In actions of this description, the defendant is liable for the natural and probable consequences of his negligent act or omission. The injury must be the direct result of the misconduct chargеd; but it will not be considered too remote if, according to the usual experience of mankind, the result ought to have been apprehended.
The act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect oi the original negligence,
Whether in any given case the act charged wаs negligent, ana whether the injury suffered was, within the relation of cause and effect, legally attributable to it, are questions for the jury. They present oftentimes difficult questions of fact, requiring prаctical knowledge and experience for their settlement, and where there is evidence to justify the verdict, it cannot be set aside as matter of law. The only question for the court is, whether the instructions given upon these points stated the true tests of liability.
Most of the instructions which were requested by the defendants as' to their fault, the plaintiff’s exercise of due care, and the burden of proof, were given in substance. The defendants now make only three оbjections:
1. The court was asked to rule that a violation of a city ordinance would not of itself alone render the defendants liable in this suit; but that negligence must be shown, and such negligence as is averred in the declaration. The jury were plainly told on this point, that the negligence charged must be proved, and that a violation of the city ordinance was not conclusive proof of it; that it was a matter of evidence to be considered with all the оther evidence in the case. This was sufficiently favorable to the defendants. The city ordinance was enacted for the purpose of rendering the streets more safe and сonvenient for travellers. In determining whether a particular use of a street was negligent, the jury might properly consider the legitimate uses to which the streets are devoted. Wright v. Malden & Melrose Railroad Co.
2. The rule оf law stated to the jury, as to what was necessary to make the plaintiff a participаtor with Horace Lane in the unlawful act of meddling with the truck or its fastenings, is not materially different frоm the instructions asked. The jury were first told, in substance, that if the plaintiff did no more than go across thе street by Horace Lane’s invitation, and witness the
3. The last instruction asked was rightly refused. Under the law as laid down by the court the jury must hаve found the defendants guilty of negligence in doing that from which injury might reasonably have been exрected, and from which injury resulted ; that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care; that Hоrace Lane’s act was not the sole, direct or culpable cause of the injury ; thаt he did not purposely roll the iron upon the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff was not a joint actor with him in the transaction, but only a spectator. This supports the verdict. It is immaterial whether thе act of Horace Lane was mere negligence or a voluntary intermeddling. It was an аct which the jury have found the defendants ought to have apprehended and provided against. McDonald v. Snelling,