*1 MARTIN, Rydell Appellant, LaMonte Minnesota, Respondent.

STATE of A14-0084.

No.

Supreme Court Minnesota. 17, 2015.

June *2 Swanson, General, Attorney Saint

Lori MN; Freeman, Paul, Hen- and Michael O. County Attorney, Barry, Lee W. nepin Hennepin County Attorney, Min- Assistant ’ MN, neapolis, for respondent. *3 OPINION DIETZEN, Justice. Rydell

Appellant LaMonte Martin first-degree com- guilty found murder a gang for the and first- mitted benefit degree murder. district premeditated for judgment court entered conviction murder, premeditated and im- first-degree posed possi- a sentence of life without the (LWOR). release bility of conviction ap- were affirmed on sentence direct (Martin I), peal. v. Martin State (Minn.2009). N.W.2d 89 filed August among for relief postconviction alleging, things, other recantations two wit appeal, part, nesses. On we reversed in concluding that an Martin was entitled to evidentiary hearing on his recan witness claim, but tation affirmed denial of his (Martin other claims. Martin v. State II), N.W.2d 734 re case manded the to the evidentiary an court for on claim. witness recantation Subsequently, peti Martin filed second relief, tion alleging his life sentence is unconstitutional under Constitutions, Federal claiming he is entitled to retroactive — Alabama, application of Miller v. remand, On matters, court consolidated both conducted MN, McGlennen, and then Minneapolis, hearing, denied Michael from Martin’s witness recantation claim appellant. postconviction petition, first and denied that the shooters were black wearing men .postconviction petition. his second af-We hats.1 firm. trial, Following jury found Martin charged by Martin was criminal com- guilty of both offenses. At sentencing

