167 Ky. 128 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1915
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
This was a suit in the Bourbon Circuit Court brought by the appellees, McCreary & Co., a partnership, at Knoxville, Tennessee, against the appellant, E. E. Landis, in which the appellees sought to recover of the appellant the sum of $4,629.53, the alleged value of twenty-one mules and other items composing the outfit of a contractor for building roads, and the value of the use of the outfit from December 9th, 1911, until June 15th, 1912. The appellees claimed, in their petition in equity, that the outfit had been put into the possession of the appellant under an agreement that he was to take it to Granger county, Tennessee, from Jefferson county, in the same state, where the parties then were; and as soon as the appellant could get the outfit to work upon a contract, which he had in the first named place, he would come to Knoxville and there’ purchase the outfit and secure the payment of its price to be then agreed upon, or else the parties would agree upon and enter into a contract by which appellant would pay to appellees a fair price for the use of the outfit while in his use and possession, and that appellant did neither of these thing’s, but in June of the following year converted the outfit to his own use, and moved same out of the state of Tennessee into Kentucky, without the knowledge or consent of the appellees.
A large amount of evidence was taken, which was exceedingly contradictory and conflicting upon all the material issues in the case. The chief element of the account, which appellant claimed that appellees owed to him, was the salary which appellees owed him for his services as their superintendent for two years and three months of time, previous to December 11th, 1911. Appellant claimed that they had agreed to pay him the sum of $150.00 per month, while the appellees claim that it was only $75.00 per month which he was to be paid, the difference between their contentions, as to the amount of the salary, being $2,025. The appellees claimed that at the time the contractor’s outfit was turned over to appellant to be taken to Granger county, that it was worth the sum of $3,954.78, while appellant claimed that at that time he bought it for $2,923.65. The case being submitted for trial and judgment upon the pleadings and proof, the chancellor held that there never had been a contract between appellant and appellees as- to the amount of his salary, but that he was entitled to such salary as his services were reasonably worth, which the court fixed at the sum of $100 per month. This had the effect of reducing the account of- appellant against the appellees in the sum of $1,366.66. It was, further, held that no sale had been made of the outfit by appellees to appellant, but that at the time he took it to
It is not claimed that the circuit court, in the disposition of the case, failed to apply the correct legal principles to the facts of the case, as the court found them to be. While the parties upon each side have exhaustively briefed the case as to the facts which the evidence tends to establish, no principle of law nor adjudication of any court is cited or appealed to. The grounds, for reversal which are relied upon are, that the court erred in its judgment as to the facts of the case, and erroneously found as a matter of fact, (1) that the sal-, ary to which appellant was entitled was $100 per month, j instead of $150 per month, as claimed by him; and (2) that there was no sale of the outfit by the appellees to appellant at any price, and its value was $3,136.03, in-; stead of a sale, at the price of $2,923.65. The findings of the court below, as to these two matters of contro-1 versy, were the determination of pure questions of fact,. to be arrived at from weighing the testimony. There: in no uncertainty as to the chancellor’s conclusions in. regard to the issues made upon these two matters. The - judgment expressly deals with them, and sets out the' chancellor’s finding with regard to them. As to the first
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.