101 Wash. App. 878 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2000
When Wallace and Patricia Lane quit-claimed one and one-half acres of land to their neighbors, they received in return a 10-year renewable lease to continue farming Christmas trees on the property. The land’s subsequent purchasers, Thomas and Sharon Wahl, attempted to terminate the lease and the Lanes sued. After a bench trial, the court found that the lease was valid, but
Facts
In the early 1970s, the Lanes bought four acres of rural land east of Moses Lake. They built two houses on the land and farmed Christmas trees on the back portion. In late 1986, the Lanes sold one of the houses and the surrounding one-half acre to Oscar and Marie Grogan. They retained the one and one-half acres behind the Grogan parcel so they could continue to farm trees.
The Lane property was part of a development subdivision that imposed covenants on the property owners. In October 1987, a lawyer representing the subdivision development association informed the Lanes that the sale of a house on only one-half acre of land violated the covenant requiring all homesites to contain at least two acres. Around this time, the Grogans were attempting to sell their house and property to Daniel and Katherine McCarthy. The McCarthys refused to close the transaction until the conflict over the restrictive covenant was resolved. To avoid a threatened lawsuit, the Lanes agreed to quitclaim the remaining one and one-half acres of the lot to the Grogans. In exchange, the Grogans agreed to give the Lanes a 10-year farm lease — renewable at the Lanes’ option for an additional 10 years — to continue operating the Christmas tree business. The Lanes quitclaimed their interest in the one and one-half acres to the Grogans on August 5, 1988. That same day, the Grogans conveyed their interest in the land to the McCarthys, and the McCarthys executed a farm lease agreement with the Lanes. The lease was recorded August 10, 1988.
In relevant part, the farm lease agreement provides that
The McCarthys later sold their property to Shelley Weber, who sold it to the Wahls in January 1993. Mr. Wahl read the farm lease before he bought the land, but he intended to break the lease and farm the back acres himself.
In autumn 1993, the Lanes decided to sell their property to Peter Harris. Mr. Harris bought the Lane parcel in June 1994 and agreed to pay for an assignment of the lease after the dispute with the Wahls was resolved. The Wahls filed a notice of farm lease termination in July 1994. In response, the Lanes filed a complaint in October 1994 seeking damages for trespass, slander of title, abuse of process and a permanent restraining order. The Wahls answered with a general denial and counterclaimed that the lease was illusory and unsupported by consideration.
For reasons undisclosed in the record, the findings and conclusions were not presented to the court until over a year later. The Lanes were awarded $4,750 in attorney fees and costs. This appeal followed.
Illusory Lease Agreement
The Wahls contend the farm lease agreement is invalid because its performance is discretionary on the part of the Lanes, rendering it illusory, unenforceable, and inadequate consideration to support the agreement.
An illusory promise is one that is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced, or by its terms makes performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor. King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wn.2d
The Wahls contend the lease provision that allows the Lanes to terminate the lease at any time with written notice creates an illusory promise. What they fail to acknowledge is that a lease is not a typical contract. Leases are conveyances whose covenants are interpreted under contract law. See Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990); Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wn.2d 660, 663, 251 P.2d 166 (1952). Key to our resolution of this issue is the decision in Peoples Park & Amusement Ass’n v. Anrooney, 200 Wash. 51, 93 P.2d 362 (1939), a case involving a 10-year lease. In Peoples Park, the lessor argued that the lease was invalid because only the lessee could terminate the lease at any time, and that consequently there was a failure of consideration for the lease. Id. at 55. The court held that the usual contract rules do not apply to leases for a fixed period:
The authorities uniformly hold that a lease for a definite term which contains a provision for its termination before the expiration of the term fixed at the option of either of the parties is not invalid, although it gives the lessor or the lessee alone the right to terminate the lease.
Id. at 56. Further, the court noted, the lessee promised to do something and to pay certain money in exchange for the lessor’s promise to lease the premises. This promise for a promise was sufficient to obligate both parties under the lease. Id. at 57.
Here, as in Peoples Park, the Lanes and McCarthys
Attorney Fees
The Wahls next contend the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Lanes. The Wahls assert that because they won damages for their counterclaims and the Lanes prevailed only on their claim that the lease was valid, the Wahls are the substantially prevailing party and are entitled to fees and costs under the lease. Alternatively, they argue, neither party prevailed and therefore neither is entitled to an award.
Attorney fees must be based on a contract, statute or recognized ground in equity. Dayton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 124 Wn.2d 277, 280, 876 P.2d 896 (1994). RCW 4.84.330 provides that a contract containing an attorney fees provision entitles the prevailing party in an enforcement action to recover reasonable fees and costs. If neither party wholly prevails, “then the determination of who is a prevailing party depends upon who is the substantially prevailing party, and this question depends upon the extent of the relief afforded the parties.” Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 633, 934 P.2d 669 (1997). Here, the Lanes prevailed in the
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. The Lanes, as the prevailing party on appeal, are entitled under the same provision in the farm lease to attorney fees, assuming they comply with RAP 18.1. Marassi v. Lau, 71 Wn. App. 912, 920, 859 P.2d 605 (1993).
Affirmed. The Lanes are awarded attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.1.
Kurtz, C.J., and Kato, J., concur.
The statutory warranty deeds from the McCarthys to Ms. Weber and from Ms. Weber to the Wahls contained provisions stating that the estate was subject to the recorded Lane farm lease.