111 Va. 680 | Va. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
This writ of error brings under review a verdict and judgment in the Corporation Court of the city of Lynchburg for $1,500, in an action brought by James S. Barnard's administrator against Lane Brothers Company for the recovery of damages for the death of plaintiff’s intestate, caused, it is alleged, by the negligence of the defendant.
The substance of the charge of negligence made in the declaration is that the automatic safety valve on defendant’s steam engine, at a point where defendant, on the Boonesboro road, in the county of Campbell, near the city of Lynchburg, had placed certain road machinery for the purpose of macadamizing the road, under a contract with the county, was so adjusted as to discharge steam in sudden streams and clouds horizontally or laterally across, over, into and upon said road, and from five to six feet above it; that these discharges of steam and hot mist and water were of an extraordinary, unusual and frightening character, such as naturally tended and were calculated to frighten, terrify and cause to become uncontrollable horses of ordinary gentleness and training, and thereby liable to cause injury and death to the travelling public; that the said automatic safety or pop-valve and pipe
The accident to plaintiff’s intestate is described in the declaration as follows: The deceased was, on the 8th day of July, 1908, travelling along, over and upon said public road and highway, as he had a right to do, at or near the place where the defendant had placed, located and was maintaining its said steam boiler, engine and said safety or pop-valve and pipe attachments, and was exercising due care on his part, and was occupying a cart and driving a horse hitched to and drawing said cart, Avhich horse was of ordinary gentleness and' training, and was passing or about to pass by said engine and boiler, and upon the open passageway of said public road and highway, when there was suddenly ejected, discharged and released from defendant’s said steam boiler and engine, by means of its said automatic, safety or pop-valve and pipe attachments in, over and laterally and horizontally across and over said road and highway, a sudden stream, etc., of steam in front of, at or nearly at, the face, head and fore
The defendant, under its plea of the general issue, claimed that it was in lawful occupation of the road with its machinery, and was not responsible for the noises and other occurrences usual in the operation of such machinery; that it was guilty of no negligence; and that except for the negligence of the plaintiff’s intestate in attempting to drive by the machinery without taking any precautions for his own safety the accident complained of would not have occurred.
The record before us presents no question for our determination other than that arising from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict of the jury because the same was contrary to the law and the evidence.
Viewing the evidence as upon a demurer thereto, the facts and circumstances attending the injuries sustained by plaintiff’s intestate were as follows: Where the accident occurred the public road spoken of above was thirty-seven feet wide from fence to fence, at the- western or Boonesboro end, and thirty-three feet wide at the eastern or Lynchburg end, with
Of the twenty-one witnesses introduced for the plaintiff,
Of the six witnesses referred to, only one witnessed the accident, and the other five were introduced to show that the machinery operated was of such a character as to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness and training, only four of whom had seen or heard the pop-valve go off. W. H. Harrison, the eye-witness, stated that he was employed by the defendant, and when the accident occurred was running the steam roller about two hundred yards west of the machinery. He was on the ground oiling his machinery when the plaintiff’s intestate passed by on the opposite side, which he seemed to do without trouble. After he passed, the witness got up on the roller and started in the same direction, following him. The road was perfectly straight, and deceased and machinery ahead, which was not then running, were in full view. Deceased was driving about five or six miles an hour, and just as he got opposite the crusher engine the pop-valve on the engine went off, and the horse immediately shied and the wheel of the cart in which deceased was seated struck the wheel of a wagon standing on the opposite side of the road, and deceased was thrown out. The horse appeared to be under control and showed no sign of fright until the pop-valve went off, the steam from which went up in the air and diagonally across the road, and with the engine located as it was the steam from the pop-valve would be thrown “somewhat across the road, diagonally across the road,” and ordinarily about half-way across, but “there is no certainty about that.” This witness seeing the accident from a point behind the deceased and two hundred yards distant, could not have seen, nor did he undertake to say, whether the steam passed in front of the
Burwell Anderson, introduced by defendant, and the only other witness of the accident who observed the discharge of the pop-valve, stated that as the horse was approaching the engine the valve popped off, and the steam, apparently blown by the wind, seemed to drift towards the face of the horse, but it seemed to abate and then the valve poped off again with a loud noise, and that seemed to frighten the horse, and it shied, jumping to one side as the valve discharged a second time. “It popped off with a loud noise, and that seemed to frighten the horse.”
