33 Barb. 49 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1860
By the Gourt,
The will of John Goodhue, deceased, was propounded for probate by Oliver F. Ranney and Harlow Goff, the executors named therein, and was contested by the appellants for the want of testamentary capacity in the deceased, as well as upon the ground that its execution was procured by fraud and undue influence.
Over thirty witnesses were examined before the surrogate and testified at length to facts bearing with more or less force upon the questions involved, and showing the character, history and business capacity of the testator, his relations to and with the parties litigant up to and at the time of his death, and the relation of the litigants to each other and the degree of their intimacy with the testator, and their connection with the will and its execution. While it is difficult to grpiip to-.
John G-ooclhue, the testator, died in December, 1857, aged eighty-one years, leaving him surviving as his heirs at law two daughters, Clarissa Lake, one of the appellants and the wife of her co-appellant Eansom Lake, and Hannah Eanney, one of the defendants and the wife of Oliver F. Eanney, one of the executors named in the will. The wife of the testator died in January, 1855, and the alleged will bears date and was executed in July of the same year. Mrs. Eanney was married in 1841, and Mrs. Lake in. 1853. Mr. and Mrs. Eanney came to reside with the testator in th'e fall of 1844, and' continued to reside in the" same house with him up to the time of his death. The evidence as to his business capacity in early life, the effect of disease and of age upon his mental faculties, and his testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will, and his freedom from a subjection to restraint, coercion, or undue influence of any kind from those by whom he was surrounded, is in this, as in most cases of this character, somewhat conflicting. We are so constituted that our social relations and our sympathies and our prejudices influence our perceptions and bias our memories, as well as our opinions and judgments. Hence two individuals of equal intelligence, integrity and opportunity for observation and judgment, will observe and note facts as it were .through entirely different mediums, and honestly report the facts with different colorings, and arrive at directly opposite conclusions, or conclusions essentially differing from each other. There is no class of cases in which the evidence is necessarily less satisfactory and conclusive than those involving the validity of acts depending on the mental capacity of the actor. With the witnesses before the judge, with ample op
Considerable evidence was given upon either side to show the state of feeling between the testator and Mr. and Mrs. Lake. The respondents proved by one witness that at one time the testator said that Lake was a drinking man, and he did not like him, and that his daughter married him against his will; and the same witness testified that the testator
Without going more in detail into the evidence, it is established :
1. That by the will propounded the division of the estate of the testator between his two daughters, Ms only heirs at law, is grossly unequal.
2. That the will was prepared and witnessed by Eanney, who in right of his wife, is the principal beneficiary; she being entitled by its terms to the bulk of the estate and con
3. That Eanney, who prepared and now propounds the will, at the time of the execution of the will, and from that time to the death of the testator, was a member of the family of the testator, and held a fiduciary and confidential relation to him.
4. That the testator, by reason of his intimities, mental and bodily, as well as his ignorance, was liable to be imposed upon by one capable of practising a fraud upon him in respect of the contents of his will and the disposition of his estate.
5. That the will was executed under circumstances somewhat peculiar and suspicious, and without all the cautions and safeguards usually adopted, and without such as the propounder of the will should, with reference to his own reputation in the circumstances in which he was placed, to guard against misconstruction have regarded, to the end that the witnesses might know that the writing published -as a will was in truth the voluntary and unbiased act of the testator, properly and fully declaring his intentions.
6. There is no evidence that the will had ever been read to the testator, or that he knew the contents thereof.
7. There is no evidence that the testator ever directed, or gave instructions for, the preparation of the will as prepared and executed by him.
8. The evidence is not satisfactory that the testator intended to distinguish between his daughters, in the distribution of his property, or that he knew that he had done so by the will prepared by Eanney and executed under his supervision, and perhaps it might be added that there is some evidence that he supposed the provisions of the will were different from what they proved to be.
. In ordinary cases it is sufficient for the individual offering a will for probate to prove a compliance with the formalities prescribed by statute; but when circumstances of suspicion
The proof most usually given, because the most accessible, is of instructions for the preparation of the will, and of previously declared intentions consistent with the will, together with evidence of the reasonableness of its provisions. But there is no line of evidence prescribed, and any evidence is competent, as well as sufficient, which satisfies a court or jury that the will was in truth executed by the testator with full knowledge of its contents, and voluntarily executed, without restraint, coercion or undue influence of any kind.
In this case the fiduciary relation of Banney to the testator, his agency in drawing the will and procuring its execution, and the beneficial interest of himself and family under it, created a presumption of fraud and undue influence, which could only be overcome by some satisfactory evidence that there was no fraud practiced, or undue influence exercised,' over the testator.
When a will containing a devise in favor of the medical attendant and confidential adviser of the testator, is drawn by the devisee himself, it is said it would be more satisfactory to the court to have direct evidence that the testator gave instructions for drawing the will, or that it was read over to or by him; yet that such evidence is not indispensable, but that there must be some affirmative evidence that the testator knew the contents of the will, and that it expressed his real intentions. (Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393.)
In another well considered case it was held that when there was no evidence that the testatrix had anything to do with the preparation of the will or that she ever read it or heard it read, or that its contents were ever even stated to her,
In every case the onus probandi lies on a party propounding a will, and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will and testament of a free and capable testator.(Barry v. Butler, 2 Moore’s P. C. 481.) We are also referred to Seoular v. Plowright, decided in 1856 by the judicial committee of the privy council in England, and reported in the Law Times of January 3, 1857, (28 Law Times, 194,) the eminent author and jurist Dr. Lushington giving the opinion. It was there decided—and with the decision all the cases in our own courts agree—that in ordinary cases, where there is execution and capacity, the validity of a will is established, but
Allen, Mullin and Morgan, Justices.]