This is an appeal from an order denying appellant Edwin G. Lambertz’s motion to reduce аlimony payments. We reverse and remand.
Edwin and appellee Frances J. Lambertz were divorced on August 5, 1982, after thirty-two years of marriage and seven children. He was age fifty-fоur. She was *646 fifty-two years old. Frances, a high school graduate, raised the children and aided the family financially by remodeling and selling their homes. Edwin was an administrator with the South Dakota Air Nаtional Guard, an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve, and a real estate salesman. In 1982, at the timе of trial, he earned $45,000 annually.
The trial court granted the divorce to Edwin. It divided the proрerty based in part on the parties’ agreement and ordered Edwin to pay Francеs $1,000 per month alimony. The award was based upon Edwin’s income, Frances’ $1,200 monthly expenditurеs, and her limited earning capacity.
Edwin did not appeal from the judgment and decreе of divorce. Rather, on September 2, 1982, he filed a motion to reduce the amount оf alimony, arguing that Frances now had an income and that her expenses were less than she indicated at trial. Frances admitted earning $3.75 per hour as a seasonal emрloyee at a country club. By order, the trial court denied the motion.
On April 26, 1983, Edwin filed another motion to reduce the alimony obligation, arguing that he had been forced to dispose of personal property and that he would retire on August 31, 1983, reducing his income to $2,000 per month. By order, the trial court dismissed the motion “as not being timely brought.”
After he did in fact retire, Edwin filed a third motion to reduce the amount of alimony payments. In his supporting affidavit he said that he had retired effective September 1, 1983, his income since retirement was $2,000 per mоnth, and he was financially unable to pay $1,000 per month alimony. Frances argued that the trial court was aware of appellant’s plan for early retirement and reduction of income at trial. By order, the court denied the motion. *
This appeal followеd. We remanded the case for findings of fact and conclusions of law. These indicatе that the trial court was aware that Edwin might take an early retirement and a decreаse in pay when it made the initial alimony award. According to the trial court, Edwin did so knowing what his financial obligation to Frances would be. Hence, the trial court concluded the finаncial circumstances at the time of the final motion to reduce alimony had not сhanged.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by dеnying Edwin’s motion to reduce the $1,000 per month alimony that he was required to pay Frances. Wе conclude that it did.
The “substantial change of circumstances” standard necessary for modification of child custody provisions is not applicable in a proceеding to modify alimony.
See Jameson v. Jameson,
Between the time of the divorce decree and the modificаtion hearing Edwin’s income was reduced by approximately half. This was not due to a voluntary reduction in income to avoid or evade the payment of alimony.
Simmons v. Simmons,
At the modification hearing, the trial court was clearly presented with a different state of facts thаn he originally adjudicated. It is clear that Edwin’s substantial reduction in income after the divorсe decree presented the court with change sufficient to warrant a reductiоn in alimony.
Guindon, supra; Dougherty v. Dougherty,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
The settled record contains no transcripts from the divorce hearing or the subsequent motion hearings.
