286 F. 5 | 3rd Cir. | 1923
This case in different aspects has been before this court several times. It was brought in the District Court by Arthur H. Ingle, as assignee of the Carey patent, No. 1,244,449, for boring machines, charging the Landis Tool Company and the Gurney Electric Elevator Company with infringement of all its claims. The defendants in their answer did not deny the validity of the patent; indeed, they admitted its validity in a counterclaim in which the Landis Tool Company asserted ownership of the patent, charged the complainant with infringement, asked for an injunction restraining the complainant from infringing, and prayed that
Between the filing of the opinion of this court indicating a reversal of the first decree, of the District Court and the entry of the second or interlocutory decree, the defendants, by a series of application’s in both the District Court and this court, endeavored to procure an opening of the case and^obtain a rehearing on an amended answer questioning for the first time the validity of the patent. In ■none of these moves have they prevailed because this court was, and still is, of opinion that the Landis Tool Company, not through mistake but deliberately and with obvious purpose, chose to stand on its claim of title. It did not attack the validity of the patent dor, claiming the patent as its own and making a countercharge of infringement, it wanted its validity sustained. This is evidenced by its prayers for injunctive relief against the complainant and for assignment of the patent. Having gone to trial on an issue of its own selection, obtained a decree in its favor in the District Court and defended that decree on appeal, it cannot now, after reversal, open the case which has been finally closed, plead a new defense clearly available at the beginning— and for several years after — and try the case again. New Equity Rules, rule 30 (201 Led. v, 118 C. C. A. v).
Therefore we affirm the decree of the District Court — with a possible modification of one part.
It appears that at the time qf the entry of the interlocutory decree directing an accounting and awarding a perpetual injunction against the defendants they had a large amount of money invested in boring machines constructed mainly under other patents but containing nevertheless the invention of the patent in suit. These machines were, and are, in various stages of completion. Their "construction, use or sale” is now enjoined, and, in consequence, they stand idle in the plant of the defendants awaiting the outcome of this appeal. As our decision is adverse to the defendants, what is the practical situation if the injunction of the interlocutory decree should remain in force ? Obviously the defendants will not be allowed to finish, use or sell any of the machines. Except for their scrap value, they will lose all the money they have invested in them. How will this benefit the complainant? He; in turn, will lose any profits and gains which otherwise would come to him from their infringing use or sale and he will not have sustained very material damage if they are scrapped instead of used or sold. Not overlooking the complainant’s
In this situation the question has occurred to us whether in the interest of all parties we should direct that the writ of perpetual injunction be stayed until final decree. Such procedure is not novel in this circuit. It is invoked, however, only in exceptional cases, such as justify a course quite out of the ordinary. Of such cases a striking illustration is Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co. (C. C.) 189 Fed. 711, where one party held a product patent and the other a process patent and where the patented product could only be made by the patented process and the process was mainly valuable in making the product. In that case — the suit being by the owner of the process patent against the owner of the product patent — infringement was found and the decree was for an injunction and an accounting but the injunction was suspended until the further order of the court upon the filing of a bond by the defendant infringer to secure to the complainant the profits and damages which it might ultimately be decreed to pay. The authorities, however, are not in harmony on this procedure. Those sustaining it as well as those opposing it may be found cited and discussed in Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co. (D. C.) 189 Fed. 710; Consolidated Roller-Mill Co. v. Coombs (C. C.) 39 Fed. 803; Ballard v. Pittsburgh (C. C.) 12 Fed. 783; McCrary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co. (C. C.) 5 Fed. 367; Brown v. Deere-Mansur & Co. (C. C.) 6 Fed. 487; Dorsey Harvester Revolving Rake Co. v. Marsh, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 387, Fed. Cas. No. 4,014. The only intimation by the Supreme Court that we can find is in Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650, 12 L. Ed. 857. This inclines to the practice.
Clearly we think this is a case for the application of this procedure. Should the injunction remain in force the defendants, who though infringers were not wanton infringers, will sustain a substantial loss, indeed, an irreparable loss; yet if the injunction be suspended it is a loss that can be avoided and without injury to the complainant. Therefore in the exercise of our discretion, Rumford Chemical Works v. Hecker, Fed. Cas. No. 12,134; Consolidated Roller-Mill Co. v. Coombs (C. C.) 39 Fed. 803, and with careful regard to the comparative injuries that will result to the parties by presently enforcing or suspending the injunction, we shall do this: Unless within fifty days after the filing of this* opinion the parties, or any of them, shall
In the event of the failure of the defendants to give bond conditioned for suspending the injunction as aforementioned, the perpetual injunction now ordered shall stand and the decree of the District Court shall be in all respects affirmed.