Lead Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
Separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
Congress has given the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) a variety of weapons to use against individuals whose actions threaten the integrity of federally insured banks or savings associations. Among these is the power to remove a bank officer from his position and to bar him from further participation in the operations of a federally insured depository institution. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1). On April 30, 1996 the FDIC notified Michael D. Landry that it intended to seek such an order against him because of his conduct as Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Cashier of First Guaranty Bank, Hammond, Louisiana.
As required by statute, the FDIC assigned the matter to an administrative law judge for a formal, on-the-record, administrative hearing. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4); 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556. The ALJ held a two-week hearing and then issued a decision recommending that the FDIC issue the proposed prohibition order.
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From the late 1980s to early 1993, First Guaranty was in serious financial trouble. In 1990, the FDIC issued a capital directive requiring it to obtain a $4.7 million infusion of capital by January 1, 1991.
Landry’s alleged malfeasance occurred in connection with a capital enhancement plan initially proposed by Rick A. Jenson, the Bank’s former president, and Scott Crabtree, a consultant, involving a corporation called Pangaea.. The FDIC and Landry agree that he had a role in this plan but disagree as to the scope of his role, his motivation, and the significance of his conduct. The FDIC Board, adopting the ALJ’s factual findings, found that Landry and his two associates were the incor-porators of Pangaea Corporation, and that they planned to use Pangaeá to acquire an 80% interest in the Bank. They hoped to raise $16 million by selling 30% of Pangaea’s stock, retaining 70% for themselves. Of the $16 million Pangaea would use $7.5 million to beef up the Bank’s capital through purchases of its stock, $6.5 million to form a limited partnership to buy real estate from the Bank’s portfolio, and $2 million to pay Pangaea expenses and to finance other ventures. They presented this plan as a means of finding capital for the Bank, and obtained approval at an executive meeting of the Bank’s board of directors on August 8,1991, but as Landry would later admit, the board was misled because the plan was “not presented as a management takeover/buyout of the Bank.” Instead, the Bank’s board was led to believe that Pangaea was an arm of the Bank so that a capital infusion would entail no genuine change in control of the Bank. After board approval, the Bank forwarded a draft copy of a descriptive booklet to the FDIC examiners. They rejected the plan because they believed it offered no short term capital infusion and Pangaea had no serious prospect of actually raising the $16 million. (The FDIC had determined that investors could have acquired complete ownership of the entire bank for $5 million, so that investors would not be willing to pay $16 million for a 30% interest in an entity (Pangaea) that would own only 80% of the Bank.)
Undeterred, Jenson, Crabtree and Landry pursued a variety of imaginative sources of capital, many of which involved Pangaea. These sources included: individuals seeking United States citizenship under a provision of the immigration laws admitting individuals who invest $1 million in a new business venture that creates ten or more new jobs; pension funds solicited for the immigration scheme with the help of an image-enhancement firm with pension fund contacts; a preferred stock offering for Pangaea prepared by Funding Placement Services; and an Ecuadorian currency scheme through which one could purportedly obtain a 500% return in six weeks.
Although this “Pangaea plan” never much developed, and although Pangaea was unlikely ever to have received approval to acquire the Bank from its board of directors or federal regulators, the FDIC Board found that Landry’s fellow Pangaea incorporators — with Landry’s full knowledge and cooperation — executed enough of the plan to cause the Bank to lose substantial sums of money in the form of promotional expenses, see Order at 14, 17-18, 29-30, J.A. at 231, 234-35, 246-47, questionable loans, see id. at 14-15, 17, J.A. 231-32, 234, and other unwise or illegal banking activities, see id. at 13,16, 20, J.A. at 230, 233, 237, without informing the
The Board’s most compelling evidence came in the form of a 16-page letter dated June 3, 1993 that Landry himself wrote to bank examiner G. Martin Cooper (“Landry letter”), and to which he attached more than 500 pages of supporting material. The Landry letter described the activities at issue here and linked them to Pangaea. Landry’s personal culpability, laid bare in this letter, was reinforced by Landry’s resignation letter (not accepted by the Bank’s board of directors), in which he described his conduct as “self dealing” and “for the good of Pangaea Corporation at the expense of First Guaranty Bank,” as well as his May 12, 1995 deposition, in which he admitted that Pangaea had become a vehicle to “make money off the bank.” After examining all of the evidence, the FDIC Board concluded that although other wrongdoers may have been more culpable, Landry’s conduct met the statutory criteria and thus warranted a removal and prohibition order. See Order at 21-22, J.A. at 238-39.
