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Lafferty v. Nickel
663 P.2d 168
Wyo.
1983
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*1 Marken, appel- for Casper, Kenneth R. lant. LAFFERTY, Johnny Franklin (Plaintiff), of Mu- W. and Jo Sherman James Owens Bostwick, appellees. Casper, rane & NICKEL, Rich Mark S. Officer

Officer Patton, RAPER, Brite and the ROONEY*, C.J., Reserve Officer and Before (De- Wyoming, Appellees BROWN, THOMAS, **, Town JJ. ROSE fendants). ROONEY, Chief Justice.

No. 5758. 27, 1981, Johnny Franklin November On Supreme Wyoming. Court of appellant-plaintiff, filed a civil Lafferty, 9, 1983. Nickel, Officer Mark S. Officer Brite, Patton, and the Rich Reserve Officer alleg- Mills, appellees-defendants, Town of were liable for various ing appellees out arising violations torts and civil Ap- arrest. March appellant’s judgment, rely- summary pellees moved The district court ing pleadings. summary appellees’ motion for granted limi- finding that the statutes of judgment1 claims for tations the Town of Mills relief had run and that protected immunity. On sovereign doctrine of issues as fol- appellant words the appeal, lows: grant- the District err in

“A. Did Court Summary Judg- Motion for ing Appellees’ Appellant’s claims grounds ment on limitations were barred statutes of Appellant’s pleadings where the the exist- Appellees’ Answer denied underlying of a material fact ence statutes, where of said application unsup- otherwise Appellees’ Motion was discovery Affidavits or materi- ported by als? Wyo- Does the applicability

“B. Claims Act extend ming Governmental Appellee law enforce- liability assault, ment officers for the torts prosecution, malicious and/or battery, one-year imprisonment beyond false provided by Wyo- l-3-105(a)(v), (1977)? ming Statute § * prejudice January 1. The district court dismissed Justice on Became Chief conversion made claim of unlawful ** against the officers. argument. Justice at time of oral Chief

