221 N.W. 534 | Minn. | 1928
The judgment in question was before this court and was affirmed by decision reported in
"However, an agreement between Parviainen and Jarvi (representing the partnership) that these labor claims would be paid by the firm was sufficient under the facts in this case even without direct notice or promise to the laborers. They were persons for whose benefit the contract was made and had a right of action on it. They had a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise." Citing authorities.
It is clear therefore that recovery was sustained in that action on the ground that defendants Jarvi Lahti were liable because of their contract with Parviainen, as modified; that these laborers were employes of Parviainen and he was primarily liable, and that Jarvi Lahti were also liable because they had contracted with Parviainen to pay these labor claims.
1. Defendants in the present action contend that recovery was had in the prior case on the direct promise of Jarvi Lahti to the laborers to pay their wages, and that in effect the laborers performed labor and services for them; that Jarvi Lahti, as well as Parviainen, were the employers of these laborers; hence the judgment is one for labor and services performed for them and collectible out of their homesteads. This claim is disposed of adversely by the record in the former action, as already pointed out. Lahti's liability was not for labor and services performed for him, but upon his contract to pay the debts of Parviainen.
2. Defendants contend next that, as the recovery was primarily based on labor and services performed, therefore the constitutional provision, art. 1, § 12, providing that "all property so exempted *392 shall be liable to seizure and sale for any debts incurred to any person for work done or materials furnished in the construction, repair, or improvement of the same; and provided further, that such liability to seizure and sale shall also extend to all real property for any debt incurred to any laborer or servant for labor or service performed," makes the homestead of Lahti liable to execution sale upon the judgment recovered; that, where a judgment is recovered by a laborer or servant for labor or service performed for someone, the homestead of any judgment debtor therein is liable to seizure and sale under such judgment, although he was held liable only because he was a surety or guarantor of the debt, or because of some collateral contract with the employer.
We do not so construe the constitutional provision. The homestead exemption law of this state has always received a liberal construction in favor of the homestead owner, as evidencing a public policy of the state to preserve to the owner a home and place of habitation. This does not permit any deviation from or limitation of any clear constitutional provision making the homestead liable, nor any forced construction thereof. On the other hand, it does not require any extension of such constitutional provision beyond its clear meaning and intent. It seems quite clear that the constitutional provision making all real property subject to seizure and sale for any debt incurred to any laborer or servant for labor or service performed necessarily refers to the relation of employer and employe between the owner of the real estate and the laborer or servant. It cannot mean of course that the real estate of some third person, not an employer of the laborer or servant, is liable to such seizure and sale. Clearly, it means that the real estate of the employer or employers of the laborer or servant, for whom the labor or service is performed, shall be liable therefor, and not the real estate of anyone else. Here Parviainen was the employer for whom the services were performed, and his real estate, including his homestead, was liable to seizure and sale under the judgment. Gust Lahti, the present plaintiff, was not an employer of these laborers, and his homestead was not liable to seizure and sale under the judgment. *393
No authorities directly in point on the facts have been called to our attention. The case of Lindberg v. Johnson,
Order affirmed.