plaint aiding first-degree and abetting with hearing, presented sup- evidence in murder, premeditated Minn.Stat. port argument that, of his age due to his 609.185(a)(1) (2014), committing capacity, and mental imposition of a for the benefit of a gang, crime MinmStat. LWOR sentence constituted cruel and/or (2014), out of arising unusual punishment under both the Feder- execution-style Christopher homicide of al and State Constitutions. The district Lynch May oc- The murder court disagreed, explaining 'that Martin six eigh- curred weeks before Martin’s *4 was less two away than months from his birthday. teenth Pursuant to Minn.Stat. eighteenth birthday when he committed 260B.007, 6(b); 260B.101, §§ subd. subd. 2 offense, the and therefore “age of 17 is (2014), Martin was automatically certified not a factor that punishment renders the jury as an adult and indicted grand prison of life in without parole unconstitu- charges. grand jury both The indict- also tional.” Martin was convicted of first-de- ed Cornelius Jackson and McDan- Jonard gree premeditated murder and the district murder in aiding iel for their role imposed court a LWOR sentence. and for committing Martin a crime for the gang. of a benefit appeal, On direct Martin asserted nine presented At trial the State evidence claims, including a claim that his LWOR Christopher Lynch innocent was an sentence constituted cruel and unusual victim and his murder was “collateral punishment juvenile because he was a at damage” on-going an between dispute I, the time of the crime. Martin gang, One-Nines, Martin’s the and a rival at N.W.2d 97.2 We affirmed con- gang. identity The shooters was sentence, viction among and concluding, highly Only contested issue at trial. two things, other the punishment of eyewitnesses, of the State’s Jermaine LWOR was not unconstitutional applied as Mack-Lyneh and his older brother Charles to Martin. Id. at 99. Pettis, provide were able to evidence direct August filed a Lynch. that Martin and Jackson shot Ten-year-old pursuant relief to Minn. shooting S.H. witnessed the 590.01, (2014). porch. from his back see the Stat. subd. 1 peti- He could not The faces, claims, two shooters’ but he observe tion alleged including did seven a claim description joined 1. A detailed more of the facts of Martin's case with his co-defendants’ I, trial; (5) case can be found this in Martin cases for the district court erred 95-97, II, at and N.W.2d prosecutor's perempto- when it the sustained at 737-38. (6) ry challenge prospective juror; of a the erred play district court when it refused to eight 2. Martin asserted claims on additional scene; (7) audio and video evidence of the the (1) appeal: the not suffi- direct evidence was allowing testify erred in district court Pettis to support cient to the conviction of crime com- testimony after he the wit- heard of another (2) gang; mitted for the benefit of a the State ness; prosecutor re- committed discovery committed it failed violation when during questioning versible witness error investigation; police to disclose the notes of a Martin, closing argument. See N.W.2d at trial counsel was ineffective when she 97-110. investigate “key” failed wit- State's nesses; (4) the when it district court erred laws; in the evidentiary should be modified entitled to an that Martin was The justice. opposed trial on the re- interests hearing a new based Mack-Lynch arguing and Pettis. petition, Martin’s second cantations of barred, court proeedurally concluded Martin’s claims were The time-barred, satisfy three-part test and moot. Martin failed States, articulated in Larrison United The court conducted Cir.1928), to estab- 24 F.2d September claim, and his witness recantation lish affi- court into received evidence to an eviden- therefore he was entitled recanting Mack-Lynch davits of Pettis tiary hearing under Minn.Stat. testimony. trial Martin subpoenaed their The court denied Martin’s appear testify, Pettis to but did not appeal, we reversed other claims. On Instead, attorney the hearing. at Pettis’s recan- summary witness denial of Martin’s and stated Pettis would invoke appeared claim, affirmed the denial of tation but the Fifth protections Amendment II, 825 claims. Martin Martin’s other and Article the United States Constitution that Martin 746. We concluded Constitution, I, Section of the Minnesota competent material evidence presented quash subpoena. and moved to true, that, satisfy the if to be could found granted quash the motion *5 trial. Larrison and warrant a new test subpoena did subpoena. Martin Therefore, we for an remanded witness, Mack-Lynch, call did not him as a evidentiary “to credibil- hearing assess the calling wit- any and rested without further witnesses, recanting to de- ity of and nesses. Martin satisfies the Lar- termine whether factors, rison and therefore is entitled that presented The State evidence 744.3 new trial.” Id. at Mack-Lynch’s Pettis’s in and recantations false were the their affidavits were and pe Subsequently, Martin filed a second ac- product Martin’s concerted criminal postconviction arguing tition for relief bribe, threaten, with and tivity others to (1) LWOR his sub sentence: violates Mack-Lynch coerce and to recant. Pettis rights under stantive constitutional Specifically, the State introduced Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu documents, charging guilty and sen- plea, tion, which unusual prohibits cruel and tencing tamper- orders in a related witness I, punishment, and Article 5 of the Section case, in ing guilty Martin pleaded which Constitution, prohibits Minnesota which bribery and was convicted of two counts of light cruel or in punishment, unusual regarding Mack- for his'conduct witnesses holding in United States Court’s — plea Lynch hearing and Pettis. At the Alabama, Miller case, (2) (2012); tampering the witness Martin admit- 183 L.Ed.2d 407 he, others, ted with the assistance of right violates his Amendment to a Sixth trial; (3) Mack-Lynch jury provided monetary payoffs violates Fourteenth equal Amendment their affida- right protection recanting and to obtain claim, Pettis, support Lynch In of his witness we did consider the recantation arid II, Martin in- also submitted affidavits of fellow Grostyan. affidavits Walker and investigator mate Jesse Walker and defense n. 5. affidavits of Grostyan. Michael we concluded Because longer in this those witnesses are no at issue that a was case. required Mack- based on the affidavits of (2) vits.4 time-barred under Minn.Stat. 4(a). The court also re- Moreover, the state introduced into evi- jected Equal Protection and Sixth Mack-Lynch’s testimony given dence Amendment jury trial claims. the case State v. Bobo. that testimo- ny, Mack-Lynch admitted his affida- in this appeal that vit for Martin in this case completely by: court erred allowing Mack-Lynch explained false. that Martin Pettis to invoke his Fifth priv- Amendment “gang and his friends” threatened Mack- ilege against self-incrimination without re- Lynch’s family in order to coerce Mack- quiring Pettis to testify at the evidentiary Lynch signing into the affidavit. Addition- hearing; concluding that the evidence ally, they Mack-Lynch later offered money was not support sufficient to Martin’s first talk investigator. to not to an The State postconviction relief; presented testimony also of other wit- concluding Martin’s sentence is constitu- nesses, including investigator with the tional he is not entitled to the Department of Corrections who testified retroactive benefit of Miller. that she had investigated potential witness

