Lead Opinion
Opinion by Judge FERNANDEZ; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT.
Jоe Leonard Lambright and Robert Douglas Smith were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Their convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court,
BACKGROUND
Lambright and Smith were traveling across the country with Lambright’s girlfriend, Kathy Foreman. Smith was troubled by the fact that while Lambright and Foreman had intercourse in his presence, he did not have anybody along to satisfy him. For his part, Lambright thought that he “would like to kill somebody just to see if he could do it.” Lambright I,
Lambright and Smith were joined in a single indictment because of their jointly facinorous conduct, but “[i]n light of the defendants’ confessions, which were not totally interlocking, and the appearance of potentially antagonistic defenses, [the trial judge] severed the cases of Lambright and Smith.” Id. As the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out:
Because most of the evidence was relevant to both defendants, however, the judge decided to hold a single “dual jury” trial, in which two separate juries were empaneled, each to decide the guilt or innocence of only one defendant, and each permitted to hear only evidence admissible against that one defendant.
Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court then held that the trial judge had erred when he resorted to the use of dual juries. See id. at 69,
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiсtion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ‘We ... review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a § 2254 petition de novo.” Smith v. Stewart,
DISCUSSION
Lambright and Smith suggest that the fact that the state trial court violated state procedural rules should lead to a decision that their due process rights were violated in this case, and that, indeed, dual jury use in their circumstances is so unreliable that the United States Constitution must have been violated. We disagree.
An error of state procedure is not, ipso facto, federal constitutional error. See Estelle v. McGuire,
We have stated many times that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Consti*1184 tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Id. at 67-68,
In this case there may or may not have been a state procedural error. In Lambright I,
No doubt, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution a defendant in a criminal case has a right to a jury trial, but that does not even mean that a state is required to use the traditional twelve-person jury. Variations are permitted. See Williams v. Florida,
The lower limit is a recognition of the fact that “[a]t some point [a] decline [in numbers] leads to inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect application of the common sense of the community to the facts.” Ballew,
That is far from saying that every experiment (jury or otherwise) leads to unreliability; indeed, many experiments lead to better and stronger institutions. In other words, “experiment” is not a pejorative word. As the Third Circuit said over forty years ago, “fair new procedures ... are allowable, although not traditional.” Byrne v. Matczak,
The use of dual juries may have been somewhat more unusual when Lambright’s trial took place than it is now, but that is far from saying that it was unreliable. Actually, the use was not all that great an innovation at the time. See Lambright I,
In so stating, we do not denigrate the reflection that death is different from other penalties; it most assuredly is. See Ford v. Wainwright,
Interestingly enough, the harms pointed to by Lambright’s generalities are all harms that can conceivably occur in any joint trial, with or without dual juries. In joint trials without dual juries, defense counsel and defendants often wind up at the same counsel table. And jurors know that some evidence can come in against one defendant but not against another one; they often even hear the evidence, but are told to use it as to one defendant only. There might be some rub-off. And mistakes might occur. Usually, those factors alone do not even offer grounds for a severance.
We have expressed our assessment of those dangers by requiring that “[a] defendant seeking a reversal by reason of a district court’s denial of a motion to sever must establish that the prejudice he suffered from the joint trial was so ‘clear, manifest or undue’ that he was denied a fair trial.” United States v. Throckmorton,
Likewise, despite the dangers, the Supreme Court has lauded the benefits of joint trials for they “ ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system.’ ” Zafiro v. United States,
To put it another way, the problems alluded to in Beam are not endemic to dual jury trials. There we spoke of the additional complexity of a dual jury trial and of the additional likelihood of error. See Beam,
In fine, we cannot agree that any due process right of Lambright or Smith was violated when the Arizona trial court resorted to the use of dual juries, and neither of them has convincingly pointed to some other specific trial right which was compromised by that use.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no per se constitutional error in the use of dual juries, either in general or in this case, and because no
In fíne, the district court did not err when it rejected those claims, and the illness found by the panel was, therefore, iatrogenic. We have heretofore withdrawn the panel’s opinion, and we now affirm the district court in this respect and return thе case to the panel for its consideration of the other issues raised by Lambright and Smith.