169 693, Appellee (10th Cir.1966); “C. Is the Town of Mills shield- 696 Appellant’s ed from or all of claims any v. Chrysler Plymouth, Parker DeKalb 459 Sovereign Immunity?” the Doctrine of 184, F.Supp. (D.C.Ga.1978), 187 aff’d 673 (11th Cir.1982); F.2d 1178 6 Moore’s Feder- with the district court agree We Practice, 56-29, ¶¶ al 56.02[3], pp. 56.11[3], claims for relief were barred p. Therefore, purpose 56-229. for the statutes of limitations and applicable this facts in the com- we affirm. plaint are deemed allega- admitted and the grant judg- The of motion for summary a tions contained therein are in light viewed ment the district court to make the appellant. most favorable to the Moxley v. genu- dual determinations “that there is no Builders, Inc., 733, Laramie Wyo., 600 P.2d ine as to material fact and that any issue (1979); Highway v. State Commission is entitled to moving party judgment 59, Bourne, (1967). 425 P.2d Wyo., 56(c), as a matter of law.” Rule W.R.C.P. rule, summary As a motions for Appellant’s complaint sep- consists of five supported by competent are to be judgment alleges arate claims —the first claim various trial, we evidence admissible at and part tortious acts on the of appellees and required to examine that evidence from a through allege the second fifth claims vari- party op- most favorable to the viewpoint ous civil violations. the determina- posing making the motion sequence appel- of events genuine tion of whether or not there is a predicates lant his claims are: He was Hyatt Big issue as to a material fact. v. jailed 24, stopped, arrested and on March 4, Wyo., Horn District No. 636 P.2d School 1979, municipal for two violations of the 525, (1981); Jagusch, and Bancroft v. ordinances of the Town of Mills. His im- course, P.2d Of Wyo., 611 approximately ended twelve prisonment judgment proper summary motion for hours after arrest on March 1979. He and question prescribed where a of law is 26, 1979, formally charged was on March Lara- dispute. there is no factual Mason v. April convicted after a trial on Company, Wyo., mie Rivers 490 P.2d judgment 1979. a formal On (1971); Fugate v. Mayor ap- Appellant and sentence entered. Buffalo, 348 P.2d Council of Town of his convictions to the district court pealed 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 on No- and the convictions were reversed In this case based their motion appellees 1979.2 filed the vember summary judgment pleadings on the on November present civil action competent evi providing any other arrest, his im- more than two pos dence to the motion. conviction, within two prisonment, summary judg appellees’ ture motion the district court’s reversal of years of ment to either a motion to equivalent municipal court. conviction dismiss for to state a claim failure allegations accept Because we as true the pursuant made granted which relief W.R.C.P., appellant’s complaint, contained in for a 12(b)(6), to Rule or a motion presented is whether or not as a question pleadings pursuant made matter of law the statutes 12(c), W.R.C.P. Com Rule Schwartz appellant run when periods F.2d had Transatlantique, 405 pagnie General on November 1981.3 Cir.1968); complaint filed his (2nd United States brief, appellant argues gation concerning date convictions were that the district In his judicial notice of this reversed. court should have taken its failure to do so left a reversal and genuine precluding the complaint issue of material fact on each of the de- 3. Service of the However, grant summary judgment. sixty days as not- was made within fendants above, allegations accept complaint. ed we as true filing action is complaint pur- filing for the contained date of the deemed commenced on the poses appeal including appellant’s alle- of this Because complaint of action does not accrue until the exist things common-law tort ence of such a state of as will for relief based on person having proper enable a rela principles and on civil violations un- property persons tions to the concerned der 42 1983 and and be- U.S.C. §§ ’” * * * an action. Canton separate cause has advanced ar- appellant Fehling, Wyo., wine v. guments concerning statute of limita- *3 Boswell, (1978), from Bliler quoting each, we will tions to treat each 57, 72-73, Wyo. 59 P. 803 reh. denied argument separately. Wyo. 61 P. 867 giving In this case the actions rise to the LIMITATIONS —CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS alleged rights civil violations arose The claims based on the federal civil arrest, confinement, prose rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ time, cution in March of 1979. At that governed by two-year statute of limita- appellant had a cause of action which could period tions contained in brought against appellees. be Ro See: Spiegel District No. Lar- School Riverton, darte v. of 552 P.2d (10th County, amie 265-266 (1976). Appellant’s causes of action Cir.1979). 