tampering involving members of the One- I. gang, Nines and had learned that Mack- review a Lynch and being pressured Pettis were court’s legal novo, determinations de recant their testimony Martin’s trial. findings its factual for clear error. Riley part As of the investigation, she recovered State, letters from Martin showing he was “It is for the trial court to decide whether bribe, threaten, implementing plan the witness’ claim of privilege [against Mack-Lynch coerce and Pettis to re- valid, making self-incrimination] and in cant trial testimony. their this decision the court has broad discre *6 Moose, The 521, court denied tion.” State v. 266 N.W.2d (Minn.1978). petition, first 525 concluding that Martin had We review a court’s de failed to prongs establish the three termination regarding validity the of a wit Larrison test for witness recantation ness’s claim of privilege for an abuse of Specifically, claims. Manley, the court found that discretion. State v. 664 N.W.2d (Minn.2003). 275, the Mack-Lynch 286 Pettis affidavits were threats, product coercion, the A.

bribes, and that purposely knowingly per filed false documents and Martin first argues Pettis’s invoca- legitimate verted the legal process use of privilege against tion of the self-incrimina- in his fraudulent attempt to obtain a new through attorney tion at the evidentia- trial. The court ry denied Martin’s second hearing was not valid. According to petition, concluding Martin, that Martin was not the by court erred entitled to the retroactive benefit of placing Mil under oath requir- ler, and therefore was: him ing privilege to assert to each procedurally barred question under State v. he was asked. Martin Knaff la, 246, (1976); 309 Minn. 243 N.W.2d 737 opportunity without the to hear Pettis individuals, misconduct, by 4. Martin was assisted nine in- all nine of Martin’s co-defen- Flax, Walker, cluding Hakeem Jesse Ramon- pleaded guilty dants and were convicted of mother, Bumpus, da Rondell and Martin’s various crimes. Heidi Mastín. As a result of the criminal 288 Generally, a “[privilege personal is court did not

testify, it and is waived belongs those to whom remand to assess to fulfill obligation on its by v. Bro asserted them.” Esser recanting witnesses! unless credibility of the 3, 194, 197, 212 Minn. 4 phey, Amendment of Unit The Fifth (1942). have, however, implicitly ap We 1, and Article Sec Constitution ed States privilege attorney’s claim of the proved de 7 of the Minnesota Constitution tion his absent self-incrimination for against compelled “be person clare that no shall (re Moose, 266 client. N.W.2d at ' against criminal case to be a witness any ineffective of counsel jecting assistance V; Minn. U.S. Const. Amend. himself.” decision counsel’s claim based defense Const, I, prevents § 7. privilege art. The to call a after the witness had witness to “answer being from forced an individual against self-incrimi privilege claimed ... put any him in questions official counsel); Man .through his see also nation criminal, in civil or formal or proceeding, (concluding that 664 N.W.2d at 286 ley, formal, incrimi might where answers its discretion trial court did not abuse future proceedings.” him in criminal nate declined, request it despite when 70, 77, 414 94 Turley, v. U.S. counsel, Lefkowitz question the witness defense (1973); 316, also see S.Ct. validly had whether the witness determine Fabian, 295, 299 v. Johnson self-incrimi privilege against invoked the counsel). through nation posteonviction conclude the The United States in con court did not abuse its discretion self- against held the privilege Court has invoked cluding validly that Pettis may a wit be claimed when incrimination self-incrimination, even privilege against apprehend cause” to ness has “reasonable being pres though did so without Pettis Reiner, it answering. from danger Ohio privilege against The self-incrimina ent. 21, 1252, 532 U.S. attor expressly Pettis’s tion raised (2001). privilege The extends L.Ed.2d testify. ney at the time Pettis was called a link in that “would furnish to answers require Pet- privilege The claim did not prosecute the chain of evidence needed the risk of self- presence tis’s because for a ... the claimant crime.” Hoffman only pur incrimination was obvious. States, United testimony at the eviden- pose for Pettis’s inquiry 95 L.Ed. *7 conflicting tiary hearing was to discuss his court; the assertion of for the witness’s at trial in affidavit. In statements .the by establish privilege the does not itself fact, presented evidence that the State To sustain the risk of incrimination. Id. bribes, affidavit of product Pettis’s was the it evident from privilege, only the need be threats, Consequently, and coercion. the setting and the implications the the required Pettis take court was to have responsive to “that a questions be asked to assert privilege. the stand the an question explanation answer to the or might cannot be be dan why it answered B. injurious disclosure could

