This appeal presents the novel question whether the medical malpractice tribunal screening process established by G. L. c. 231, § 60B,
1. Background. The facts underlying the controversy are somewhat more complex than the generality on the jurisdictional issue posed above. In March, 1991, Lambley applied for a position as a reserve police officer with the city of Lynn. Pursuant to rules of the State Department of Personnel Administration (DPA), every applicant for a police position has to undergo psychological fitness screening. In April, 1991, the Lynn personnel director, exercising authority delegated by DPA, informed Lambley that he was to receive his psychological screening from two psychotherapists, Donald Seckler, a psychologist, and a psychiatrist, who turned out to be Dr. Kameny. Seckler and Kameny were aware of the purpose of their evaluation of Lambley and that Lambley would be entitled to an explanation from them of any adverse testing results.
After interviewing and testing Lambley,
Lambley filed an appeal from his rejection with the State Civil Service Commission, pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 2(b). In July, 1992, after a hearing, the commission overturned Seckler’s and Kameny’s psychological evaluation of Lambley as constituting a “casual” and “cavalier” analysis unsupported by the testing done, inconsistent with DSM-III-R criteria (see note 4, supra) and in actuality representing a “smokescreen” designed to mask the real reasons for Lambley’s rejection, allegedly questionable incidents in his background rather than his psychological fitness.
Lambley subsequently commenced a Superior Court action against Seckler and Kameny, asserting counts for “medical malpractice/negligence,” “interference with advantageous business relations” and “defamation,” and demanding as relief damages for “loss of wages, employment opportunities and mental anguish.” The action was referred over his objection for a hearing before a medical malpractice tribunal. There Lambley continued to argue that his claims were not within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, but also presented an offer of proof, which included, in addition to evidence of Seckler’s recantation before the Civil Service Commission, a report by Steven N. Shapse, a clinical
2. The jurisdiction of the tribunal. Lambley asserts that his claims against Dr. Kameny were not within the tribunal’s jurisdiction because his three causes of action are not “treatment related,” the damages sought do not flow from “medical results,” he was not a patient of Kameny, and his “interference with advantageous business relations” count charges an intentional tort that does not involve a medical decision, medical malpractice, or a physician-patient relationship. We see no merit in his contentions on this record and conclude that the tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate.
The first count of Lambley’s complaint, which is expressly labeled “medical malpractice,” alleges that “Kameny . . . and . . . Seckler . . . were negligent in their evaluation and/or examination of the plaintiff in that they . . . failed to exercise the degree of care and skill of the average qualified member of the medical profession practicing a specialty taking into account the advances in the profession . . . [and] [erroneously diagnosed plaintiff’s condition.” These are the classic allegations of an action for medical malpractice. See Brune v. Belinkoff,
Although the label attached to a pleading or motion is far less important than its substance, see Smith & Zobel, Rules Practice § 7.11 (1974); 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1196 (2d ed. 1990), here form followed substance.
In short, Lambley’s claims realistically constitute a charge that Dr. Kameny was “negligent or mistaken in terms of [his] medical judgment” regarding Lambley’s psychological condition; such an impugning of Kameny’s psychiatric judgment would appear to be well within the jurisdiction of a medical malpractice tribunal. See Leininger v. Franklin Med. Center,
The language and purpose of the statute support tribunal jurisdiction. The first words of G. L. c. 231, § 60B, as inserted by St. 1975, c. 362, § 5, proclaim that “[e]very action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health care[
A broad reading of those words that brings Lambley’s action within the ambit of § 60B is also in accord with the remedial purpose of the statute. The tribunal screening mechanism was created to discourage frivolous claims against health care providers, the defense of which would tend to increase malpractice insurance premiums to levels that would create undue financial hardship for providers, causing an increase'in the cost of medical services, or even discourage provider entry into or continuation in practice, all to the public’s ultimate detriment. See Austin, 372 Mass, at 655 n.4; Paro v. Longwood Hosp.,
Consistent with that statutory purpose, even claims not sounding in traditional malpractice — unlike those involved here — which directly implicate the professional judgment or competence of a provider have been held subject to tribunal screening. See Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn,
Lambley nonetheless maintains that, since he was not a patient of Dr. Kameny, no physician-patient relationship existed and, therefore, his claims should not have been transferred to the tribunal. It is true that an oft-repeated tenet of tribunal jurisprudence is that a medical malpractice plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a doctor-patient relationship, as well as physician performance not conforming to good medical practice and resulting damage. Kapp v. Ballantine,
Assuming, however, without deciding, that such a relationship or its equivalent is a jurisdictional prerequisite, if sufficiently existed here. The essence of the doctor-patient relationship is the undertaking by a physician to diagnose and/or treat the person being diagnosed or treated with reasonable professional skill. The law imposes on the practitioner a duty of care to the extent of conforming to certain prevailing standards of
The court in Bratt found support for its pronouncement of a duty of due care on the part of a physician, even in the absence of a technical physician-patient relationship, in Harriott v. Plimpton,
“Having undertaken for compensation to be paid by another to examine the plaintiff, and to report whether he was diseased, the defendant was bound to have the ordinary skill and learning of a physician, and exercise ordinary diligence and care, and if he- failed, and the plaintiff was injured because of his want of such skill and learning, or his want of such care, the defendant was answerable to him in damages. In our opinion, the fact that the purpose of the examination was information, and not medical treatment, is immaterial, and the breaking of*285 the plaintiff’s marriage engagement in consequence of the wrong diagnosis was not too remote a damage to sustain the action.” (Citations omitted.)