1-3-115 as fol- appellees’ alleged rights based on civil viola lows: tions occurred in March of 1979 and the liability “All actions a a created two-year period began statute of limitations statute, federal other than a forfeiture or Therefore, point. to run at that unless the limita- penalty, which tolled, it expired statute, tions is in such provided prior appellant’s filing complaint of his (2) years commenced within two barring action. cause of action has accrued.” In contention that that the appellees’ concedes running of the statutes of limitations tions claims for giving rise to of the mu- tolled relief were on civil based nicipal proceedings court criminal and until rights violations occurred between March court’s reversal of the convic- district more than two he resulting proceedings, those action, argues before he filed his relies on Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Insur- municipal effectively court convictions Inc., Agency, ance 209 Kan. 498 P.2d him from civil claims estopped pursuing his Galbraith, and Hoover v. implicit finding probable because of the Cal,3d Cal.Rptr. 498 P.2d 981 cause in those convictions. he However, easily these cases are dis- contends that either the claims did not ac- tinguishable. municipal crue until the reversal of his Keith, In supra, plaintiffs filed an action court convictions or the convictions tolled against an insurance broker for failure to running of the statutes of limitations coverage for procure compensation worker’s until such reversal. employer plaintiffs’ decedents A claim for relief accrues or arises: plaintiffs’ compen- claims for worker’s “ ‘ * * * held that the first comes to sation were denied. court person when in both contract and tort a A sounded bring an action. cause of say page and went on to at 272 of P.2d: implies person there is some “ * * * suit, in existence who can and also effectively pre- Plaintiffs were lawfully who can be sued. a con- suing vented from defendants [on Again, wrong has been commit- finally when a tract until it was deter- theory] ted, occurred, Johnson, supra or a has Kan. duty breach of mined in Otta v. [204 accrued, although 758], that insurance had not cause of action has nor an election caused to may ignorant procured, claimant be of it. A cause been 3(b), complaint purposes of statutes of limita- tions. Rule W.R.C.P. filed, respect and with to the action firmed. The Supreme Court held that a sounding in tort actual damages did not litigant may be collaterally estopped from result until a final determination of those raising an issue in his civil rights action if matters.” that issue has been fully fairly litigated in a state court criminal case, proceeding, it is unnecessary to wait for but the court did not address question determination as to whether or not insur- before us. actually procured ance had been or to wait damages for the provi- result. Contract In Singleton v. City of New supra, sions are not here present for determination the court commented on the proce- better and the damages occurred when the dure to be followed in those instances in were alleged to have been vio- which an action for violation of civil lated. had been filed but could not be processed Hoover, creditor until facts pertaining to it were finally de- *4 brought an action the former di- termined in a pending criminal action: rectors of corporation a defunct to collect « * * * As suggested by Circuit, the Fifth judgment on a corporation. debt of the the better course in situations where the The court held judgment the creditor district court feels compelled to abstain is could take no the director dismiss, to stay, rather than the 1983 § until the judgment against plaintiff action so that protected is corporation was final because he was possible from a statute of limitations bar not a creditor until that time. A Pickett, 1983 suit. Conner v. 552 § similar situation does not here exist. (5th Cir.1977) F.2d 585 (per curiam); see Singleton v. City of New 632 Ricci, also Mastracchio v. 498 F.2d 1257 (2nd Cir.1980), F.2d 185 cert. denied 450 (1st Cir.1974), denied, cert. 420 U.S. U.S. 101 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d 347 95 S.Ct. 42 (1975) L.Ed.2d 838 (1981), the issue presented was as to wheth (§ 1983 suit stayed ‘by agreement of er or not the pendency of criminal charges pending counsel’ outcome of state crimi against Singleton tolled the statute of limi proceedings); Klein, nal Fulford v. 529 tations applicable to his civil rights action (5th Cir.1976), banc, F.2d 377 aff''d. en brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sin § (5th Accord, Cir.1977). F.2d 342 Zurek v. gleton’s civil rights claims arose out of the Woodbury, F.Supp. (N.D. same incident as the charges. criminal Ill.1978).” 632 F.2d at 193. court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during of the Appellant’s civil rights claims based criminal proceedings. The same conclusion 24,1979 on his March arrest accrued at that Locke, was reached in Rinehart v. time, and the applicable two-year statute of (7th Cir.1971), and in Strung Ander limitations was not pend- tolled son, (9th Cir.1971). 452 F.2d 632 Spie Cf. ency prosecution. of the criminal Inasmuch gel, supra. as action was not filed until