gerous because differently, Alternatively, at Put to result.” Id. 487. by refusing the witness the hazard of the court erred

require prove to immunity request judicial privilege grant the claim of would eliminate the to for designed testify Pettis to at the evidentia- privilege compel that the to to protection ry hearing. at Martin contends the guarantee. Id. compelled request court should have to make a written to the court. Minn, testify Windschitl, to in assess the order to credibility of his recantation. Peirce, In we considered the general in Minne- whether immunity statute district erred in

sota, 609.09, (2014), § court in concluding that Minn.Stat. subd. the a request by absence of part: prosecutor, relevant the provides, it authority grant lacked to a defendant’s ... if any criminal it proceeding, request to grant immunity to two codefen- a person may be entitled to appears they dants so that could testify in his to a question refuse answer ... 364 N.W.2d at defense. 808. We affirmed person that the incrimi- ground may be the district court on the ground that the thereby, and if prosecuting nated “trial court ... authority lack[s] the attorney, writing, the ... requests power grant immunity” to even it is when proceed- of the court in judge which the alleged that the witness has ex- important pending person ing is to order that to culpatory evidence otherwise available ..., the question judge, answer after to the defendant. Id. at 809. We rea- hearing, notice the witness shall allowing soned that a defense to offer if judge to do so so order finds that immunity witness would “impermis- be an public not be in- contrary would to the prosecutorial into sible intrusion discretion likely expose and would not be terest which must remain with the executive witness to prosecution in another branch,” granting request such a or in state the federal courts. manipulation would be “vulnerable to statute, may to the Pursuant the court abuse codefendants and a others with grant request prosecut- the written in evading guilt.”5 common interest Id. attorney in ing a criminal proceeding We observed there was no claim prose- immunity grant in certain witness misconduct, cutorial such prosecutor as the set forth in statute to circumstances making testify. a witness unavailable to compelled testimony to allow overcome privilege against assertion self-in- Peirce, crimination. State v. It is unclear whether immu- Minnesota’s (Minn.1985); nity applies State see also ex statute to a Landkammer, 299 Minn. hearing. rel. Windschitl conclude that even if Minn. 190-91, 609.09, 1 applies, 498-99 Stat. the district (1974). Thereafter, in denying the district court must not err mo- did statutory clearly criteria determine tion. apply requires The statute immunity granted. request immunity whether should be See written witness come Consequent- prosecutor, Minn.Stat. subd. 1. from the which did not occur Moreover, ly, if the defense wishes to immuni- this there is no obtain case. evidence witness, ty it must that the caused Pettis to prosecutor ask the be unavail- *8 statute, (1984). approach passing immunity the United the 5. Our is consistent with In use Supreme interpretation “Congress gave Depart- certain States Court's officials in the statute, immunity §§ authority grant 6002- exclusive federal 18 U.S.C. ment of Justice to (2012). Pillsbury Conboy, 459 6003 The Court has de- immunities.” Co. v. 253-54, 608, 248, jurisdiction clined to extend the the courts U.S. 103 S.Ct. of grants judicial immunity interpreted of in the The Court has this to to include 430 required by "Congress as request of the formal mean that foresaw the courts absence 605, Doe, immunizing playing a minor only statute. United States v. role in the 465 616-17, 11, 1237, process.” at 254 608. L.Ed.2d 552 Id. n. 103 S.Ct. 79 290 that fact, reasonably the is certain the testify. the evidence is court to

able genuine. to is 559-60. in criminal conduct recantation engaged that Martin contradicting But a ear- testimony. merely statement Pettis recant coerce a a that testimony lier or conclusion wit- II. not suffi- generally ness unreliable is is State, that post- the 559-60; Martin next v. 710 Opsahl cient. Id. at concluding (Minn.2006). court in erred 776, conviction At a mini- 782 N.W.2d claim re recantation and his his witness “suffi- mum recantation must contain the lacked merit. for a new trial quest cient of indicia trustworthiness.” a postcon- the denial of review II, at 741. of relief for an abuse discretion.

