156 S.E. 746 | W. Va. | 1931
This is a suit to compel the defendant, A. B. Crichton, as agent for plaintiffs, to account for profits made on a purchase from them. The total outstanding stock of the Greenbrier Eastern Railroad Company was 10,000 shares. Plaintiff Nelson Fuel Company owned 2655 of these shares, which it had authorized its president, plaintiff J. B. Laing, to sell, and which has been generally referred to in this litigation as the "Laing stock". At the request of Laing, Crichton had a conference with the Chesapeake Ohio Railway officials on April 6, 1925, one of the purposes of which was to have them purchase the stock of the G. E. Rr. Co. Nothing definite was accomplished at this conference, but the officials promised to investigate the representations then made by Crichton. The Fuel Company was in financial distress. It was anxious to *4 dispose of its G. E. stock, and Laing did not see fit to await further negotiations with the C. O. On April 15, 1925, he sold the 2655 shares to Crichton at the price of $75.00 a share. The money for this purchase was advanced by four of Crichton's business associates and four of his brothers, and the stock was immediately turned over to them by Crichton as follows: James A. Graham, 75 shares, C. T. McCormick, 75 shares, John W. Walters, 332 shares, John E. Evans, 332 shares, W. G. Crichton, 432 shares, William Crichton, Jr., 332 shares, H. A. Crichton, 577 shares, and J. N. Crichton, 500 shares. On May 22, 1925, Crichton contracted with Union Trust Company of Cleveland, Ohio, (agent for C. O.) to sell to it on or before June 1, 1925, 8128 shares of the G. E. stock at $125.00 per share, Crichton to retain cash on hand and accounts receivable of the railroad company, and to pay its current indebtedness. This contract was not executed as arranged but was finally consummated on October 30, 1925, by Crichton's delivering 8047 shares of the stock to Union Trust Company at the price of $140.91 a share, without reservations. The Laing stock was included in this sale.
The circuit court found as follows:
*5"(1) During the period complained of the relation of principal and agent existed between Laing and Crichton.
(2) Crichton's negotiations for and his final decision of April 15th, 1925, to purchase Laing's stock resulted directly from information and impressions received by him from Van Sweringen and Bernet at and after the Cleveland interviews of April 6th, to the effect that it was either (a) the intention of the Chesapeake Ohio Railway authorities to buy or (b) the opinion of such authorities that their Company should acquire the Greenbrier Eastern Railroad; that Crichton concluded therefrom that the Chesapeake Ohio Railway Company in the near future would offer to purchase the Greenbrier Eastern Company at the price per share in excess of what he was paying to Laing.
(3) Such information, impressions and conclusions were not fully and fairly dissolved by Crichton to Laing, as required by the relationship existing between them."
Pursuant to this finding, the court decreed that Crichton should have accounted to the Fuel Company for $195,220.76 (which was the sum of the profits made on the Laing stock by Graham and associates) as of October 30, 1925, and entered judgment in favor of the Fuel Company against Crichton for that sum, with its accrued interest, amounting to $243,733.10 on December 21, 1929, the date of the decree. An appeal was granted Crichton but it was limited specifically to the measure and the amount of the recovery against him.
The evidence is conclusive that Crichton made no personal profit whatsoever on the Laing stock, but that the profits thereon went entirely to his brothers and business associates. The C. O. officials knew that Nelson Fuel Company was not in position to exact a high price for the G. E. stock. Consequently it does not follow that, had Crichton been unreserved with Laing, the latter would have been able to sell his stock to the C. O. for the price obtained by the former and his associates. Therefore it is not apparent why the lower court selected the profits made on the Laing stock as the precise measure of damages.
Counsel agree that the measure of damages generally applied against a fraudulent agent is such an amount as will compensate the principal for the loss occasioned by the fraud. In more concrete terms the measure has been said to be the difference between the amount received by the principal for the thing sold and its actual value at the time. Staker v. Reese,
Modified and affirmed.