Alan LANDMARK, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, v. MADER AGENCY, INC., Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant.
No. 20403.
Supreme Court of Idaho
June 29, 1994
Rehearing Denied Aug. 24, 1994.
878 P.2d 773
MCDEVITT, Chief Justice.
Moscow, April 1994 Term.
TROUT, J., concurs in opinion except joins in JOHNSON, J.‘s dissent as to Part II.
Brown & Litteneker, Edwin L. Litteneker, Lewiston, and Clements, Brown & McNichols, Lewiston, for appellant.
Dennis L. Albers, Grangeville, for respondent.
MCDEVITT, Chief Justice.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Alan Landmark (Landmark) was an insurance salesman employed by Mader Agency,
After the employment relationship terminated, Landmark filed a complaint in district court alleging that Madеr owed him payment for renewal commissions, reimbursement for medical insurance paid for Mader‘s secretary and office expenses paid through the oral agreement, and contingency commissiоns paid by the insurance companies as a result of “good loss experience.” Mader asserted, as both a defense and counterclaim, that Landmark had not paid the entire amount due under the оral agreement. Landmark and Mader then agreed to submit the matter to binding arbitration, and the district court dismissed the case.
Following a hearing, the arbitrator issued an award granting Landmark‘s claim for renewal commissions and denying all other claims and defenses asserted by Landmark and Mader. Discussing Landmark‘s claim for renewal commissions, the arbitrator noted in his written award:
In Count 1 the evidence is clear that plaintiff was entitled to rеceive renewal commissions for one year following the termination of their business relationship. The evidence shows that renewal payment [sic] were paid until March 1989. Plaintiff gave notice of his intention tо terminate the relationship in May 1988 “as soon as possible“. The parties continued their business relationship through July 1988 and the termination was completed on July 31. Plaintiff is entitled to receive renewal commissions until August 1, 1989 but received them only through March 31, 1989, a period of 4 months.
Plaintiff shall receive the sum of $1,760.30 for April, 1989 renewals; the sum of $1,420.64 for May; the sum of $1358.94 for June and the sum of $1,465.00 for July.
Stating that “[b]oth parties seek pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10 percent on all sums found due and owing[,]” the arbitrator also ordered interest on the above sums commencing thirty days after the amounts became payable.
Mader filed a motion in district court to confirm the arbitrator‘s award and offer of judgment on August 7, 1992. On August 9, 1992, Landmark filed a motion to reopen the case for purposes of modifying and correcting the award and for purposes of confirming the award after correction. Landmark argued that the arbitrator incorrectly concluded that Landmark received payments until March 1989 and that the interest rate agreed to by the parties was twelve, rather than ten, perсent. The district court concluded that it was unsure whether the award contained a miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake, and remanded the award to the arbitrator to clarify or modify the award. Madеr objected, stating that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order under
Following remand, the arbitrator issued a substituted decision dated October 1, 1992. The substituted award was essentially unchanged as to counts two аnd three. Count one was modified to include renewal commissions and interest for the entire period from August 1988 through July 1989. The total amount due to Landmark increased from $6,004.96 awarded under the original decision to an award of $23,066.11 under the substituted decision. Part of the substituted award was based on an increase in the interest rate from ten to twelve percent.
Landmark filed a motion to confirm the award based on the substituted decision, аnd Mader filed a motion to vacate the substituted decision and confirm the original award. The court determined that “there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of аny person, thing or property referred to in the award; and that the award was imperfect in a matter of form.” The court then issued an order confirming the substituted decision and judgment. Mader contends on appеal that
II
ANALYSIS
A district court‘s review of an arbitrator‘s award is limited to an examination of the award to determine whether any of the grounds for relief provided by the UAA are present. Bingham County Comm‘n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 42, 665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983). When a party applies for confirmation of an arbitration awаrd, the UAA directs that the district court shall confirm the award “unless grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in sections 7-912 and 7-913, Idaho Cоde.”
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the desсription of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
. . . .
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.
When electing to remand the award for clarification, the district court stated that it was unable to determine whether there was an evident miscalculation of figures or if the award was imperfect as a matter of form. However, the record discloses nothing in the original award that indicated either an evident miscalculation or misdescription, nor was the award imperfect as to form.
The original award contained no evident miscalculation or misdescriрtion as required by
The district court was unaware of any potential inaccuracy in the award until after it considered affidavits disputing the arbitrator‘s factual findings. The UAA does not provide for such review, and this Court has essentially foreclosed judicial review of the merits of an arbitrator‘s award. In Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 617 P.2d 861, (1980), this Court adopted the holding of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that:
The courts are precluded from considering factual or legal issues which are by vоluntary agreement made the subject of arbitration. Judicial intrusion is restricted to the extraordinary situations indicating abuse of arbitral power or exercise of power beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitratоr.
101 Idaho at 562, 617 P.2d at 866 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local 8-766, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int‘l, 600 F.2d 322, 326 (1st Cir. 1979)). The factual errors underlying the district court‘s order remanding the award do not constitute a basis for modification of an award under
III
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellant, no attorney fees are awarded on appeal.
JOHNSON and TROUT, JJ., concur.
BISTLINE, Justice, with whom SILAK, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The Court‘s opinion states that “[a]lthough
If that additional language is not read tо provide a basis apart from the modification or correction of
Notes
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, or corruption in any of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 7-905, Idaho Code, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 7-902, Idaho Code, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.