Appointments Clause
Landry argues that the FDIC’s method for appointing ALJs violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution:
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:- but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Landry would classify ALJs who conduct administrative proceedings for the various federal banking agencies as “inferi- or officers” of the United States. If so, Congress’s instruction to the banking agencies to “establish their own pool of administrative law judges” to conduct such hearings, see Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIR-REA”), § 916,
The FDIC also makes a preliminary objection — that Landry has shown no prejudice from any Appointments Clause violation that may have occurred. The FDIC itself determined Landry’s responsibility after reviewing the ALJ’s recommended decision de novo. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (requiring the FDIC to make its own findings of fact when issuing its final decision); 12 CFR §§ 308.38, 308.40 (requiring the FDIC Board to issue the agency’s final decision). The Supreme Court has not decided whether an Appointments Clause violation requires reversal where it appears to have done a party no direct harm. Ryder v. United States,
The Court recently noted its use of the label “structural,” observing that only in a limited class of cases has it “found an error to be ‘structural,’ and thus subject to automatic reversal.” Neder v. United States,
There is certainly no rule that a party claiming constitutional error in the vesting of authority must show a direct causal link between the error and the authority’s adverse decision. In fact, the opposite is often true. For example, in a challenge to the authority of a non-Article III court on the grounds that the challenger is entitled to a court enjoying Article Ill’s exceptional tenure provisions,' the assumption that inadequate tenure may prejudice the challenger is so automatic that it usually goes unmentioned. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
Of course in the above cases there was no de novo review following the decision of the (arguably) unlawfully designated official. (But see Vasquez v. Hillery,
Moreover, Appointments Clause analysis of purely decision recommending employees presents a special problem. Suppose that a purely recommendatory power, i.e., one followed as here by de novo review, can make an employee an “inferior officer” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause^ — a hypothesis we must assume at this stage. If the process of final de novo review could cleanse the violation of its harmful impact, then all such arrangements would escape judicial review, unless the officer’s powers happened fortuitously, as in Freytag, to be combined with still greater powers. Recognition of this problem may well explain the Court’s statement in United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,
For this reason our decision here is not inconsistent with Doolin v. OTS,
Finally, we note that- in United States v. Colon-Munoz,
We now turn to whether a violation of the Appointments Clause occurred. The line between “mere” employees and inferi- or officers is anything but bright. See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Apr pointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 Colum. L.Rev. 1103, 1114-15 (1998) (“Early Supreme Court attempts to define the term ‘officer’ provide inexact, if any, judicially manageable standards”); Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1515, 1545 (1990) (“[A] definitive understanding of the term ‘officer’ is not forthcoming for two simple reasons: (1) there are too few cases for any consistent precedential principle to be articulated, and (2) the few cases that do exist posit conclusions rather than arguments and provide little insight to justify their results.”). In fact, the earliest Appointments Clause cases often employed circular logic, granting officer- status to an official based in part upon his appointment by the head
In the most analogous case, Frey-tag, the Court decided that STJs were inferior officers.
It is, to be sure, uncertain just what role the STJs’ power to make final decisions played in Freytag. Many of the features of the STJ job that the Court found to contribute to its being covered by the Appointments Clause have analogues here. The office of STJ was “established by Law” (the threshold trigger for the Appointments Clause) and the “duties, salary, and means of appointment” for the office’ were specified by statute, a factor that has proved relevant in the Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence. Freytag,
Nonetheless, in another way the Court laid exceptional stress on the STJs’ final decisionmaking power. After noting those powers, the Court went on to explain why Freytag could raise the claim even though in his case the STJ had not been exercising them:
Special trial judges are not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties under [the enabling statute], but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities. The fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.
Id. All this explanation would have been quite unnecessary if the purely recommen-datory powers were fatal in themselves. Accordingly, we believe that the STJs’ power of final decision in certain classes of cases was critical to the Court’s decision. As the ALJs hired pursuant to § 916 of FIRREA have no such powers, we conclude that they are not inferior officers.
