LAKER AIRWAYS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 98-4229, 98-5561.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 30, 1999.
Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr., Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
Laker Airways, Inc. (“Laker“) appeals the district court‘s order dismissing its antitrust action against British Airways PLC (“BA“) pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Laker sued BA under federal and Florida state antitrust laws alleging that BA combined and conspired to restrain and monopolize scheduled passenger air service between Miami, Florida and London, England. Laker named as co-conspirators certain individuals and Airport Coordination Ltd. (“ACL“), a private English corporation appointed by the government of the United Kingdom to coordinate requests for landing and take-off times (“slots“) at British airports. As relief, Laker sought treble damages and a permanent injunction requiring BA to (1) cease violating antitrust laws, (2) transfer to Laker a single daily arrival and departure slot at London‘s Gatwick Airport, and (3) enter into an interline ticketing and baggage agreement with Laker.1
*Honorable Richard Mills, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
The district court dismissed Laker‘s complaint because Laker failed to join ACL, an indispensable party within the meaning of Rule 19, and further concluded that even had ACL been joined, the act of state doctrine barred Laker‘s suit. Laker then filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to
On appeal, Laker argues that the district court improperly applied
II. DISCUSSION
A. Slot Allocation Process
The transatlantic airline industry is a highly regulated business controlled, to a great extent, through negotiations among national governments.2 The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have signed two bilateral treaties which control many aspects of the transatlantic industry, including factors such as the number of carriers, fares, capacity, and route designations.3 As a result of these international agreements, a backdrop of national sovereignty pervades discussions about transatlantic air transport issues.
While bilateral treaties control the number of entrants into the Miami-London market and designate the U.S. airlines given access to London‘s Heathrow Airport, forcing Laker to land at London‘s Gatwick Airport, the gravamen of Laker‘s complaint is that BA conspired with ACL to prevent Laker from being allocated desirable landing and take-off slots at Gatwick.4 We must first consider, then, the United Kingdom‘s procedure for slot allocation. On January 18, 1993, the Council of the European Communities issued a regulation setting forth the common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports. See Council Regulation 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14). This regulation required Member States to “ensure the appointment of a natural or legal person” to act as airport coordinator, after consultations with the air carriers regularly using the airport facilities. Id., art. 4(1). The coordinator is then responsible for the allocation of slots. Id., art. 4(5). The regulations further provide that the Member State “shall ensure that the coordinator carries out his duties ... in an independent manner.” Id., art. 4(2). The coordinator is to act in “a neutral, non-discriminatory and transparent way.” Id., art. 4(3). Finally, the regulations provide that “[s]lots may be freely exchanged between air carriers or transferred by an air carrier from one route, or type of service, to another, by mutual agreement or as a result of a total or partial takeover or unilaterally. Any such exchanges or transfers shall be transparent and subject to confirmation of feasibility.” Id., art. 8(4).
To implement the European Community regulation, the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacted The Airports Slot Allocation Regulations 1993, S.I. 1993, No. 1067 (“ASAR“). This legislation provides that the appointment of any person as a coordinator must be approved by the Secretary of State for Transport, the Minister designated for the purpose of monitoring, among other things, the allocation of slots. The Secretary may withdraw approval of a coordinator if he has not performed in an independent manner. ASAR, ¶ 4(3). ACL is the designated slot allocation coordinator for London‘s Gatwick Airport. ACL is
B. Rule 19 Dismissal—Slot Allocation
We review dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party for abuse of discretion. Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 1989).
1. Necessary Party
A party is considered “necessary” to the action if the court determines either that complete relief cannot be granted with the present parties or the absent party has an interest in the disposition of the current proceedings. Id. Laker argues that ACL need not be joined in the suit because (1) it seeks now only monetary
damages, which BA can provide without ACL and (2) even if Laker were still pursuing slots, BA could transfer a slot to Laker without the involvement of ACL. Laker is correct in arguing that courts have held that joint tortfeasors need not all be joined in one lawsuit. See Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (“It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.... The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 19(a) explicitly state that a tortfeasor with the usual ‘joint-and-several’ liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability.“) (citations and quotations omitted).
