208 Pa. 574 | Pa. | 1904
Opinion by
The plaintiff George Irving Laird, aged twenty-five and married, fell under a street car on defendant’s railway in Philadelphia on November 21, 1901, and was very seriously injured. He was immediately taken to the Pennsylvania Hospital, where the next day, I. W. Brodt, acting for the defendant company, called upon him and gave him $150, on payment of fidfich Laird executed -fin the presence of four subscribing witnesses a formal release to the company of all claim for damages by reason of the injury, stating in the release that by reason of the speed of the car he was thrown to the ground and thereby the car passed over his foot. After his recovery and leaving the hospital he brought this suit against the company, averring, that his injury was caused by the negligence of the company. The company answered that plaintiff’s injury arose from his own negligence in attempting to get on a moving car, and further offered and read in evidence the release. The learned Judge was of opinion, that the release in view of the evidence, was an effectual bar to recovery, and so instructed the jury. We now have this appeal by plaintiff, assigning for error the peremptory instruction of the court,
As to the second point of appellant’s argument, that Laird did not possess mental capacity to execute a valid release, it seems to be based upon a misapprehension of the relative functions of the court and jury with reference to such an instrument. A chancellor has still some duties to perform in determining what effect it should have on an issue like the one before us; equity has precisely the same power and the samé duty in a suit between an individual and a corporation, as between natural persons. While it is clear, that plaintiff suffered a grievous injury, it is by no means clear he súfféred a wrong from defendant and it is, perhaps, also clear that he is needy and defendant is wealthy. This arouses sympathy. But sympathy is emotion, not equitj'; nor is equity a chancellor’s mere notions of what is equality, on the contrary, it is a system both in England and this country, of well established law. No rule of equity is better established in this state, than that to set aside a written instrument the evidence must be “ clear, precise and indubitable ” whether the allegation be fraud practiced by the beneficiary under it, or incapacity on the part of him who executed it. Penna. Railroad Co. v. Shay, 82 Pa. 198, and the many cases following it. In this case incapacity is alleged ; it is argued that at the time Laird signed the release, he was in a state of unconsciousness. It is attested by four disinterested witnesses, three qf whom were
Counsel for appellant rely upon the decision in McCaw v. Union Traction Co., 205 Pa. 271, as ruling this case. There was evidence of fraud in procuring the release in that case; here there is none, only some slight evidence of incapacity on the part of plaintiff when he signed the release but nothing nearly sufficient to meet the decided weight of the evidence adduced by defendant, showing full mental capacity.
Besides, there being no fraud practiced in obtaining the release, the plaintiff ratified it by using the money weeks after with full knowledge of where it came from and made no offer to return it before bringing suit.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.