105 F. 729 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois | 1900
The declaration in this case consists of the common counts and of special counts in assumpsit upon a contract between the parties, in pursuance of which plaintiff built for defendant a bridge. Defendant filed the general issue and eight special pleas. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth pleas aver that the contract in question is void under the Illinois statutes of
The second, fifth, eighth, eleventh, and fifteenth replications go to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth pleas, respectively, and, in substance, aver that plaintiff, in its business, is within the exception to the anti-trust statute of 1891 which is provided by the act of 1897. Defendant demurs to these replications on the ground that the act of 1897 is but an amendment of the first section of the act of 1891; that said amendment constitutes class legislation, and is therefore void; and that a void amendment cannot in any manner affect a valid statute. Plaintiff, on the other hand, denies that the act of 1897 is an amendment of the act of 1891, but contends that it is in law a repeal and re-enactment of said section 1, in which view it would vitiate the entire act of 1891. Both parties are in accord in the contention that the exception provided by the statute of 1897 constitutes class legislation.
The defendant is, in this suit, attempting to avail itself in a collateral proceeding of a defense based on a fact which should be determined in a direct proceeding. In other words, before a defendant can evade the payment of the purchase price of commodities, actually received, on the ground that the seller is a trust or combination in restraint of trade, in contravention of the statute, there should be an adjudication of a competent tribunal, in a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose, determining that such seller is a trust or combination in the sense contemplated by the statute. This is in accord with the ordinary rules of statutory construction. The practical working of any other rule could not fail to emphasize the justice and necessity of so holding in cases similar to the one at bar. It cannot be insisted that the decision in one case would be binding or even persuasive in any other case. Each suit to recover purchase money, in which the statute is pleaded by way of defense, would call for a separate and distinct determination of the legal status of the plaintiff, thereby making the claim for purchase money merely an incidental issue. This would be true even if the amount involved were but five dollars, and the case were before a justice of the peace. The result would depend upon the varying conditions of each case as affected by the skill of lawyers, the bias of jurors, and other attendant circumstances. This would inevitably lead to such confusion as would force federal courts to so construe the statutes as to protect the due and regular administration of justice from unconscionable prolixity and irreconcilable adjudications. In the case of Ford v. Association, 155 Ill. 166, 39 N. E. 651, 27 L. L. A. 298, the supreme court of Illinois permitted the defendant to interpose this defense in a collateral proceeding. The point last above stated does not appear to have been considered by that court. The only contention was as to whether or not the statute of 1891 constituted a valid defense to that action. But the Illinois statute is silent as to the method to be pursued in determining whether a corporation seeking to enforce a claim comes