157 Iowa 300 | Iowa | 1912
— The plaintiffs are the sons and daughter of the defendant. Another son, Harry Lang, did not join in the petition,. and a daughter Hattie had died of tuberculosis. Their mother died January 21, 1908, and her surviving husband, the defendant, then sixty-two or sixty-seven years of age, married Leonora Pegan, then twenty-one years of age and a sister of the wife of his son Thomas, April 17th
(5) The said party of the second part, in consideration of the above agreement, hereby agrees to and does return to her said husband, and agrees to remain with him and to care for him as his wife until his death, except in case the said' party of the first part shall break his said promise and again become addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, or in ease he shall abuse his said wife, so as to endanger her health or life; in either of which events, the said party of the second part may abandon her said husband and be excused from further living with or caring for her said husband. (6) It is also understood and agreed by the parties hereto that, in case the said party of the first part shall keep his said agreement in relation to abstaining from the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and in case he shall keep his said agreement in relation to conducting himself towards his wife, so as not to illtreat her in such a manner as to endanger her health or life, and, notwithstanding the keeping of the said agreements by the said party of the first part, his said wife shall voluntarily forsake her said husband and refuse to live and to care for him until his death as his wife, then, and in that event,*304 she forfeits all claim to the real and personal property mentioned and referred to in this agreement which was to be conveyed and given to her by her said husband, and said party of the second part, in such event, would take only such property out of her husband’s 'estate as is allowed to her by law. In event of- her death during his life, the deed was to be a nullity, and no title to pass at his death.
The petition was filed September 28, 1908, and the appointment of a temporary guardian for the management of his property requested, with the prayer that a permanent guardian may be designated for that purpose, and also to take such steps as may be essential, in order to restore to his estate the title or right to claim any of his property acquired by his wife since their marriage. The grounds on which such action is sought are that (1) he has become a spendthrift, (2) has become addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors to such an extent as to render him incapable of managing his business affairs, and (3) his mind is unsound.
Only the last ground was submitted to the jury, and appellant contends that this was error, in that the evidence was such that a verdict should have been directed for defendant. A detailed review of the evidence contained in an abstract of over 400 pages is impractical and would serve no useful purpose. It is enough to say that for more than twenty-five years prior to July 25, 1908, the defendant had used intoxicating liquors excessively, frequently becoming intoxicated, and evidence was adduced tending to prove numerous incidents and circumstances in their nature so unusual or unnatural as that they tended to indicate a disordered or diseased intellect; and nonexperts, basing their conclusions • on these ,expressed the opinion that he was of unsound mind, as did two experts. On the other hand, numerous nonexperts were of opinion that his mind was sound, as were two experts. We have thoroughly examined the record, and are content with the. ruling that the evidence was
A delusion, such as indicative of an unsound mind, is a belief in something impossible in the nature of things, or impossible in the circumstances surrounding the afflicted individual under investigation, and which refuses to yield to evidence or to reason. Scott v. Scott, 212 Ill. 597 (72 N. E. 708). It is defined in Potter v. Jonas, 20 Or. 239 (25 Pac. 769, 12 L. R. A. 161), as “a conception that originated spontaneously in the mind without evidence oí any kind to support it, which can be accounted for ón no reasonable hypothesis, having no foundation in reality, and springing from a diseased and morbid condition of the mind.” “A delusion is not necessarily a belief in something impossible in the nature of things or the circumstances of the case; but if the belief is entertained against all evidence and probability, and after argument to the contrary, it affords grounds for inferring that the person labors under an insane delusion.” Medill v. Snyder, 61 Kan. 15 (58 Pac. 962, 78 Am. St. Rep. 307).
The belief entertained by defendant, though, owing
The evidence was admissible as tending to show that defendant’s belief was unfounded. In so holding, we are not to be understood to approve of all the rulings on the' admissibility of this class of evidence. Eor instance, it was incompetent to permit a witness to express his opinion generally that the sons were “good boys,” or that they did not shirk, or that they were “hard workers,” and the like. These were mere conclusions. The witnesses should have been required to state what they had observed, and allow the jufy to determine whether they would infer as much. And it was not material how they compared with neighbors’ children, as was sought to be shown in cross-examination. They were not on trial and the evidence was merely for the purpose of showing whether there was any foundation for defendant’s belief of what they were and had been. The evidence might well have been carefully restricted to the refutation of defendant’s beliefs.
Y. In the opening statement, counsel for plaintiff said to the jury that a suit had been started in the district court of Crawford county against defendant’s wife by Mrs. Burnett for the alienation of her husband’s affections. This was objected to, and the objection overruled, on the theory-that such evidence would tend to show Mrs. Lang disreputable, and that she had such an influence over Lang as to take away his property. Of course, the bringing of such suit would not be competent to prove anything of the kind, and the facts recited, in no event, could have had any bearing on the issues being tried.
There was evidence tending to prove his present wife to have been of loose morals prior to her marriage, and that defendant, in marrying her, must have known this. He testified he never heard anything against her, and this was stricken, on motion. The ruling was erroneous; for his answer tended to rebut any inference which might otherwise have been drawn, had he knowledge of what she was.
In the last case, such questions were declared to be ensnaring, to which the witnesses themselves, might object, because calling for opinions, not based on their own knowledge and observation, but on that of others, and it was said that:
The witnesses had already given the opinion and the facts on which they founded it, and the jury were to judge of the correctness of any opinion from the facts and reasons stated by the witnesses. And the witnesses’ opinion of the capacity of a man must not be founded on the hearsay of others, or the oath of others. As well might the defendants in error have called for the opinion of any bystander who had heard the evidence given by them of the state of the man’s mind. ... To give such latitude as was allowed in this ease to a cross-examination would be trying the case, not 'by the evidence of facts and opinion formed by witnesses from their own observation and knowledge, but would be trying it on opinions founded on hearsay and facts stated by others, unknown to the witnesses, and altogether inconsistent with their knowledge and with the knowledge to which they had testified.
In re Dolbeer’s Estate, supra, the court said that “hypothetical questions involving facts not testified to by the witnesses themselves were put by contestant to certain nonexpert witnesses familiar with the deceased, and by the court were ruled out. These rulings were proper. No case has been cited which allows such a line of inquiry, even upon cross-examination, and as to the impropriety of such questions reference may be made to” the cases above cited. The rulings by which hypothetical questions were permitted to be propounded to nonexpert witnesses were erroneous; and as in such questions the matters claimed to be indicative of soundness were repeated over and over
We have not undertaken to pass' on all of the numerous errors assigned and the omission of any is- not to be treated as an approval of the particular ruling. Some requiring consideration may have been overlooked in appellant’s brief of 446 pages, wherein assignments of error, brief points, suggestions, and arguments are intermingled without much attention to order, logical sequence, or facilitating investigation. This- brief is inexcusably prolix, and the cost of printing 200 pages only will be taxed. — Reversed.