Appellant also refers to the holding years of more than two after his claims ac 90, 101 v. McCurry, Allen crued, U.S. S.Ct. they are barred.

66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), to sustain conten tion that the statute of limitations is tolled LIMITATIONS —TORT CLAIMS pending a final decision in a criminal case. Appellant’s complaint also claims The plaintiff there filed a for relief battery, based on assault and ma- pursuant to 42 alleging U.S.C. liabil prosecution imprisonment licious and false ity by the defendants for an illegal search committed the law by and seizure. The enforcement officers ques search and seizure within the of their duties. The had been previously addressed plaintiff’s plaintiff criminal case wherein for these was convicted and the conviction was af- pertinent part: 1-39-113, provision supra, re- notice fn. than for the

“(a) Civil actions other only real be covery property period. to extend statutes of limitations af- following periods brought notice of the claim to That section the cause of action accrues: ter given government entity within two

¡f¡ # [*] n years act, error or omission or not discov- unless it was not discoverable “(v) (1) an action for: year, Within one diligence due despite ered the exercise of slander; “(A) Libel or act, error or omis- years within two “(B) battery; Assault or timely notify sion. The failure to “(C) or false Malicious the claimant government entity precludes or imprisonment; bringing Wyo- an action under the “(D) Upon penalty for a statute Act. Section ming Governmental Claims forfeiture, if a different except fn. 4. in the statute prescribed (cid:127)limitation appellant In this case concedes the action given which the occurred in complains actions of which he pre- brought within March, of 1979 and were April, May (Emphasis scribed the statute.” of their occur- discovered within two added.) l-3-105(a)(v), required appellant rence. to the Town of Mills present his claim more, clearly these claims Without pre- in order to not later than appellant’s complaint barred since filed an action under the serve two years on November more than *5 Ap- Act. Wyoming Governmental Claims upon after the occurrences such with the Town pellant not file his claim did claims were based. 25,1981, more than of Mills until November however, that the Appellant argues, alleged two the date Act, 1- Claims Wyoming § Governmental actions, by he 1-39- precluded § W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1982, et seq., 39-101 4, 113(a), supra, bringing fn. from an statute of limita provides three-year4 Claims Wyoming under the Governmental from tortious “resulting tions for an action Act. officers while conduct of law enforcement rights holding appellant’s Our that duties.” scope within the of their statutes by claims are barred 1-39-112, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. appellant’s of limitations tort Assuming 1982. brought because of may tort claims not be subject to the Wyoming claims are Govern file a claim Act5, timely failure to they properly mental were not Claims unneces- the Town of makes it it. relies on the with processed under “(ii) three-year figure by adding The claimant failed to discover this 4. He reaches act, one-year alleged within the two in error or omission limitation § two-year Cum.Supp. (2) year period despite notice the exercise of due to the 1-39-113, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. provision diligence.” in § provides pertinent pertinent part: 1982. Section 1-39-113 Section 1-39-114 part: provided, “Except otherwise actions as entity public governmental or a brought “(a) under this No action employee acting of his entity governmental act unless occurring after June duties for torts is based is claim presented which the action subject shall be forever which are to this act entity state- to the as an itemized (1) year within one barred unless commenced (2) years writing within ment two pursuant omission, act, the claim is filed to alleged after the date date of the except error or * * *” may W.S. 1-39-113. that a cause of action be institut- (2) years after dis- ed not more than two assumption tort this act, omission, Without covery if error or one-year by clearly would be barred the claimant establish that period applicable to these causes. act, limitation error or omission was: l-3-105(a)(v), supra. “(i) reasonably See § within a Not discoverable (2) year period; two sary to address the third issue raised prompt filing of the civil action with a appellant. stay until the criminal is de- termined as a solution.

Affirmed.

I am satisfied that the thrust of Allen v. THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring. McCurry, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1980), is that the principles of I concur in the result of this case as judicata res estoppel collateral ap- announced in the I majority opinion. would plicable prevent the relitigation in a civil however, prefer, espouse the court action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 of issues such instances a tolling respect rule with tried in state court criminal proceedings. I the statute of limitations because it seems can see no why reason those principles to me that there is a likelihood of situations should not also foreclose the retrial of issues arising in which the accused would in claims based common-law torts. be foreclosed by judica- the doctrines of res also, See Rodriguez, Preiser v. 411 U.S. ta and collateral estoppel pursuing 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 439 civil action by virtue of a criminal convic- (1973), and the cases there cited. During tion which ultimately might be set aside. the time in which the criminal conviction If that reversal occurred after the statute remained unreversed the civil claim of the of limitations for his civil action had run he criminal defendant for a violation of his would be effectively denied a subject would be to dismissal. Since the wrong. Because his opportunity for very this is a disability, arising evident out pursuing the civil action to conviction of a pending legal proceeding, rely I would would be practically many limited in in- upon it to justify tolling. stances, I am not satisfied that the rule espoused by majority opinion from Sin- recognize I legal that this is not a disabil gleton City New 632 F.2d 185 ity such as those contemplated in 1-3- (2nd Cir.1980), is adequate protect all recognize W.S.1977. I also the rule of whose might infringed. Rowray v. McCarthy, Wyo. to the effect that as a My position is influenced the stance I proposition courts have no power to read *6 took in my concurring opinion in Jessee v. into exceptions statutes of limitations not State, Wyo., 640 P.2d reh. denied 643 exceptions found therein because in favor P.2d 681 (Wyo.1982). urged I there abroga- persons laboring of under disability some tion of the exclusionary rule in criminal construed, strictly are and the enumeration cases in those instances in which there ex- specific exceptions of by implication ex isted a good-faith reasonable belief the cludes all others. I believe this to be the law enforcement officer that his action was rule, but it is not an absolute rule. proper. I also said: “ * * * In rel. Pink v. Cockley, State ex 110 Ind. Furthermore, I identify in the App. 37 N.E.2d 284 it táas essen development of civil depriva- actions for pursuing tial to an action tion of constitutional rights, and in the proceeding appeal. be reversed on rules, legal whether statutory or common court held that the time during which the law, which have developed permit suits prevented by action was the in against police officers a more effective proceeding the other would not be counted deterrent than the exclusionary rule. ” * * * against party determining the whether State, Jessee the statute of limitations barred his action. at 66. In 54 Limitations of Actions C.J.S. I have not position, retreated from that p. following appears: the language in order for the civil action to be a more effective deterrent it must be freely person prevented availa- “Where a is from exer- ble to infringed. those whose cising legal remedy by pendency his the my judgment it effectively pre- is more of the legal proceedings, during time served with tolling by proposing rule than which he is prevented thus should not be to unlawful determining tion to serve as a deterrent

