17 Mo. 204 | Mo. | 1852
delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was instituted to recover of the defendant the value of a ferry boat charged to have been lost by the negli-
Defendant offered evidence tending to show that, though Alfred Cutting was agent for said defendant, and was foreman and superintendent of the docks of said defendant when the contract was made with plaintiff for the repair of bis boat, be ceased to be such foreman and superintendent on Saturday, the 13th of July, being the Saturday night previous to Monday morning when said boat was brought to St. Louis. The evidence of defendant further tended to prove that said Cutting continued in the employment of- said defendant, from the time said contract was entered into till some weeks after the plaintiff’s boat was lost, though the actual superintendent of the dock, after July 15th, was Luther Perkins. In regard to all the material points in the case, the testimony of the plaintiff was in direct conflict with the testimony of the defendant. Two verdicts have been rendered for the plaintiff. On motion of plaintiff, the court instructed the jury as follows :
If the jury believe from the evidence, that Alfred Cutting was the authorized agent of the defendant to take control of boats brought to the place of business of the defendant to be repaired, and that, as such agent, said Cutting took charge of said ferry boat of plaintiff, and that, through the inattention or carelessness of said Cutting, said boat was lost, they will find for the plaintiff.
The fact that Cutting told plaintiff not to bring his boat to St. Louis until such time as he {Cutting) should direct, will not prejudice the plaintiff’s right to recover, if the jury believe from the evidence that, when the boat was in fact brought to St. Louis, it was taken possession of by said Cutting, as
On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury as follows :
The jury are instructed that, if they believe from the evidence that the boat of the plaintiff was not in charge of the defendant, at the time she sunk, then the defendant is not liable for her loss.
If the jury believe from the evidence, that Gilky brought the boat of plaintiff to St. Louis before he was notified to do so by Cutting ; that Cutting, on Gilky’s telling him of the arrival of the boat at St. Louis, told Gilky that the docks were full, which statement was correct; that Gilky then left the city, leaving the boat in charge of the boy of whom the witnesses have spoken, without any agreement on the part of defendant to take charge of said boat until there was a place for her on the docks, and that before there was a place for her on the docks, the boat was lost by the carelessness of Gilky and the boy left in charge of her, without any participation therein by defendant, then the plaintiff cannot recover.
The court refused the following instructions, asked by the defendant :
No liability of defendant can be made to accrue in consequence of any failure of Cutting, as an individual, and not as agent of defendant, to save the vessel of the plaintiff; such neglect, if it occurred without any antecedent promise, cannot be the foundation of any legal liability against the defendant; if Cutting was not the foreman or superintendent of the defendant on the 15th of July, 1850, nor especially authorized to take charge of boats generally, nor of this boat in particular, on account of defendant, then defendant is not liable for his acts.
That if the jury believe the evidence of Simmons, Cutting or Perkins, relative to the time and circumstances when the change of superintendent of the docks took place, then Cutting had no authority to bind defendant on the 15th July, 1850.
If the jury believe from the evidence, that Cutting was superintendent or foreman for defendant when the contract was made with plaintiff for the docking and repairing of his boat, and that he made on the part of defendant said contract with plaintiff, then any agreement or acts of said Cutting, on the 15th of July, within the scope of the powers of said foreman or agent, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, would bind the defendant, unless the plaintiff or his agent acting for him at the time, was informed and knew that said Cutting had ceased to be foreman or superintendent for defendant.
If the plaintiff, or plaintiff’s agent, acting for him, on the 15th of July, knew that Cutting had ceased to be the foreman or superintendent of defendant, and had no authority to take possession of the boat, under the circumstances, then the defendant is not liable therefor.
If the custom or general duties of foreman or superintendent included the taking charge of boats under the circumstances proved, then the foreman or superintendent had authority so to do, so as to bind the defendant; otherwise not.
The defendant is not liable for any neglect of Cutting to save the boat, unless Cutting was, at the time, agent for defendant and the boat under charge of defendant.
Whether Cutting or Perkins was, on the 15th day of July, (the day the boat was brought down to the company for repairs,) the agent of the company, at the time the boat was received, cannot alone determine the rights of these parties. Cutting had been the agent; a correspondence or conversation about the repairing of the boat had taken place before -that
In looking into the instructions given by the court, we think that the whole transaction was properly laid before the minds of the jury; that the merits of the case were fairly, under the law, put before them ; that the instructions refused-could not have had a tendency to make the- case more plainly understood by them. In the conflict of evidence, the jury must determine, and we have no- disposition to interfere with them in matters so peculiarly within their province.
We consider the main point, the one about the character of Cutting on the 15th of July, and this we think a very plain one. Story on Agency, §470, speaking of the revocation of
Upon the whole ease, then, as it was submitted to the jury by the court below, in the opinion of this court there is no error, and the judgment must consequently be affirmed. The other Judges concurring, it is affirmed.