The interests of ACL under the circumstances presented here, however,
Furthermore, we held in Haas v. Jefferson National Bank, 442 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1971), that a joint tortfeasor will be considered a necessary party when the absent party “emerges as an active participant” in the allegations made in the complaint that are “critical to the disposition of the important issues in the litigation.” Id. at 398. Here, Laker is alleging that BA conspired with ACL to favor BA in the slot allocation process. According to Laker‘s complaint, ACL would certainly be considered an active participant in the allegations. ACL is the only entity that can allocate slots at Gatwick Airport. Without ACL, BA would not be able to manipulate, as Laker suggests, the slot allocation process. ACL, then, has significant interest in the resolution of the allegations surrounding the slot allocation process because the resolution will inevitably comment upon the neutrality and independence of the process. We determine, therefore, that ACL is a necessary party and should be joined, if feasible.7
2. Analysis Under Rule 19(b)
If a necessary party cannot be joined, the court must then proceed to
The primary factor weighing in favor of dismissal of this action is the prejudice that would accrue to the interest of ACL, the nonjoined party, if the case were
Because slots are a limited resource, see Eastern Air Lines v. FAA, 772 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985) (“At high density airports, slots are scarce and, hence, quite valuable.“), the process of allocating slots has been the source of many disputes among air carriers and their representative countries.8 EC Regulation 95/93 itself anticipates the possibility of international difficulties caused by the slot allocation process and provides for “appropriate action” to be taken against a state that violates the non-discrimination provisions of the regulation. Id., art. 12. See also Air Canada v. United States Dep‘t of Transportation, 843 F.2d 1483, 1485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing “long-running controversy between Canada and the United States over landing rights at LaGuardia Airport“). The government of the United Kingdom maintains control over the number of slots that can be issued at each airport. See R1-5-4 (“U.K. Air Traffic Control has established the number of landings and take-offs (called ‘slots‘) that will be permitted in any hour at Gatwick.“). ACL, as the United Kingdom‘s designated slot coordinator at Gatwick Airport, has the responsibility of ensuring the slots are allocated in accordance with Regulation 95/93 and ASAR in an independent and neutral manner. If ACL does not fulfill this responsibility, the Secretary of State for Transport may withdraw its approval of ACL as airport coordinator. ACL, then, would be prejudiced by not being able to participate in a proceeding which would, at the very least, comment upon ACL‘s allocation of slots.
In considering the second and third factors of
Finally, we note that our consideration of the fourth factor applicable to our analysis of Rule 19(b)—whether the plaintiff would have an alternative remedy were the case dismissed for nonjoinder—also suggests that dismissal is appropriate. As observed by BA, Laker may still: (1) raise a complaint with the United Kingdom‘s Secretary of State for Transport that ACL is not allocating slots in an independent and neutral manner or (2) petition the United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration to restrict slots provided to the United Kingdom because of the alleged unfair slot allocation at Gatwick Airport.9 See Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993) (where administrative agency was authorized to address plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs had an adequate remedy under fourth factor of
In sum, we find that each of the four factors outlined in
C. Rule 19 Dismissal—Interline Agreements
To the extent, however, that Laker complains that BA has improperly refused to enter into interline ticketing and baggage agreements with Laker, the interests of ACL are not implicated. Interline agreements allow passengers to have their baggage automatically transferred between airlines on one baggage check ticket. Laker alleges that interline agreements with BA are necessary in order to compete effectively in the Miami-London market. An interline agreement, in contrast to slot allocation, is simply a contract between airline carriers and involves no other authorizing parties. As a result, no interests of ACL are implicated by interline agreements.
In addition, we conclude that ACL cannot be considered a necessary party to Laker‘s interline agreements claim under the “complete relief” prong of
D. Laker‘s Rule 60(b)(3) Motion
Following the district court‘s dismissal of Laker‘s suit, pursuant to
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Laker‘s suit against BA concerning the slot allocation process at
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
Notes
Rule 19 provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person‘s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person‘s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person‘s ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person‘s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person‘s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