AFFIRMED in part and returned to the panel.
Notes
. See State v. Smith,
. Because we reject the dual jury claim, we need not consider whether accepting it would create a new rule of constitutional law. See Teague v. Lane,
. Experiment is not defined by the word unreliability. It simply means that we do not necessarily know the outcome at first. But we may — often do — have a very good idea of what the outcome will be. College (even high school) students conduct "experiments” in science classrooms everyday, but the outcome is very predictable if they do the experiment correctly. Nor are even truly new scientific experiments unreliable per se. Rather, they may well turn out to be elegant successes.
. See Beam,
. The argument that each defendant’s jury will "necessarily speculate” about the evidence being heard by the other defendant's jury is itself rank speculation. See Harris,
. As to the claim of procedural due process violations based on some kind of liberty interest created by Arizona law, nothing that they have pointed to shows, in any way, that the more traditional procedure for determining guilt — use of one juiy — conferred any sort of substantive right or guarantee that a single
. See Graham v. Johnson,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
This court, like so many others in this era of diminishing concern for constitutional rights, particularly in capital cases, pays lip service to the idea that “death is different.” Meanwhile, it firmly closes its eyes and its mind to the content of that message. The majority tells us, as courts have in so many cases recently, that it is only the end that matters, not the means.
Perhaps it is not surprising, when the primary concern of the judiciary is to “get on with” executions, and when even actual innocence is of questionable importance,
We may, of course, seek to improve the methods that we use to arrive at fair verdicts in criminal trials, but we may not experiment with them in capital cases. Experiments tell us whether a procedure is safe to use — whether it is reliable.
As the Arizona Supreme Court said, “death penalty cases are inapproрriate vehicles for experimentation with new procedures.” The majority seems impervious to this elementary concept, and instead affirmatively approves the unauthorized use of an unproven process in a death penalty case. Accordingly, it finds no constitutional error in the lawless judicial conduct that produced the experimental trial in Lam-bright and Smith’s case.
To conduct unauthorized experiments in capital cases is to demonstrate a disdain for human life. A system that deems such experiments to be constitutional institutionalizes that disdain and diminishes the Constitution. The majority says that the experiment “worked out just fine” and so concludes, retroactively, that it was all right to try it out on capital defendants. Even assuming that the experiment did work out in general — and that is still a subject for debate' — -that fact is irrelevant. Human beings on trial for their lives are entitled to more, under our Due Process Clause, than a procedure that may or may not work out “just fine.” They are entitled to a trial by a process that the courts have determined to be reliable. When they are denied such a process, they are denied due process of law. If a dual jury procedure or any other reasonable procedure is determined to be a fair and reliable one, following cаreful experimentation, that procedure may be employed in future capital cases. But, if it has not yet been determined to be reliable, and it is at an experimental, indeed an unauthorized experimental, stage, its use in a capital case does not comport with due process. Simple respect for human life should tell us that.
Finally, the majority’s bald assertion that the experimental trial caused no problems in Lambright and Smith’s case is not supported, and could not be supported, by objective proof. Errors that affect the very nature of the process or, as the Supreme Court calls them, “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,” are “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” In other words, notwithstanding the majority’s facile assurances, the very nature of the error makes it impossible to tell whether everything worked out “just fine” in this unauthorized experimental trial.
