Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant on account of alleged injuries received on November 7, 1906, while in the employ of appellant as a freight brakeman. Appellee’s complaint is in two paragraphs, and is challenged in this court by the assignment of error that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Each paragraph is claimed to be defective for the reasons (1) that it does not appear that appellant was guilty of negligence proximately causing the injury of which the appellee complained, and (2) that the negligence of appellee materially contributed to his injury.
Looking to the facts as they appear in the complaint, appellee, at the time he was injured, was occupying a position reasonably necessary to perform the service required of him. When appellee took the position described, and for the time necessary to do the work, the place was not dangerous, except from the movement of the switch engine, which he alleges appellant negligently moved, thereby injuring him. We are not advised as to the distance between the passing trains, but it appears that appellee could not have performed the service from the top of a car. It appears that he could have seen the switch engine as it approached him, had he looked in that direction, but his failure so to look is explained by the fact that his work required him to look in the opposite direction. As we see this case, as -made by the complaint, appellee was in a place at the direction of appellant, performing a service requiring his attention in one direction, and while thus engaged he was negligently run down by appellant’s switch engine and tender coming from the opposite direction. While the complaint may be subject to criticism for uncertainty, yet we cannot say that any essential fact was entirely omitted, or that it does not contain facts sufficient to bar another action for the same cause. The complaint must be regarded as sufficient to withstand the present attack. Vandalia Coal Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (1907), 168 Ind. 144; Indianapolis Traction, etc., Co. v. Kidd (1906), 167 Ind. 402; Southern
Judgment affirmed.