It seems clear, therefore, from this evidence, that the horse was frightened by the noise of the discharge of the valve, rather than by the appearance of the steam. At most, it leaves it conjectural whether there was any connection between the accident and the cause alleged in the declaration, to-wit: that the horse was frightened, and the accident caused, by the discharge of the steam across the roadway. Be that, however, as it may, it appears from the evidence that the machinery used by the defendant was such as is used in road building all over the State. It was located at the place of this accident by lawful authority, and the work was conducted according to methods usually pursued in similar work elsewhere. The safety valve, which was used for the safety of those working around the engine, was attached at the place fixed for it at the factory, its use being that if the engineer fails to keep a lookout as to the amount of steam he is generating, the valve may open automatically by reason of the pressure and permit the excessive steam to escape and thereby
I would not call that shying, if I was going to buy him for myself.” It further appears that the deceased, just before this accident happened to him, said to plaintiff’s witness just quoted from, that the horse he was driving would shy. He (deceased) had passed defendant’s machinery that morning when the employees assisted him, as they had been instructed to do whenever their services were needed by any one travel-ling the road, but when deceased returned in the afternoon he said to the same witness that he didn’t think he would have any trouble going back, and then drove off down the road by the machinery, at a speed of not less than five or sis miles an hour, so that when his horse shied to the side of the road by reason of the pop-valve going off, his vehicle struck the wheel of the wagon of Burwell Anderson, standing on the side of the road where Anderson had driven it in order to clear the road for deceased when he saw him coming. It, nowhere appears that deceased would have been unable to control his horse had not his vehicle collided with Anderson’s wagon, which was where it was without any fault of the defendant.
It is contended for the plaintiff in the argument, that the defendant’s negligence consisted not only in establishing and maintaining its machinery on the side of the public road, but in attaching the pop-valve to its engine so that the steam would be ejected into or over the road, instead of from the road; or in not employing some device or equipment which would have kept the steam out of the road entirely.
We have seen that the defendant had located its machinery,
Though machinery, and the noises made in operating it are of such a character as to frighten horses, this alone does not impose a liability; therefore, the defendant in this case being in lawful occupation of the road with its machinery, and using it for a lawful purpose, was not responsible for the appearance of the machinery, nor for the noise or other occurrences usual in its operation. Southern Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 98 Va. 299, 36 S. E. 388.
“Injury alone is not sufficient to support an action arising from the alleged negligence of the defendant. There must be a concurrence of wrong and injury. If a person does an act
In Piollet v. Simmons, 106 Penn. St., 51 Am. Rep. 496, cited in the last named case, the horse of a traveller took fright at a small barrel mounted on wheels, which the owners of the property through which the highway ran were using in whitewashing their fences, and which they moved from time to time as the work progressed. They left it standing covered over with a white cloth, and having a shovel projecting a short distance above the top, all day Sunday on one side of the beaten highway track; and in an action for damages thus caused, it was held, that unless there was something of an unusual or extraordinary character in the structure or appearance of the apparatus, which would naturally tend to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness and training, it was not negligence to use it, although some horses might and did take fright at seeing it.
It is true that it is incumbent on a person or corporation using and-operating machinery located in or by the side of a public road or highway, to take proper precautions against the dangerous operations and conditions attending the use of the machinery, in order to prevent injury to a traveller on the highway; but the rule as to the test of negligence in •an action brought to recover damages for an injury inflicted under such conditions is that the defendant is liable for the consequences, not of danger, but of negligence; “and the unbending test of negligence in methods, machinery, and appliances is the ordinary usage of the business. No man is held hy law to a higher degree of skill than the fair average of Bis profession or trade, and the standard of due care is the
We are of opinion that the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the finding of the jury; therefore, the judgment of the trial court complained of must be reversed, the verdict set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.'
Reversed.