60 Kan. 436 | Kan. | 1899
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action brought by Isaac Landrum against Felix Flannigan to recover damages on account of injuries to him in his person, property, and means of support, in consequence of his wife, Barbara, falling into a condition of habitual intoxL cation upon liquors sold to her by the defendant. The action was founded upon section 41, chapter 101, General Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1889, ¶ 2535), which reads as follows :
“Every wife, child, parent, guardian or employer, or other person, who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication, habitual or. otherwise, of any person, such wife, child, parent or guardian shall have a right of action in his or her own name against any person who shall by selling, barter-* ing or giving intoxicating liquors have caused the in-¿ toxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as for exemplary damages; and, a married woman shall have the right to bring suit, prosecute and control the same, and the amount re: covered, the. same as if unmarried; and all damagés recovered by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such minor or to his or her parents, guardian or next-friend, as the court shall direct; and all suits for damages under this act shall be by civil action in any of the courts of this state having jurisdiction thereof.” ' ' ’
The question presented to us for determination is, Does the statute, rightly interpreted, confer a right of action upon all of the classes first enumerated, as it at first apparently undertakes to do, or is the right of action limited to the lesser number of classes last mentioned ? The question is not difficult. The first and most important aid to the ascertainment of legislative intent is, of course, the words employed. When these are plain of meaning the statute needs no interpretation. It interprets itself. If the words be of doubtful meaning ; if they be inartistically arranged ; if the syntax be violative of the rules of composition ; if ellipsis, tautology or redundancy occur, the statute must be examined in other lights than those'afforded by the mere words employed, and chief among these lights are those afforded by the evident purpose and intent of the legislature and the entire context of the statute.
Another important rule is that all parts of the act must, if possible, be given a meaning and be allowed to stand. In this case either the right of action is
The plaintiff in error contends that in the interpretation of the statute the last enumeration of classes of persons should be eliminated, because wholly tautological and adding nothing to the meaning of the section. To do so would, of course, correct the composition to accord with rhetorical rules, but it would not make the legal sense of the act any clearer. The interpretation of a statute by the elimination of some of its words maybe sometimes allowable (Endlich,
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.