76 Ind. App. 77 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1921
Appellee was injured March 27, 1917, while working for appellant Lambert, and on May 17, 1917, the parties entered into an agreement for compensation, which was approved by the Industrial Board May 29, 1917. By this agreement, appellant Lambert agreed to pay appellee $10.39 per week during total disability not to exceed 500 weeks. Compensation was paid as agreed until January 22, 1918. In February
Appellee filed a special answer alleging that in June 1919, he had filed a certified copy of the agreement in the Grant Circuit Court with a showing that there was a balance of $747 then due him under said agreement and the further sum of $10.39 per week from June 23, 1919, and continuing not to exceed 500 weeks from the date of the award, and that a judgment had been rendered against appellant Lambert in accordance with said agreement and denying the jurisdiction of the Industrial Board to change or modify said agreement.
A hearing was had before the full board in March 1920, and the board made an order that the cause should be disposed of on the basis of permanent partial disability, but that the evidence was insufficient for a finding as to appellee’s permanent partial disability, whereupon the hearing was continued and appellants were ordered to pay appellee compensation in full up to June 16, 1919. Compensation was afterwards paid to June 16, 1919. On September 3, 1920, on final hearing the board by a majority of the members made an award finding that appellee had been wholly disabled to work from the date of the injury and was still so disabled; that there had been no change in his condition and that his total disability would probably continue indefinitely, and an order was made denying appellants’ petition for review. From this award appellants appeal.
Appellee’s contention is that a judgment taken under this section is conclusive unless the same is contested and set aside on account of fraud or because of some equitable defense to the same. It will be noticed that this section, while authorizing the rendition of the judgment, also recognizes the right of the Industrial Board to modify the original award of compensation by ending, diminishing or increasing any weekly payment under the provisions of §45, supra,, of the act, which section expressly provides that the power and jurisdiction of the board over each case shall be continuing, and authorizes the board on its own motion or upon the application of either party to make such change in the award, ending, lessening, continuing or extending payment previously awarded, as it may deem just on account of a change in conditions.
Judgments rendered under this statute are not to be • treated as judgments in an ordinary civil action to the extent that they are not subject to change or modification. Such judgments, however, so long as they remain unmodified, in the 'language of the statute, /‘shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though said judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court.” The judgment and pro
Appellants contend that the evidence shows there has been a change of conditions affecting 'appellee’s right to compensation in that (1) Any disability resulting from the injury has ceased and that his present condition is not due to the injury but is due to a disease not resulting from the injury, and (2) whatever disability he now suffers is by way of permanent partial impairment and not by way of total disability.
In the present case appellants may honestly believe that the board erred in holding that appellee was laboring under a total permanent disability, and it may be that they were correct in their belief, but that does not justify an appeal when it is known there is a conflict of evidence and that the question presented by the appeal depends upon the weight of the evidence. Such appeals are of too frequent occurrence to impress us that they are always taken in good faith.
Were we to review the evidence in this case and state the law applicable thereto, it would be a statement of the law as it has been laid down by the courts in every jurisdiction having a Workmen’s Compensation Act. We have, however, given the evidence careful consideration and find that there is evidence to support the award of the board.
The award is affirmed with the penalty as fixed by the statute.