Lamont v. StateLamont v. State
We have for review Lamont v. State, 597 So.2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), in which the district court certified its decision as being in conflict with the decisions of other district courts of appeal on the issue of whether life felonies are subject to enhancement under the Habitual Felony Offender Act,
Andre Henry Lamont and James Edward Brooks were both sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders after being found guilty of life felonies. Lamont was convicted of sexual battery with a firearm, a life felony pursuant to
Brooks was convicted of second-degree murder pursuant to
Both Lamont and Brooks appealed, arguing that the habitual offender statute is inapplicable to life felonies because subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b) of the statute do not specifically provide for enhanced sentencing for one convicted of a life felony. The district court rejected this argument but certified its decision as being in conflict with every other district court to address the issue. See e.g. Glover v. State, 596 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (life felonies not subject to enhanced sentencing under the habitual offender statute); McKinney v. State, 585 So.2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (same); Walker v. State, 580 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (same) review dismissed, 593 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 1992); Power v. State, 568 So.2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (same).
The district court rejected the petitioners’ construction of the Act. The court reasoned that such a construction would defeat the legislative intent, as expressed in
Looking to the Act as a whole, the district court concluded that although subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b) do not apply to life felonies, the remainder of the Act, including subsection (4)(e), does apply. Therefore, the habitual offender sentences for the life felony convictions were affirmed because the defendants could be sentenced pursuant to subsection (4)(e) of the Act;
Relying on our recent decision in Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1992), the district court affirmed Lamont‘s sentence as a habitual offender for the armed burglary conviction, which was classified as a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. 597 So.2d at 829. The district court appears to have rejected Lamont‘s contention that the first-degree felony should have been reclassified to a life felony pursuant to
We agree with the district court below that it does not appear rational that the habitual offender statute subjects career criminals who commit less serious felony offenses to enhanced punishment but does not do the same for those who commit the most serious offenses. However, as recognized by the dissent below,
Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the language should be given effect without resort to extrinsic guides to construction. As we have repeatedly noted,
“[e]ven where a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.”
St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hillard, 75 Fla. 792, 798, 78 So. 693, 694 (1918)). We have made clear that
penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter... . Words and meanings beyond the literal language may not be entertained nor may vagueness become a reason for broadening a penal statute.
Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991) (citations omitted). Moreover, even if we were to find the statute ambiguous, it
A review of the history of the relevant statutes supports the petitioners’ construction of the Act. As recently explained by the First District Court of Appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal‘s construction of
fails when the history of the relevant statutes is examined. Since the advent of life felonies in chapter 72-724, Laws of Florida, no amendment to the recidivist statute has referenced life felonies, and prior to enactment of section 6, chapter 88-131, Laws of Florida, the penalty provisions of section 775.084 did not include subsection (4)(e). Yet, in chapter 75-298, Laws of Florida, the legislature began directing punishment as provided in section 775.084 for life felonies. It appears that this omnibus crime bill made universal reference to section 775.084 for all felonies other than capital felonies, without consideration of the specific contents of the recidivist statute. The Lamont court having conceded that sections 775.084(4)(a) and 775.084(4)(b) do not apply to life felonies, we fail to see the logic of the legislative intent it ascribes to the 1975 enactment.
Lee v. State, 606 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Both the plain language and the history of the relevant statutes lead us to hold that one convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under
We find no merit to Lamont‘s contention that his conviction of burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm should have been reclassified to a life felony under
Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.
(Emphasis added).
Count II of the information charges Lamont with burglary of an occupied dwelling, in the course of which
the defendant [1] was armed or did arm himself with a dangerous weapon, to wit: A FIREARM and/or [2] made an assault or battery upon [the victim] by touching her and/or pointing a FIREARM at her in violation of 810.02 Florida Statutes.
Under
Lamont‘s argument would have merit if he had been found guilty of burglary with an assault or battery during the commission of the offense under subsection (2)(a) of the burglary statute. See Lareau, 573 So.2d at 814 (because conviction was based on great bodily harm provision of aggravated
Accordingly, we approve that portion of the decision under review upholding the application of the habitual offender statute to Lamont‘s armed burglary conviction. Burdick. We also approve that portion vacating the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences for the life felonies. However, we quash that portion of the decision below finding
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
McDONALD, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I would approve the decision under review in full and therefore dissent to the majority opinion to the extent that it disagrees with it.