See Miller v. West,
In our view, the duty to exercise reasonable professional care and skill recognized in Bratt and Harriott is practically indistinguishable from the duty owed by a physician to his conventional patient, at least with respect to the tortious, as opposed to the contractual, consequences of the relationship. It would be irrationally anomalous, as well as inconsistent with legislative intent, to hold (as Lambley urges) that a plaintiff who can recover in negligence against an examining physician who violates his duty of exercising professional due care by misdiagnosing, and causing foreseeable harm
3. Sufficiency of the offer of proof The tribunal erred,
Even without Seckler’s acknowledgment of misdiagnosis, Shapse’s twelve-page, single-spaced opinion (to which was attached his curriculum vitae reflecting extensive credentials in the general field of psychotherapy) provided the requisite sufficiency. It not only concluded that Dr. Kameny’s diagnosis of Lambley reflected a misreading of the tests results, was unsupported by the authoritative DSM-DI-R whose standards Kameny had misapplied, and was “unfounded,” but went further by opining that Lambley did not in fact suffer from the passive-aggressive personality disorder Kameny had purported to find. It was not required of Shapse to state his opinion as to Kameny’s perceived deficiencies in any particular form or by use of any magic words. Nickerson v. Lee,
The judgment of dismissal in favor of Dr. Kameny is, accord
So ordered.
Notes
General Laws c. 231, § 60B, as inserted by St. 1975, c. 362, § 5, provides in the first paragraph: “Every action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health care shall be heard by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of the superior court, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the commonwealth . . . and an attorney authorized to practice law in the commonwealth, at which hearing the plaintiff shall present an offer of proof and said tribunal shall determine if the evidence presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for
The screening included administration of a number of psychological tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, the California Psychological Inventory, the Press Test, the Draw-A-Person Test, the Rorschach Inkblot Test, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the Bender Gestalt Test.
Nowhere in their joint report did Seckler and Kameny mention their application of the diagnostic criteria for such a disorder prescribed by the recognized standard authority in the area at that time, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R).
Reportedly, after two years of college Lambley had been placed on academic suspension and left school; he had defaulted on a student loan and on a number of credit cards; he was three months behind on a mortgage; he had a number of motor vehicle charges; he had made an unwarranted claim for unemployment compensation; he was divorced; and he had held and resigned from three different jobs between 1982 and 1990. The commission noted that under the city of Lynn’s own procedures, the psychological fitness evaluation was the last step in the hiring process and that the city had had an earlier opportunity to reject him on the basis of an unsatisfactory background check but had, apparently inadvertently, failed to do so, leaving an unsatisfactory psychological diagnosis as the only remaining procedurally acceptable basis for bypassing Lambley.
The record does not reveal whether Lambley pressed his application following the commission’s decision or his application’s ultimate fate.
The judge also allowed Kameny’s motion for entry of a separate and final judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b),
Even if only one of Lambley’s counts sounded in physician negligence, he would nonetheless have to go before a medical malpractice tribunal on that count before proceeding in court with his other theories of liability. Lubanes v. George,
There is no contention that, as a psychiatrist, Kameny is not a health care provider under the statute. See G. L. c. 231, § 60B, seventh par., which also covers Seckler as a psychologist.
Lambley asserts that his claims are not treatment-related because he neither sought nor received any treatment from Kameny. His argument ignores reality — he was examined by Kameny for the sole purpose of Kameny’s providing a medical diagnosis and opinion as to Lambley’s psychological status, the results of which would be communicated to Lambley — as well as the cases holding that medical malpractice is a tort which covers actions against medical professionals, including psychiatrists, for improper diagnoses that result in damages. See Levinson v. Ruble,
Lambley cites Thomasson v. Diethelm,
On this record it is impossible to assert that Kameny should not reasonably have foreseen that a misdiagnosis of Lambley’s psychological condition would directly harm him.
Lambley’s additional contention against tribunal jurisdiction, that his counts for interference and defamation, which rely on precisely the same facts as his “medical malpractice/negligence” count, are intentional torts which did not result in medical injuries, has no merit. See Johnston v. Stein,
Generally supporting our conclusion that tribunal jurisdiction in the instant circumstances does not depend on a conventional physician-patient relationship are: (1) the abolition of the requirement of privity in tort actions, see Carter v. Yardley & Co.,
A medical malpractice plaintiff’s offer of proof must establish that the defendant did not conform to accepted medical standards. Kapp v. Ballantine, 380 Mass, at 193.
The tribunal, couching its decisions in the statutory formula, did not explain why Lambley’s offer was nonetheless sufficient as to Seckler, whose professional relations with, testing of, methodology applied to, and conclusions regarding Lambley were exactly the same as Kameny’s. The most plausible reason appears to be Seckler’s admission before the Civil Service Commission that he had indeed misdiagnosed Lambley. To the extent the tribunal may have deemed Lambley’s supporting expert opinion from clinical psychologist Shapse, who expressly criticized both Seckler and Kameny, to be effective against psychologist Seckler but not against psychiatrist Kameny, it would have been mistaken. See Heyman v. Knirk,
We, of course, express no opinion on the substantive merits of Lambley’s claim against Kameny, who the trial evidence may show did not deviate from accepted standards of care.
Dr. Kameny’s arguments in favor of the tribunal’s decision are that Shapse’s opinion does not expressly state the applicable standard of care or that Kameny’s different opinion deviated from it, and that Shapse, as a psychologist, was not qualified to address the standard of care applicable to a psychiatrist. The preceding discussion in section 4 demonstrates the fallacy of Kameny’s first contention. As to the second, it has long been accepted that a