177 Pa. 412 | Pa. | 1896
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Monopolies of any sort have never been favorites with the law. They were held at the common law to be against public policy because against common right. The grants, charters, letters patent, or other form of device or assurance, by the sovereign for their creation were declared by the act of parliament of 21 James I. chap. 8, to be “ utterly void and of none effect, and in nowise to be put in use and operation.” Nothing short of the “omnipotence of parliament” is able to exclude a subject from trade in England: Bacon’s Ab. vol. 7, p. 23. Two exceptions to this general rule were given by the early text writers. First, “It seemeth clear that the king may, for a reasonable time, make a good grant to any one of the sole use of any art invented or first brought into the realm by the grantee.” Second, The king may grant to particular persons the sole use of some particular employments, as “ of printing the Holy Scriptures, and law books,” etc. The somewhat curious reason given for the second exception is that an unrestrained liberty to print the books to which it relates might be “ of dangerous consequences to the public.” To these exceptions a third must now be added, viz, the right of a tradesman to the exclusive use of such signs, words or symbols as he may have adopted and used in his business to distinguish articles of his own production from all similar articles produced by other persons. These exceptions do not impair the force of the general rule. Exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exceptis. The rule is unrestricted liberty in the practice of all arts and trades and in the use of the methods by which they are conducted. He who asserts the right to an exclusive privilege in any department of business must bring himself under the protection of some recognized exception to the rule. The plaintiff in this case claims an exclusive privilege under the third exception, viz, the right to the sole use of a certain trade-mark adopted, used, and registered by him; and he alleges that the defendant has adopted and is now using a trade-mark which is an imitation of, and an infringement upon, his own. It becomes important therefore to learn just what the plaintiff’s trade-mark is, and then to determine whether
The defendants are engaged in the manufacture of confectionery and state in their answer that their goods include stick candies, toy forms, caramels, plain confections, candied fruits, leaves, nuts, and the like. These when prepared for use are packed in boxes of various sizes and forms, each of which bears a slip or label indicating the variety of confectionery it contains, and another slip or label displaying the trade-mark which affords to the purchaser an assurance that the goods he is about to buy are the genuine product of the defendant’s establishment. As a general proposition the right of W. H.
They are put upon a background of “ any suitable color,” no color whatever being named. If this injunction can be sustained on the ground on which it was put in the court below, there is no style of letter, no mode of arrangement, no color in the solar spectrum, to which the plaintiffs cannot lay equal claim. But as the plaintiffs themselves say in the description from which we have quoted, “ the essential characteristic of our trade-mark is the letters P. C. W.” Those are what indicate the ownership and origin of the goods, and they carry their
The master finds that the defendant has adopted boxes and packages quite like those used by the plaintiff. The same is no doubt true of most of the confectioners in the commonwealth. The boxes and packages are made by box manufacturers to contain an even number of pounds, or fractions of a pound, and are necessarily uniform in size and general appearance. They are made for the trade and are sold to the trade, without discrimination. The plaintiff and the defendant have an equal right to buy from the manufacturers; and they must buy boxes of the sizes and shapes made for, and in use by, confectioners generally. The similarity in size and shape of the boxes does not therefore justify the master in finding that they were selected for an improper or fraudulent purpose; for the size and shape of the boxes are determined by the makers and fixed upon with a view to the accommodation of the largest number of purchasers. The other circumstance to which the master refers as justifying his decree is the use of the same names for varieties of candies that the plaintiff had previously used, and perhaps devised. But one who invents a machine or a new combination, or devises a new article, contributes the result of his skill and his inventive powers to the public if he does not take the necessary steps to secure himself an exclusive right to use and vend his invention.
If he does not do this he must not complain if his neighbor appropriates his invention or device to his own use, and enters into competition with him in its production and sale. The ground on which the courts will interfere in such cases is to protect the inventor from the attempt of his neighbor to sell his own work as and for the work of the inventor. This would be enjoined as a fraud upon both the inventor and the public; but so long as he sells his own work as his own, any man may imitate the unprotected work of any other man as closely as he is able. We think the injunction awarded in this case cannot be sustained upon the findings of the learned master, and should be set aside.
If the defendant is really attempting to sell his own confectionery by representing it to the public as the production of the
The decree is reversed. No order is made in relation to costs.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
This is a perfectly clear case of a fraudulent effort of appellants to get a part of plaintiff’s trade by such imitation of his boxes, labels, lettering, coloring, etc., as will deceive and mislead intending purchasers. It is an effort which equity ought and usually does enjoin without reference to the strict doctrine of trade-marks. For this reason I would affirm the decree.
' We concur in this dissent.
Dean, J.,
Fell, J.