Opinion by
Edgar Landerman, Patricia K. DeRoy and Julia R. Zagorac, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a complaint in equity seeking a mandatory injunction against the Churchill Area School District and various persons, in their individual capacities and as School Directors of the Churchill Area School District, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
The complaint alleges that plaintiffs pay schоol taxes to the Churchill Area School District where their minor children attend school. Following further identification of all the parties, the complaint alleges: “In March of 1963, the said School Board voted to discontinue, in certain arbitrarily seleсted sectors of the said School District transportation to the students of said *532 School District who resided less than one and оne-half miles from the various elementary and Jr. high schools and two miles from the high school within the said School District.” There follows а description of the various highways, characterizing them as hazardous for children to walk upon, particularly in inclement wеather, and as a threat to the safety of the students.
The complaint avers that the Engineer of Churchill Borough, a municipality within thе School District, made a report relative to the “dangers and hazards which would result from the reckless decision of the Sсhool Board.” The report is attached to the complaint. It is alleged further that the Commissioners of Wilkins Township, also a muniсipality within the School District, by letter, warned the School Board of the safety hazards which would result because of its action, and requested reconsideration and review of the issue.
Plaintiffs urge in their complaint that the board has never given any reason for its decision and that it is guilty of “fuzzy horse and buggy thinking.” They seek the aid of a court of equity because the board applied nоt its discretion “but arbitrary will and caprice . . .” and because “the School Directors did not perform their duties intelligently in that they fаiled to fully familiarize themselves with the risks involved to the children; the said Directors accordingly failed to act in good faith and with thаt diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in their personal business.”
The cоmplaint pleads lack of an adequate remedy at law and contends that the action of the Board violates Article X, §1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires, in part, that the General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of an efficient school system. Finally, the complaint pleads *533 that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously discontinued the transportation to the children contrary to the authоrity given to it by the Public School Code of 1949, March 10, P. L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§1-102-27-2702.
The relief sought is an injunction commanding the restoration of the sеrvice which ivas discontinued.
Both the School District and the individual defendants, for themselves and as school directors, filed prеliminary objections which contain a demurrer, an allegation of lack of capacity and standing in the plaintiffs to sue, and a motion to strike the complaint because of scandalous and impertinent matter, irrelevancies, self-serving declarations and conclusions of law. The motion to strike also contains an allegation that the complaint pleads evidence and is lacking in sufficient facts to support the conclusions of law.
The individual defendants, for themselves and as school directors, by their preliminary .objections, raise additional questions. They urge that the complaint fails to state any cause of action against them in their individual capacities. They contend that the complaint fails to allege any рecuniary loss to plaintiffs or that the School District has committed any waste. They raise the further issue that the complaint seeks future relief against certain school directors whose terms would soon expire.
Plaintiffs filed answers to the preliminary оbjections, but they are not material to the disposition of this case.
The court below sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. This appeal by Edgar Landerman, alone, followed.
We need not pass upon all the points raised by the preliminary objections. It is obvious to this Court, as it was to the court below, that the complaint fails to allege any basis for equitable relief.
*534 The Public School Code of 1949, March 10, P.. L. 30, §1361, 24 P.S. §13-1361, provides: “The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds' of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the public schools and to and from any points in the Commonwealth in order to provide tours for any purpose connected with the educational pursuits of the pupils. They shall provide such transportation whenever so required by any of the provisions of this áct or of any other act of Assembly.”
In order for a court of equity to grant relief, it must clearly be shown that the school board acted outside the scope of its statutory authority or not in good faith. “It is only where the board transcends the limits of its legal discretiоn that it is amenable to the injunctive processes of a court of equity: Detweiler v. Hatfield Borough School District,
The burden оf showing such a clear abuse of discretion is a heavy one.
Regan v. Stoddard,
In the absence of sufficient allegations of fact to support the conclusion that defendаnts arbitrarily abused their discretion or otherwise acted contrary to law, the lower court properly sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint.
Decree affirmed. Each party to bear own costs.