In the opinion that the court has withdrawn, the panel majority explained these points in greater detail and with appropriate citation to and analysis of the applicable case authority. I set forth the most relevant portions of that opinion below (with all the extensive and detailed footnotes omitted, out of compassion for the reader). I remain fully persuаded that the panel opinion is correct, as does my able colleague, Judge Warren Ferguson, whose dedication to the Constitution provides a model for all to emulate. The panel opinion read in part:
Although federal due process protections extend to all state criminal trials, the Supreme Court has demanded an even higher degree of procedural regularity and reliability in capital cases. The heightened requirement of proee-*1189 dural regularity and reliability derives from the longstanding recognition that:
death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.... From the point of view of thе defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
Gardner v. Florida,
Indeed, in numerous opinions, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty may be imposed only following rigidly regular and reliable sentencing procedures. The Court has therefore dictated the discretion that sentencing courts and juries must have. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio,
In Beck v. Alabama, the Supreme Court made explicit the obvious point that similar concerns and heightened protections extend to the guilt phase of capital trials. The Beck Court held that the federal Due Process Clause requires lesser included offense instructions in all capital trials, although it reserved the question of whether due process requires such instructions in noncapital cases. The Court concluded that “[t]o insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of ‘reason rather than caprice or emotion,’ we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination. That same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt determination.” Beck,
This court has also emphasized the higher level of procedural reliability dеmanded of capital trials. In Beam v. Paskett,
States may, of course, “experiment” with new procedures designed to improve the
Perhaps the most well-known endorsement of state court “experimentation” with trial procedures came in Chandler v. Florida,
received and reviewed briefs, reports, letters of comment, and studies. It conducted its own survey of attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and court personnel.... A separate survey was taken of judges by the Florida Conference of Circuit Judges. The court also studied the experience of 6 States that had, by 1979, adopted rules relating to electronic coverage of trials, as well as that of 10 other States that, like Florida, were experimenting with such coverage.
Id. at 564,
When states carefully consider the impact of new techniques and procedures on a criminal trial, they may, within limits, authorize experimentation with those techniques. Because Florida engaged in such reasoned consideration of the impact that television would have on trials, the United States Supreme Court approved the experiment. This obviously does not imply, however, that individual state trial judges have free reign to experiment with the central elements of the historic trial structure when the state itself has not considered whether to authorize its judges to do so. To allow this type of unauthorized experimentation in a capital case would be to allow individual judges to determine the quality of process each capital defendant would receive. Our constitution guarantees “due process” to prevent exactly this.
Before carrying out an experiment with the fundamental elements of the criminal process, a state must proceed cautiously. It must give due consideration to the potential impact of the procedural innovation. In 1982, Arizona did have a set of rules for the authorization of new criminаl procedures. Trial courts had the authority to propose changes, but could not implement them without first securing the approval of the Arizona Supreme Court. As the court stated in this very case:
Nothing we say here should discourage courts, through the adoption of local rules, to carry out experiments which may improve the judicial process. Indeed, these efforts should be encouraged. But local rules must first be approved by this court.
Lambright,
The trial judge in this case did not take the steps Arizona required for the authorization of experimental trial procedures. Instead, he simply decided unilaterally that two defendants would be tried, in a capital case, in an experimental proceeding
Having determined that the unauthorized experimentation conducted by the trial judge in this case constitutes a due process violation, our next task is to determine what type of error — tidal or structural' — -results from the use of an unauthorized, experimental jury system. Structural errors are those that affect “the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Arizona v. Fulminante,
Our determination of what type of error occurred here, where the trial judge im-permissibly experimented with the jury structure, is aided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana,
[T]he jury guarantee [is] a “basic protection” whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function. The right to trial by jury reflects, we have said, a “profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.” The deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as “structural error.”
Sullivan,
It is, indeed, hard to imagine an error more starkly structural than an error implicating the very design of the jury mechanism. When, as here, a judge impanels an unauthorized and experimental jury system, he commits an error of this type. The consequences of such an error arе, as the Sullivan Court wrote, “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” Id. Such an error, moreover, quite obviously amounts to an error in the “constitution of the trial mechanism,” that affects “the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Fulminante,
It is well settled that structural errors are not subject to harmless error review. See, e.g. Brecht v. Abrahamson,
Because the use of dual juries at Lám-bright and Smith’s trial constituted structural error, we reverse petitioners’ convictions.
. It is not Lambright, incidentally, who "dubs the Arizona trial court’s use of dual juries an experiment” as the majority states. It is the Arizona Supreme Court that "dubbed” a/k/a "held” the use of dual juries to be an "experiment,” and an "unauthorized” one at that. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that "[i]t is clear that the 'experiment' conducted in the instant case was unauthorized....” Arizona v. Lambright,
