Lambert v. StateLambert v. State
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS MOOT.
PER CURIAM
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Terrance Arnez Lambert pled guilty on January 31, 2011, to first-degree domestic battery, second-degree battery, and second-degree terroristic threatening, and a cumulative sentence of ninety-six months’ incarceration in the Arkansas Department of Correction was imposed along with an additional 144 months’ suspended imposition of sentence. No appeal was taken from the judgment. Appellant then sought in the circuit court postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2011). His petition was denied, and no appeal was taken.
On March 9, 2012, appellant filed in the circuit court a petition to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Now before us are appellant’s motions for an extension of time in which to file his brief and for a copy of the record at public expense. Because it is clear that appellant could not prevail if his appeal were allowed to proceed, we dismiss the appeal, and his motions are moot. This court will not permit an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief, including a petition under
When a petition to reduce an illegal sentence is based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petition is properly treated as a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. See Gonder v. State, 2011 Ark. 248, 382 S.W.3d 674. A petition that seeks postconviction relief cognizable under Rule 37.1 is governed by that rule, regardless of the label placed on it by a petitioner. See id.; Musgrove v. State, 2010 Ark. 458 (per curiam); Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 349 (per curiam); Jackson v. State, 2010 Ark. 157 (per curiam). Rule 37.1(b) does not allow for a second petition to be filed under the rule unless the first petition was dismissed without prejudice. See Omar v. State, 2011 Ark. 55 (per curiam). Therefore, because appellant had already filed a Rule 37.1 petition, he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that Rule, and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis, regardless of the label he placed on it. See Gonder, 2012 Ark. 248, S.W.3d 674; Omar, 2011 Ark. 55 (citing Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 349 (per curiam)).
Moreover, we note that, even if we were to consider appellant’s petition under
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that appellant’s petition was subject to dismissal by the circuit court, and he could not prevail on appeal if his appeal were allowed to proceed. The appeal is therefore dismissed, and appellant’s motions are moot.
Appeal dismissed; motions moot.
Terrance Arnez Lambert, pro se appellant.
No response.