Privilege and Brady/Jencks claims
During pre-trial discovery the FDIC asserted claims of deliberative process, law enforcement, and attorney-client privilege in various permutations to justify withholding 97 documents. As required by the FDIC’s rules, see 12 CFR § 308.25(e), FDIC enforcement counsel produced a privilege log which briefly described each document and indicated its date, author, and recipient and the privileges claimed. In addition, enforcement counsel produced the affidavit of Cottrell L. Webster, the Memphis regional director of the FDIC’s division of supervision, claiming to have personally reviewed each of the withheld documents, formally invoking the law enforcement and deliberative process privileges, and explaining how each privilege applied.
The ALJ rejected an initial effort to compel production of the documents, and the FDIC denied interlocutory review. It specifically rejected Landry’s claim that there were documents that Brady v. Maryland,
After reviewing the newly submitted documents, the Board found most of them not to be privileged but did not order disclosure because it found the error harmless in light of the cumulative nature of the information withheld. See Order at 5-6, 51-52, J.A. at 223-24, 268-69. The
Privilege. We begin with Landry’s challenges to the FDIC’s claims of privilege. His most substantial argument is that the deliberative process and law enforcement privileges were not properly invoked. Assertion of either of these qualified, common law executive privileges requires: (1) a formal claim of privilege by the “head of the department” having control over the requested information; (2) assertion of the privilege based on actual personal consideration by that official; and (3) a detailed specification of the information for which the privilege is claimed, with an explanation why it properly falls within the scope of the privilege. See In re Sealed Case,
The argument mistakenly assumes that only assertion by the head of the overall department or agency is enough. Our cases hold to the contrary. In Tuite v. Henry,
For these privileges, it would be counterproductive to read “head of the department” in the narrowest possible way. The procedural requirements are designed to “ensure that the privilege^ are] presented in a deliberate, considered, and reasonably specific manner.” In re Sealed Case,
Under our cases, the head of the appropriate regional division of the FDIC’s supervisory personnel is of sufficient rank to achieve the necessary deliberateness in assertion of the deliberative process and law enforcement privileges.
We note that decisions involving the more sensitive and absolute privilege for state and military secrets have been more insistent on assertion at the highest level. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds,
Landry’s claim that the FDIC fell fatally short by not including the disputed documents in the record is meritless. See Vaughn v. Rosen,
Landry also argues that the FDIC waived its privileges by initiating this action. He is mistaken. Here he relies on an erroneous reading of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the OCC,
Brady/Jencks. In its order the FDIC Board assumed without deciding that Brady v. Maryland,
We begin with Brady. After Landry requested that the FDIC produce all Brady materials, the government informed the ALJ and the FDIC Board that it had reviewed the contested documents and had disclosed all exculpatory factual material. Normally we accept the government’s representations as to whether documents in its possession constitute Brady material. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
Landry’s Jencks claims have more merit. He argues that the withheld reports by Jerry Cox and G. Martin Cooper, the bank examiners who testified at his hearing, touch upon the events and activities discussed in their testimony and therefore must be produced. See Jencks,
The FDIC does, however, claim harmless error, and the claim is sound. Because these documents merely duplicate other evidence in the record, we find the error harmless even under the strict application of harmless error used to assess Jencks violations. See Norinsberg Corp.,
Evidence Satisfying the Statutory Standard
The statute authorizes a prohibition or removal order:
Whenever the [FDIC] determines that-—
(A) any institution-affiliated party has, directly or indirectly-—-
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(ii) engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any insured depository institution or business institution; or
(iii) committed or engaged in any act, omission, or practice which constitutes a breach of, such party’s fiduciary duty; (B) by reason of the violation, practice, or breach described in ... subpara-graph (A)—
(i) such ... institution ... has suffered or will probably suffer financial loss or other damage;
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(iii) such party has received financial gain or other benefit by reason of such violation ...; and
(C) such violation, practice, or breach—
*1138 (i) involves personal dishonesty on the part of such party; or
(ii) demonstrates willful or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or soundness of such ... institution....
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1994). That is, the statute requires: misconduct, with certain adverse effects, committed with a culpable state of mind. Landry argues that each of these three factors is absent.
Misconduct. The Board ruled that Landry’s actions constituted both unsafe and unsound banking practices under § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) and breaches of his fiduciary duty under § 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii). Because there is significant overlap between the two categories, see Kaplan v. OTS,
In Kaplan we suggested that an “unsafe or unsound practice” was one that posed a “reasonably foreseeable” “undue risk to the institution.”