viction presented the Based on evidence Specifically, at 167. we Riley, 819 N.W.2d evidentiary postconvic the hearing, at the con legal a court’s review tion failed es court concluded Martin State, v. de novo. Andersen 830 clusions testimony trial of tablish that the Mack- 1, But we 6 will not N.W.2d false, Lynch was and therefore and Pettis findings the factual unless reverse court’s satisfy prong the first of Martin failed clearly Riley, 819 they are erroneous. test. court found that Larrison N.W.2d .the Mack-Lynch by the executed affidavit To a new trial on the obtain was, admission, Mack-Lynch’s a by own newly the ground of discovered evidence of Further, complete the fabrication. testimony, of a trial recantation witness’s prod the found that Pettis’s affidavit was three-prong the test. apply Larrison we Martin, by uct of pressure relentless exert States, 24 v. F.2d 87- Larrison United cooperation prison fellow through ed the of State, Cir.1928); Doppler v. 771 88 associates, inmates, members, gang and (Minn.2009).6 867, 872 The crite N.W.2d other and therefore Pettis’s recan agents, is ria to determine whether defendant no tation and had indicia was credible entitled to new trial on witness recan testimony at reliability. of Martin’s are the rea tation claim that: court is tamper in guilty the witness plea testimony sonably well-satisfied testimony ing Mack-Lynch’s case false; was given by -a material witness provided v. Bobo matter addi State testimony jury might the false without Mack-Lynch support tional conclusion; reached a have different genuine, Pettis recantations were not cred petitioner surprise was taken ible, truthful, or reliable. testimony given false when the to it or court’s conclusion respond was unable did until after trial. failed establish first falsity know of (Minn. amply Turnage, prong sup- the Larrison test is N.W.2d of 2007). ported by The third of the test not a the record. The prong precedent granting hearing provided strong a new evidence wit- condition trial, tampering Mack-Lynch but is a the court should con ness factor conviction on making Ferg determination. resulted sider its (Minn. State, charges. coupled bbibery This evidence son u 2010). testimony Mack-Lynch in with The first criterion is satisfied when overruled, Although apply the Larrison test to claims witness Larrison has been see II, Mitrione, N.W.2d at 739 n. 357 F.3d recantation. Martin United States v. *9 Cir.2004), courts continue to Minnesota 6. State v. Bobo matter that recanting his time-bar for a new interpretation of feder- affidavit was false and was obtained as a al law that is “retroactively applicable to bribery amply sup- result of coercion and petitioner’s Specifically, case.” Martin — Miller, port postconviction court’s conclusion contends that holding of Mack-Lynch’s -, that Pettis’s recanta- U.S. at at applies Therefore, were disingenuous.7 tions Mar- retroactively to him. Alternatively, Mar- tin to satisfy prong faded the first argues tin that his claims should be re- n Larrison test, and it is not necessary to viewed in justice. the interests of Minn. Larrison criteria. 590.01, 4(b)(5). address the other § Stat. subd. postconviction court concluded that

III. justice interests of argument petition in his second lacked merit because it was not supported by any his LWOR Similarly, sentence is unconstitutional un- evidence. Martin makes showing'in der the no State constitutions. his materials to this Court Federal Specifically, Martin claim claims his should be LWOR reviewed (1) justice. sentence: Therefore, violates his substantive con- interests stitutional must Miller rights Eighth under the show that applies Amend- retroactive- ly ment to the U.S. Constitution to him to avoid prohibiting having petition be punishment 590.01, cruel and unusual § and Article time-barred under Minn.Stat. I, 4(a). Section 5 of the subd. Minnesota Constitution — Miller, at-,

