CRAIG LAMBERT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. JAMES J. FIORENTINI, Mayor of Haverhill; ALAN R. DENARO, Chief of the Haverhill Police Department, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 19-1406
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
January 24, 2020
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before Howard, Chief Judge, Lynch and Barron, Circuit Judges.
David G. Gabor, with whom Katherine A. Brustowicz and The Wagner Law Group were on brief, for appellant.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. After retiring as a City of Haverhill police officer in 2014, Craig Lambert in 2017 sought an identification card from Chief of Police Alan DeNaro that would allow Lambert to carry a concealed firearm across state lines under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (“LEOSA“),
Chief DeNaro denied the request on the grounds that Lambert was not in good standing at the time of his 2014 retirement. Lambert then brought this action against DeNaro and Haverhill Mayor James Fiorentini in state court, advancing four causes of action. DeNaro and Fiorentini removed the case to federal district court and moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court entered for defendants on all four claims.
We hold, as a matter of first impression, that Massachusetts has, in its state certiorari procedure,
We affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 due process claim, the only federal claim set forth in Lambert‘s complaint and the only basis asserted for federal jurisdiction. We also affirm dismissal of the negligence claim and the purported equity claim as they plainly fail to assert a claim under state law. We vacate the judgment on the merits as to the state certiorari claim and direct its dismissal without prejudice.
I.
“Because this appeal follows the granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we glean the facts from the operative pleading,” accepting those facts as true. Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). We also “consider ‘documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; . . . documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; [and] documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint’ . . . even when the documents are incorporated into the movant‘s pleadings.” Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). We describe the substantive legal standards for issuance of such identification cards before setting forth the facts.
A. Legal Standards
LEOSA provides that a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” carrying certain identification issued by the officer‘s former law enforcement agency “may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”
The Massachusetts regulations require that “[t]he chief law enforcement officer for a law enforcement agency shall issue an identification card to a qualified retired law enforcement officer who retired from that law enforcement agency.”
The state regulations leave the definition of good standing to local law enforcement agencies. See Frawley v. Police Comm‘r of Cambridge, 46 N.E.3d 504, 507-08 (Mass. 2016) (observing that neither the federal statute nor state regulations establish good standing criteria). The Haverhill Police Department‘s relevant policy defines “[s]eparated in good standing” to mean “that such officer was not charged with or suspected of criminal activity at the time of retirement, nor was he or she under investigation or facing disciplinary action for an ethical violation of departmental rules, or for any act of dishonesty.”
B. Facts
Lambert began work as a police officer for the City of Haverhill in April 1994. Effective August 21, 2012, Lambert was placed on injured leave.
After Lambert went on leave, Chief DeNaro sent Lambert a letter dated August 22, 2012. The letter stated that DeNaro had concluded that Lambert had violated orders from a deputy chief and a captain in June and July 2012. The letter informed Lambert that, because of that violation, he was suspended for five working days, from August 22, 2012, to August 28, 2012, and that DeNaro would recommend to Mayor Fiorentini that Lambert also receive an additional 55-day suspension.2
Lambert successfully challenged the loss of five days’ injury pay in state Superior Court. The court held that the disciplinary matter could not be used as the basis for withholding Lambert‘s injury pay because the City imposed the suspension after Lambert went on leave.3 Lambert remained
Lambert then filed a four-count complaint in Essex Superior Court against DeNaro and Haverhill Mayor James Fiorentini. Count I is a complaint in the nature of certiorari pursuant to
C. Procedural History
On November 22, 2017, the defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 due process claim. See
II.
We review de novo the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Villeneuve v. Avon Prods., Inc., 919 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2019). “Dismissal is proper if -- after accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to [Lambert] -- the complaint fails to allege a plausible right to relief.” Id. “In conducting this appraisal, we are not bound by the district court‘s reasoning but, rather, may affirm the entry of judgment on any ground made manifest by the record.” Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018).
We begin with the sole federal claim set forth in the complaint, Lambert‘s § 1983 due process claim.4 Count II is labelled as a § 1983 claim, and Lambert argued to the district court that this claim alleged violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights.5 “Procedural
“A sufficient procedural due process claim must allege ‘that [the plaintiff] was deprived of constitutionally protected property because of defendants’ actions, and that the deprivation occurred without due process of law.‘” Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E. Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522 (1st Cir. 1983)). A procedural due process claim that does not “allege the unavailability of constitutionally-adequate remedies under state law” fails. Id.
Even assuming LEOSA could give rise to a property right, Lambert‘s complaint makes no allegation that the state remedies available to him are constitutionally inadequate. To the contrary, Count I of the complaint invoked the state certiorari remedy for judicial review of DeNaro‘s denial of his LEOSA identification card. The procedural due process inquiry “examine[s] the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has specifically held that judicial review of a denial of a LEOSA identification card is available through a civil action in the nature of certiorari pursuant to
Lambert‘s substantive due process claim fails on the pleadings for a different reason. “In order to assert a viable substantive due process claim, a plaintiff has ‘to prove that [he] suffered the deprivation of an established life, liberty, or property interest, and that such deprivation occurred through governmental action that shocks the conscience.‘” Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008)).
On these pleadings, as to substantive due process, the denial of Lambert‘s LEOSA identification is not “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking.” Licari, 22 F.3d at 347 (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990)).7 Lambert‘s § 1983 claim fails to
III.
The § 1983 due process claim provided the sole basis for federal jurisdiction, so we consider whether the district court appropriately exercised its supplemental jurisdiction under
Lambert makes no argument to us that the district court‘s conclusion as to his last two state law claims was error, and vacating that ruling would promote neither comity nor justice as both plainly fail to state a claim. Count III, which alleges that DeNaro and Fiorentini acted negligently in performing their duties, is barred by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. See
The state certiorari claim stands on different footing, as we cannot say on the face of the pleadings that it failed to state a claim. Lambert has argued that his five-day suspension is no longer outstanding and was not outstanding at the time of the denial, which the defendants dispute. That dispute appears to raise questions of state law, which would be “best resolved in state court.” Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672. There also appear to be disputed issues of material fact, such as the date, if any, on which the suspension became effective, which are inappropriate for resolution on the pleadings. Finally, the certiorari claim is not so “inextricably intertwined” with the procedural due process claim under § 1983 that exercising supplemental jurisdiction
IV.
We affirm dismissal of the § 1983, negligence, and “equity” claims with prejudice. We vacate the dismissal of the state certiorari claim on the merits and direct its dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. No costs are awarded.