The acts attributable to Landry meet both parts of the test. The ALJ’s and the Board’s findings leave no doubt as to their imprudence. After a thorough review of the transactions we summarized above, the Board correctly concluded: “The list of misguided and aborted projects and relationships that management entered into with minimal information and virtually no expertise is shocking.” That these activities exposed the Bank to abnormal risk is also unassailable. Conduct attributable to Landry included substantial involvement in at least one large loan to an uncreditwor-thy out-of-territory borrower, long-term contracts with consultants whose fees were “proportionately greater than the services rendered,” and the use of Bank funds for travel and related expenses in pursuit of breathtakingly irresponsible schemes. In the Bank’s weakened condition, these expenditures created an undue and abnormal risk of insolvency. As the FDIC Board found:
[R]ather than preserve the Bank’s few remaining assets, Landry chose to dissipate them in furtherance of his personal takeover of the Bank.
... [Landry] failed to disclose that Bank funds were being spent in furtherance of Pangaea and IAIS [a partnership intended to be used for the immigration law scheme]. He failed to disclose the contracts and certain uncre-ditworthy loans to which he or Jenson had committed the Bank, or the fee-splitting arrangements, which benefited him and Pangaea to the Bank’s detriment.
Order at 26, J.A. at 243.
Landry argues that the continuing profitability of the Bank during the relevant period forecloses a finding of undue risk, but in so arguing he misconstrues the concept of risk, which is independent of the outcome in a particular case. Just as a loss, without more, does not prove that an act posed an abnormal risk, see Johnson v. OTS,
Landry also argues that his expenses cannot be considered losses because they were approved by the appropriate Bank officers and the Bank’s shareholders. But these approvals were tainted, even assuming they could otherwise salvage the expenses. Landry’s own letters show that he understood that his expenses and those of his co-incorporators were incurred on behalf of Pangaea to the detriment of the Bank, without the shareholders’ having understood the fact.
Culpability, . The Board found that Landry’s misconduct doubly satisfied the culpability prong because it involved both personal dishonesty, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C)(i), and willful or continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the Bank, see id. § 1818(e)(l)(C)(ii). The courts of appeals that have examined the question are in agreement that both standards of culpability require some showing of scienter. See Kim v. OTS,
Landry offers two arguments against this finding. First, he claims that a requirement that a bank control transaction must secure approval by the bank’s directors, and by regulators “provide[s] the ultimate assurance of fairness that precludes a sanction against Landry,” citing Kaplan,
Landry also argues that the FDIC reached its decision without taking account of exculpatory evidence. It is well established that the substantial evidence rule requires consideration of the evidence on both sides; evidence that is substantial viewed in isolation may become insubstantial when contradictory evidence is taken into account. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
Last, Landry says that the Board failed to provide adequate record citations for its factual findings. Indeed, Landry is correct that several critical findings lack record citation. Such omissions might render an agency’s reasoning incomprehensible, possibly requiring a remand. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
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For the foregoing reasons, Landry’s petition for review is
Denied.
Notes
. In the same proceedings, FDIC enforcement counsel also sought, and ultimately received, a prohibition order against Alton B. Lewis, a member of the Bank’s Board of Directors who also did some legal work for the bank. Lewis's petition for review is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Lewis v. FDIC, No. 99-60412 (5th Cir. filed June 18, 1999).
. In its Order, the Board seemed to agree with Landry that the ALJs were inferior officers but found this status irrelevant because the federal banking agencies are "departments” capable of accepting Congress's delegation of appointment power. The FDIC has abandoned its apparent concession and now argues that the ALJs are not inferior officers. Because we agree that the ALJs in question are not inferior officers we need not decide whether any of the federal banking agencies are in fact "departments” for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Moreover, because the issue before us does not depend on the FDIC’s interpretation of the statute or exercise of its discretion, there is no problem under SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I join the court’s opinion except for its disposition of Landry’s claim under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In my view, Freytag v. Commissioner,
Rather than paraphrase the critical portion of Freytag, I will quote it in full:
Petitioners argue that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r]” of the United States....