in light of U.S. A. 2455; S.Ct. at violates his Sixth Miller, right by Amendment to trial jury; vio- In the United States Su lates his right Fourteenth Amendment preme Court considered whether impo equal laws; protection of the sition of a mandatory life sentence without jus- should be modified in the interests of the possibility of release for those under acknowledges tice. Martin age the two- of 18 at the time of their crimes year time bar for relief un- Eighth violated the prohibi Amendment’s 590.01, 4(a), der Minn.Stat. subd. ex- against tion cruel punish and unusual — 6, 2012, pired January at-, and that he did ment. 132 S.Ct. at 2460. not file his second July until The case involved the appeals consolidated n 2013, but Martin contends that his Miller 14-year-olds two convicted of homicide.8 claim timely Id. The Court concluded under Minn.Stat. “the Eighth 4(b)(3), which is an exception to the sentencing Amendment forbids a scheme II, 7. In Martin we stated that an 8. The two cases were Jackson v. Hobbs and required credibility to assess the Miller v. Alabama. The Jackson case was be Mack-Lynch’s and Pettis's fore the Court on a writ of certiorari from a testimony. Specifically we stated that "when decision of the Court that Arkansas light viewed in a tion, peti- most favorable to the peti affirmed the dismissal of state Jackson's Mack-Lynch and Pettis affidavits Miller,-U.S. corpus. tion for habeas - at present prima facie prong evidence of the first , Miller, 132 S.Ct. at II, of the Larrison test.” Martin granted Court certiorari to review a decision remand, 743. On Appeals the Alabama Court of Criminal evidentiary hearing, conducted the pro- which that affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence engaged duced evidence that Martin in a con- appeal. on direct Id. at 132 S.Ct. at tampering bribery certed effort of witness 2462-63. Mack-Lynch ultimately Pettis that re- bribery. sulted in Martin’s conviction of *10 292 But laws. right equal protection of the prison possi- in without to life

that mandates upon being ap- claims rest Miller juvenile bility parole for offenders.” of him, we retroactively proposition to plied at-, previ- at 2469. We have 132 S.Ct. rejected. therefore have previously not the Miller rule does ously held that as reject these claims well. juvenile retroactively to whose apply final before sentence became LWOR peti- that Martin’s second We conclude See Chambers rule announced. Miller was relief is time-barred tion for (Minn.2013); 311, State, 331 831 v. 4(a). 590.01, Be- under Minn.Stat. subd. State, 193, 200 845 N.W.2d Roman Nose v. retroactively apply cause does not Miller (Minn.2014). Martin, petition not fall to his second does exception in Minn.Stat. within we recon- should Martin contends 4(b)(3). Mar- Additionally, in Chambers and Ro- sider our decisions any argue support tin to to has failed basis of the federal district light man Nose in petition that his be re- his claim should Roy, v. No. decision, Flowers Civ. We, justice. in the interests viewed 1757898, (JNE/SER), 2014 WL therefore, court’s affirm the (D.Minn. 2014), 1, May *1 which held post- denial Martin’s second retroactively juvenile applies Miller conviction relief. aof sen- seeking collateral review LWOR Affirmed. Ap- Circuit Court of Eighth tence. however, has concluded that Miller peals, ANDERSON, (concurring). Justice on retroactively applicable to cases correctly majority concludes Symmes, v. 782 collateral review. Martin appli Martin is not entitled retroactive Cir.2015). 939, Because F.3d 943 — U.S.-, Alabama, cation of Miller v. a compelling has raised reason (2012), 2455, 132 183 L.Ed.2d 407 S.Ct. previous our decisions for us reconsider State, 311, under v. Chambers conclude, issue, as in this we we did State, (Minn.2013),and v. 331 Roman Nose Nose, Roman that Miller Chambers and But I 200 retroactively juvenile to a does not apply I write as did in Chambers separately, became final be- whose LWOR sentence Nose, to reiterate the need Roman rule announced.9 fore Miller of this issue the United resolution Court, that his Supreme failing also claims sentence action States forum, right Amendment in that additional attention from LWOR violates Sixth jury Fourteenth Amendment our court.1 to a trial and ,-U. S.—, (La.2014), granted 264 cert. Supreme has not 9. The United Court States 135 191 L.Ed.2d 635 yet question of Miller retroac- addressed Supreme tivity. We Court has that the note Although appeared Supreme it granted Montgomery v. Louisi- certiorari question in prepared to answer this Court was ana, questions whether: presents the which Toca, (La.2014), So.3d State v. 265 ju- Supreme has States Court United Louisiana, case dismissed. has been Toca risdiction decide whether the - -, 135 S.Ct. 191 L.Ed.2d U.S. correctly give Court of refused to Louisiana certiorari). (2015) (dismissing writ of case to decision retroactive effect in this question The Court now seeks resolve this Miller; adopts a new sub- and Miller Montgomery, case. See State v. another - retroactively applies (La.2014), stantive on col- rule that granted, cert. So.3d juveniles serving lateral LWOR sen- review to U.S. Montgomery, tences. See 141 So.3d *11 Miller, Supreme disagree. Court fashioned Martin v. Symmes, See 782 (8th Cir.2015). 939, F.3d straightforward seemingly rule of univer 945 I share Jus- “mandatory Barry life-without- tice G. application: hope sal Anderson’s juveniles for issue be parole sentences violate will soon resolved the United , - Eighth Amendment.”—U.S. at States Court. Whether Miller is Yet, application vary Mil retroactive should not from 132 S.Ct. state to juvenile juvenile. cases on collateral has been state and from ler to review ap but universal. state anything Several PAGE, (dissenting). Justice pres courts