counted Mm in law enforcement officers is neces- right, whether limitations have barred his excep- creation of an sary the courts are reluctant though even In this tion to the statute of limitations. additional to those knowledge exceptions ” * * * is reached as in the case the same result in the statute itself: contained is the statute majority opinion because support cited there do the textual The cases days the action was only yet tolled for different, the factually While conclusion. causes days filed 2 and 250 those cases a con- rationale of does accrued, except pros- for malicious of action statutory like this that the clusion in cases ecution. held to of limitations should not be agreement with I do add that I am not the criminal during run that the position majority opinion of the appeal. prosecution for malicious cause of action In 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions the defendant’s ar- accrued at the time of proposition is stated as p. Wyoming prosecution. The law in rest and follows: the claim for malicious is that laid down that when- “The broad rule is underlying state not accrue until does paramount authority prevents ever some terminated in favor of proceeding court has exercising legal his reme- from Lin- v. Johnston Fuel plaintiff. Weber which he is thus dy, the time ers, Inc., P.2d 535 Wyo., 540 counted prevented is not to be not accrue that cause of action did instance determining him in whether statute I still concur in until November even of limitations has barred however, be- majority, decision specific ex- though the statute makes police that these there is no indication cause in such cases. This ception his favor officers were not give effect to a rule enables the courts duties, therefore can- they official their exception object an creating law prosecution. malicious not be sued for from run- prevent which is to the statute River, Kimbley of Green pre- during the time the claimant ning P.2d 871 vented, part, fault on his majority opinion facet of the One other have the full benefit suing, so that he can agree I do not that even troubles me. which to time allowed him in Wyoming application of the hypothetical rule, injunction an his action. Under this Act, 1-39-101 et Governmental Claims §§ prevents legal or other proceeding appropri- (Cum.Supp.1982), seq., W.S.1977 exercising legal one from July effective statute became ate. That op- suspends tolls or against another months after more than three ”* * of limitations. eration of the statute satisfied that it is Lafferty. I am arrest *7 no and could have substantive nature language is the like tenor and effect Of occurred to those events which application Limitation of Ac- in 51 Am.Jur.2d found I that it became effective. prior to the date 170, p. tions would, therefore, applica- rule that it has and would not tion to these circumstances necessary that it is my Because of view computation hypothetically even discuss of action to citizens this cause preserve limitations as affected period of a violated, I would not rights may be whose statute. limita- them the statute of apply time for which period tions period case that the I would hold in this and could criminal conviction is effective the date the was tolled from of limitations of civil until the asserted to foreclose was effective criminal conviction judicata or the doctrine of res In this instance that claims under it was reversed. date however, enough, my long If is not estoppel. the doctrine of collateral of time the statute of State, application has va- to bar the in Jessee v. argument claim. limitations to of the civil lidity preservation then the

Case Details

Case Name: Lafferty v. Nickel
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: May 9, 1983
Citation: 663 P.2d 168
Docket Number: 5758
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
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