The Commissioner, in contrast to petitioners, argues that a special trial judge ... acts only as an aide to the Tax Court judge responsible for deciding the case. The special trial judge, as the Commissioner characterizes his work, does no more than assist the Tax Court judge in taking the evidence and preparing the proposed findings and opinion. Thus, the Commissioner concludes, special trial judges ... are employees rather than “Officers of the United States.”
*1141 “[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [Article II].” Buckley [v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1 , 126,96 S.Ct. 612 ,46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)]. The two courts that have addressed the issue have held that special trial judges are “inferior Officers.” The Tax Court so concluded in First Western Govt. Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner,94 T.C. 549 , 557-559,1990 WL 39357 (1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner,930 F.2d 975 , 985 (1991), agreed. Both courts considered the degree of authority exercised by the special trial judges to be so “significant” that it was inconsistent with the classifications of “lesser functionaries” or employees. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,282 U.S. 344 , 352-353,51 S.Ct. 153 ,75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (United States commissioners are inferior officers). We agree with the Tax Court and the Second Circuit that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r]” whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause.
The Commissioner reasons that special trial judges may be deemed employees in subsection (b)(4) cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision. But this argument ignores the significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess. The office of special trial judge is “established by Law,” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute. See Burnap v. United States,252 U.S. 512 , 516-517,40 S.Ct. 374 ,64 L.Ed. 692 (1920); United States v. Germaine,99 U.S. 508 , 511-512,25 L.Ed. 482 (1879). These characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute. Furthermore, special trial judges perform more than ministerial tasks. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.
Even if the duties of special trial judges [just described] were not as significant as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged [because they may be assigned to conduct other types of proceedings and render independent judgments] .... Special trial judges are not ■inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties ... but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.
There are no relevant differences between the ALJ in this case and the special trial judge in Freytag. Both held offices “established by Law,” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
The majority attempts to distinguish Freytag on two grounds. Neither survives close attention. First, the majority says that the Tax Court, in reviewing the special trial judge’s “non-final decision” in Freytag, gave deference to factual and credibility findings pursuant to Tax Court Rule 183(c), whereas the FDIC reviewed the ALJ’s decision de novo. Maj. op. at 1133. It would be odd for the constitution
According to the majority opinion, the second difference between this case and Freytag is that here the ALJ can never render final decisions of the FDIC, whereas special trial judges could, in cases other than the sort involved in Freytag, render a final decision of the Tax Court. See maj. op. at 1133, 1134. It is true that the Supreme Court relied on this consideration; the last paragraph of the opinion quoted above indicates as much. What the majority neglects to mention is that the Court clearly designated this as an alternative holding. The Court introduced its alternative holding thus: “Even if the duties of special trial judges [just described] were not as significant as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged.”
Because the ALJ in this case was an “inferior Officer,” the next question would ordinarily be whether he was duly appointed by the President, a Court of Law, or the Head of a Department, as Article II requires. The FDIC assumed that the ALJ was an inferior officer and ruled that he was properly appointed, having been hired by the Office of Thrift Supervision and assigned to this case by the Office of Financial Institution Adjudication. See In re Landry, FDIC-95-65e,
The remaining question then is what relief is appropriate. Given the FDIC’s de novo review and the majority’s thorough rejection of Landry’s various claims of error,
. There was doubt, despite this court's decision in Stone v. Commissioner,
. The Second Circuit reached this conclusion for the same reasons given in the third full paragraph of Freytag quoted in the text:
The special trial judges are more than mere aids to the judges of the Tax Court. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. Contrary to the contentions of the Commissioner, the degree of authority exercised by special trial judges is "significant.” See Buckley [v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1 , 126,96 S.Ct. 612 ,46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)]. They exercise a great deal of discretion and perform important functions, characteristics that we find to be inconsistent with the classifications of "lesser functionary” or mere employee. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,282 U.S. 344 , 352,51 S.Ct. 153 ,75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (United States commissioners are inferior officers).
. De novo review does not mean that the ALJ’s recommended decisions are without influence. In this case the FDIC "affirm[ed] the recommendation of the ALJ and adopt[ed] his Recommended Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as discussed herein.” In re Landry, FDIC-95-65e,
. On some points, the FDIC supplied different rationales to reach the same conclusions as the ALJ and on other matters the FDIC reached different conclusions. See, e.g., In re Landry,
