Langford subsequently filed two unsuccessful petitions for post-conviction relief (see State v. Langford (1991), 249 Mont. 385, 819 P.2d 151; State v. Langford (1991), 250 Mont. 542, 822 P.2d 1092) and, thereafter, the District Court scheduled Langford’s execution for January 17, 1992. Pursuant to the then-current version of
In December of 1991, Langford moved the District Court for a declaration that execution by hanging is cruel and unusual punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court denied Langford’s motion, determining that his election to be executed by hanging rendered his cruel and unusual punishment argument moot; we affirmed the District Court on appeal. State v. Langford (1992), 254 Mont. 44, 833 P.2d 1127.
Langford also petitioned the United States District Court, District of Montana, for a writ of habeas corpus, including within the petition an Eighth Amendment claim that execution by hanging constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The federal trial court denied relief, on the merits, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Langford v. Day (9th Cir. 1997), 110 F.3d 1380. Langford then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on July 11, 1997.
During the pendency of Langford’s federal habeas corpus proceedings, and prior to his July 11, 1997 petition for writ of certiorari, the Montana Legislature amended
In this original proceeding, Langford asserts that the State impermissibly truncated his ability to fully appeal his death sentence to the Supreme Court by removing hanging as a method of execution in Montana and, thereby, nullifying his federal Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. He contends that the legislative amendment deprived him of his final opportunity to avoid the death penalty because, if the Supreme Court had held that hanging is an unconstitutional punishment, the State would have been precluded from executing
DISCUSSION
I. JURISDICTION
As a threshold matter, we must address the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over Langford’s petition for injunctive relief. This Court has original jurisdiction to issue such writs as are provided by law, including writs of injunction. Art. VII, Sec. 2, Mont. Const.;
[t]he supreme court is an appellate court but it is empowered by the constitution of Montana to hear and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. The institution of such original proceedings in the supreme court is sometimes justified by circumstances of an emergency nature, as when a cause of action or a right has arisen under conditions making due consideration in the trial courts and due appeal to this court an inadequate remedy, or when supervision of a trial court other than by appeal is deemed necessary or proper.
Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P.
The State is clearly a party to this action by virtue of being a named respondent in Langford’s petition for injunctive relief. Moreover, the issue central to Langford’s petition implicates the State’s involvement as a party to the underlying controversy in two senses. First, it was the act of the State Attorney General (AG) in advocating the amendment of, and the State Legislature in amending,
Furthermore, the public has an interest in establishing and maintaining the validity of state actions — or in establishing that a state action is invalid — in a proceeding which attempts to curtail the State’s ability to enact, amend and enforce state legislation. This public interest is especially apparent in the context of state criminal laws and procedure and the imposition of the death penalty thereunder. We conclude, therefore, that at least two of the three criteria in
The State argues that Langford has failed to allege emergency circumstances or other conditions making trial court consideration and subsequent appellate review an inadequate remedy, as required under Rule 17(a), M.R.App.R, and, therefore, that the petition is insufficient to justify our exercise of original jurisdiction. In this regard, we need only take judicial notice of the fact that, after Langford filed his petition for injunctive relief, the District Court scheduled Langford’s execution for February 24,1998. With less than two months remaining before that date, we conclude that circumstances of an emergency nature exist in this case which render due consideration in the trial court and appeal to this Court an inadequate remedy. Therefore, we accept jurisdiction of Langford’s petition for a writ of injunction.
As a backdrop to our resolution of the merits of Langford’s arguments in support of his petition, it is appropriate to outline the underlying premise on which Langford bases his request for injunctive relief.
While his federal action remained pending at the Ninth Circuit, the Montana Legislature amended
Langford’s argument regarding the effect of the statutory amendment on his attempt to avoid the imposition of the death penalty has two aspects. First, he contends that it was quite probable that the Supreme Court would have ruled in his favor on his Eighth Amendment claim had he been able to present it in his petition for writ of certiorari. Second, Langford asserts that, once the Supreme Court held hanging was cruel and unusual punishment, the State would have no legal process by which to execute him under the old version of
Langford’s specific arguments in support of his petition for injunctive relief fall into three categories: (A) the amendment to
A. Ex Post Facto law
Langford asserts that the amendment to
Insofar as it is relevant here, the ex post facto clause is a prohibition against statutes which deprive a person of a defense to a charged crime. See Leistiko, 844 P.2d 99-100. In this case, Langford is not asserting a defense to a crime with which he was charged. He has already pleaded guilty to, and been sentenced for, the crimes he committed and the validity of those convictions is not at issue here.
Langford asserts, however, that the amendment to
We conclude that
B. Bill of Attainder
Langford also argues that the 1997 amendment to
The amendment to
Langford argues, however, that the punishment inflicted by the statutory amendment is the preemptive extinguishment of his ability to have the Supreme Court address his Eighth Amendment claim regarding hanging. Essentially, Langford is contending that the Legislature amended
The transcripts reveal various reasons for amending
We conclude that the amendment to
C. Violation of other rights under the Montana Constitution
Finally, Langford argues that Article II, Sections 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24 and 34 of the Montana Constitution protect his right to seek federal relief from his conviction and sentence and that the amendment to
A large portion of Langford’s brief in support of his petition is devoted to discussing the role of the AG in the 1997 amendment to
First, neither the transcripts of the legislative hearings nor any other evidence of record supports Langford’s inference regarding the AG’s motives vis-a-vis the 1997 amendment to
Moreover, Langford’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the transcripts contain no admission by the AG that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment. While Mike Mahoney, warden of the Montana State Prison, made several statements during the legislative hearings to the effect that lethal injection is more humane than hanging, no one testifying on behalf of the AG made such statements. Furthermore, a statement that hanging may be less humane than another execution method does not equate to an admission that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment. The transcripts of the legislative hearings on the amendment simply do not support Lang-ford’s assertions that the AG, acting on behalf of the State, either admitted that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment or was concerned that an Eighth Amendment claim regarding hanging would be successful in the Supreme Court.
Additionally, the legislative hearing transcripts establish that, while the AG supported the amendment to
Langford’s claims regarding the AG’s motives for supporting the amendment of
Langford’s final argument in support of his petition for injunctive relief is that, by mooting his Eighth Amendment claim prior to its presentation to the Supreme Court, the amendment to
Furthermore, we observe that Langford’s Eighth Amendment claim was not the only claim he pursued in his federal court habeas corpus proceeding. He also asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the pleading and sentencing phases of his case. Both the federal trial court and the Ninth Circuit addressed Langford’s ineffective assistance claim on the merits and Langford apparently included it in his petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Thus, the time spent on death row while Langford pursued his state and federal court remedies was not spent entirely on his Eighth Amendment
We conclude that Langford has not established that the 1997 amendment to
The Court having accepted jurisdiction of this original proceeding and having concluded that Langford has not established a violation of any of the provisions of the Montana Constitution on which his petition is grounded,
IT IS ORDERED that Langford’s petition for writ of injunction is DENIED.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, JUSTICES TRIEWEILER, REGNIER, NELSON and LEAPHART concur.
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurs.
I concur in the result of the opinion, but not in all that is said.