115 Mo. App. 489 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
— This is an action to recover damages for persona] injuries sustained by plaintiff at the crossing of a public street and defendant’s railroad tracks in the city of Boonville. Plaintiff had judgment in the sum of three thousand dollars and defendant appealed.
The facts disclosed by. the evidence introduced by plaintiff are as follows: Plaintiff, a farmer living six or seven miles west of Boonville, while on his way. home, was driving a team attached to an ordinary farm wagon and at the time of the occurrence in question was standing near the front end of the wagonbed. His position placed him some fifteen feet distant from the end of the tongue. In driving westward on Spring street, it was necessary for him to cross three tracks of defendant’s road. These tracks ran north and south and intersected the street at right angle. East of the east track and on the south side of the street was a grain elevator, and directly across on the north side of the street was another elevator. The east track ran close to both elevators and served as a loading track for them. A box car was standing on this track at the northwest corner of the south-side elevator and extended some six or eight feet into the street. The street declined from the east to the crossing. East of the elevator, there was an open space which afforded a view to one approaching from the east of the tracks extending to the south except the portion of them obscured by the elevator building. When he reached this point of view, plaintiff looked to the south and saw the smoke from an engine several hundred yards away and from his observation rightly concluded that the engine was not approaching the crossing. He continued on slowly and cautiously, looked both to the right and left, and listened for the approach of trains or cars. His wagon was almost new and made but little noise. Just before the crossing was reached, he checked his team, but did not come to a full stop. He saw and heard
On the part of the defendant, the evidence goes to show that plaintiff could have seen and did see the approaching car before he reached a place of danger and attempted to “run” the crossing; that the car was not “kicked” or “shunted,” that is, was not set in motion by the engine and then detached to travel forward, but was given “slack”to start it and then gained headway by
In the view we take of the case, notwithstanding the allegation in the petition that the car .was “kicked” or “shunted,” it is immaterial whether it was given headway by that operation or was started in the manner claimed by defendant. The means of propulsion used do not enter into the question of negligence. The determinative fact is that the servants of defendant, by any process, started the car in motion, and sent it over the crossing without warning and without any means of control. This fact is admitted by defendant and its negligence thereby confessed. It is so well settled in this State that it is negligence per se to move cars in this manner over public crossings that it is not required of us to discuss the subject. [Pinney v. Railway, 71 Mo. App. 577; O’Connor v. Railway, 94 Mo. 150; Baker v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 533; Baker v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 140; Stevens v. Railway, 67 Mo. App. 356.] This disposes of the criticism that the court, in one of the instructions given on behalf of plaintiff, assumed, as proven, the fact of the negligence of defendant.
Defendant asked for an instruction in the nature of a demurrer tó the evidence and complains of the action of the trial court in refusing it, assigning two grounds in support of its position-: first, a total failure of proof of the allegations of the petition; and, second, that the contributory uegligence of plaintiff should be assumed as a matter of law.
As to the first, the petition alleges that “by the force of the collision of the said car with his said wagon, plaintiff was thrown several feet into the air and fell with great force and violence, head foremost, to the ground, etc.” It is insisted that plaintiff himself admits he was not thrown from the wagon by the impact, but jumped before it occurred and in anticipation of it, from which defendant argues that there is a complete depar
Relative to the second point, we are urged to declare that in law plaintiff, under his own evidence, was
Where obstructions exclude a vieAV of the tracks, a person approaching the crossing is not necessarily compelled, in order to satisfy the requirements of reasonable? care, to leave his vehicle and go forward to the track
Tested by these principles, the characterization of plaintiff’s conduct was a question of fact for the jury. After leaving the open space east of the elevator, he could not see the track until his team entered into the sphere of danger, but, according to his evidence, he could have heard signals or warnings and was listening for them. After he passed beyond the obstruction to his sight caused by the presence of the elevator, he could have seen over the top of the stationary box car, before he entered into danger, the top of an engine or box cars moving on the main track, and he was looking in that direction. He could neither see nor hear the stealthy approach of the coal car. It was wrongfully there through defendant’s negligence, and to charge him with constructive knowledge of its presence would be a gross injustice.
It has been suggested that, as plaintiff was not himself in danger when he first observed the car, it was negligence for him to attempt to whip his team over the
The views expressed answer the questions raised relative to the giving and refusing of instructions. The law was correctly declared in those given. Instruction number eleven asked by defendant contained a declaration of law embodied in other instructions given on behalf of defendant and, therefore, was properly refused. The case was fairly tried and submitted, and the judgment is affirmed.