pellate have held that Miller a substantive ents rule of constitutional I respectfully dissent. I do so for the procedure retroac applies criminal reasons set forth in section I my dissent review,2 tively cases on collateral while State, v. 311, Chambers 831 N.W.2d courts, including other state and federal (Minn.2013) J., (Page, 342-44 dissenting), own, application our have denied collateral my State, dissent Roman Nose v. It unsurprising of Miller.3 that states 193, (Minn.2014) 845 204-05 (Page, N.W.2d conclusions, come to as have different J., dissenting). presents Miller rule both substantive and characteristics. Roman procedural See

Nose, (Anderson, 845 N.W.2d at 202-04 G. now, I

Barry, concurring). For concur here, the result existing

with based on

precedent. Minnesota, Appellant, STATE of

LILLEHAUG, (concurring). Justice v. — Alabama, whether Miller v. U.S. On Christopher WENTHE, Thomas -, 2455, 132 S.Ct. 407 183 L.Ed.2d Respondent. (2012), retroactively, should be I applied based on the deci- concur doctrine of stare No. A12-0263. State, sis, I as did Roman 845 Nose v. Supreme Court of Minnesota. 193, (Minn.2014) J., (Lillehaug, 204 concurring). 24, 2015. June other have high

Four state courts held retroactive,

that Miller is not while ten State, 954, Maxwell, (2015); parte Falcon v. 963 Ex 424 See 162 So.3d L.Ed.2d 179 Davis, 381, (Fla.2015); People 66, v. 379 Ill.Dec. (Tex.Crim.App.2014); S.W.3d 75-76 State — 709, denied, (Ill.2014), 6 N.E.3d 722 cert. 487, Mares, (Wyo.2014). v. 335 P.3d 508 -, 710, 135 439 U.S. S.Ct. 107, (2014); Ragland, State v. 836 N.W.2d Ponton, 219, v. 3. See Johnson 780 F.3d 226 (Iowa 2013); Attorney, 117 Diatchenko v. Dist. (4th Cir.2015); Symmes, Martin v. 782 F.3d 655, 270, (2013); 466 Mass. 1 N.E.3d 281 939, Cir.2015); People Carp, v. Mantich, 320, 287 Neb. 842 N.W.2d 440, 801, 832, 841 496 Mich. - -, 716, (2014), denied, U.S. 731 cert. (2014), filed, petition cert. No. 14-824 67, (2014); S.Ct. In re 135 190 L.Ed.2d 229 (U.S. 13, 2015); Chambers, Jan. State, 227, 659, 166 N.H. 236 A.3d 331; Cunningham, Commonwealth (2014), filed, cert. No. 14-639 1, 543, (2013), denied, cert. Pa. 81 A.3d 1, (U.S. 2014); Byars, 410 Dec. Aiken v. S.C. -, U.S. 189 L.Ed.2d 763 (2014), 765 S.E.2d cert. de - nied, U.S.