*1 (No. 69181 . LAFATA, THE
DOMINICK VILLAGE OF Appellee, al.,
LISLE et Appellants. Opinion July Rehearing filed 1990 . 1, 1990. denied October *2 J., RYAN, STAMOS,J., dissenting. joined by Diamond, DiCianni, Ancel, Clink, Thomas G. of Murphy P.C., & for of Lisle. Cope, Chicago, appellant Village Griffith, Hinshaw, Culbertson, D. Kendall Moel- mann, & for Fuller, Hoban Frank Chicago, appellant Associates, & Inc. Novotny
Daniel Hugh N. B. Arnold and John J. Kadjan, & Toomey, Chicago, Arnold for Kadjan, appellee. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of court: Plaintiff, Lafata, Dominick this brought action against defendants the circuit of Du multiple Page County, seeking to recover he damages injuries sustained October when he was struck by an machine earth-moving known as an endloader while *3 working a site. At the construction time the acci- dent, the endloader was transporting a section of con- crete pipe, suspended from a cable attached to- the bucket the endloader, from a stockpile sections pipe located construction site to near place where section was to pipe be installed drainage sewer Plaintiff system. alleged count I of his a vi- complaint (Ill. 1987, olation the Structural Stat. Work Act Rev. 48, ch. pars. 69), and named through as defendants under count the of Lisle Village (the and Village) Associates, Frank and Inc. II Novotny (Novotny). Count of the was complaint brought different defend- against ants and is not relevant here. trial judge granted and Village’s Novotny’s motions for summary judg- ment, concluding that the endloader was not a mechani- cal the contemplation contrivance within Struc- tural Work Act. The reversed appellate of the trial court and remanded cause for
judgment (185 further We proceedings. App. and for leave to granted Village Novotny’s petition Ill. 2d R. appеal (107 315(a)).
Plaintiff as a Benchmark laborer employed Benchmark with the Construction contracted Company. the intersections of Route Village McKinley widen Avenue, Lisle, and Street Illinois. The con- Burlington tract also the removal replacement involved and sewer curbs and and the of new and gutters, placement water pipes. the carrier the sections
Normally, delivering of sewer and water to the would sec- pipe jobsite string pipe tions the trenches the sections in- where would be along times, however, stalled. At other sections would pipe occasions, be at one site. On those an stockpiled endloader, a vehicle with a dirt-moving shovel-type front, bucket in was used to sections transport pipe from the to the where in- place they were stockpile stalled the sewer After the was deliv- system. pipe ered, a backhoe would then be used to lower the sections into the trench. down
On the of the accident sections had been day pipe at one site. Plaintiff was stockpiled assigned help the sections of from the to the transport pipe stockpile shoulders of the trenches the sections would be in- where stalled, a distance of about one-half block. To accomplish one task, this and co-worker attached end of a bucket, wire cable to the endloader’s the other wrapped section, end of the around the middle of a cable pipe section then lifted the bucket so was elevated feet Each ground. three four above approximately section feet approximately eight long pipe *4 As sеveral hundred co- weighed pounds. plaintiff’s where the sec- place worker drove the endloader to installed, tion walked ahead of the was plaintiff endloader and held one end of the section pipe pre- vent it from in either direction. tilting
On one when a section had been moved trip, ap- pipe destination, half distance to its intended proximately on an then plaintiff tripped unidentified He was object. endloader; struck its left front came to rest wheel he was on the As a top plaintiff lying ground. incident, result of the suffered multiple injuries. Plaintiff filed a one-count the circuit complaint court of Cook that County against Village, alleging cause proximate of his violation injuries Structural Stat. ch. (Ill. pars. Work Rev. Plaintiff through 69). later amended the count to add firm Novotny, engineering the draw- prepared for the ings, plans specifications sewer repair as a later systems, defendant. Plaintiff added a second count to the complaint. additional count is based on the manufacture and of the endloader design involved the incident and is not at issue here.
The Village moved for summary judgment, arguing endloader, that the as was used at the time of being plaintiff’s injuries, was not a mechanical contrivance within the of the Structural Work Act. The meaning Vil- lage reasoned that the endloader not being used for tools, support workers, but rather equipment, the device’s sole use at the time of in- plaintiff’s juries was for the sections of purpose transporting from one area of the construction site pipe to another. alternative, that a violation of Village argued statute was not the рroximate cause of in- plaintiff’s juries. judge trial motion for sum- granted Village’s
mary judgment; determined judge endloader, as it was used at the time of being plaintiff’s was not a Structural injuries, device covered Act. He did Work not reach the second conten- Village’s *5 352
tion relating proximate cause. After the trial is- judge sued his ruling, also moved for Novotny summary judg- ment. Finding issues raised by Novotny were identical to those addressed by Village, the trial an judge entered order granting motion for Novotny’s summary judgment.
On appeal, appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. court Initially, appellate addressed the division of authority among the appellate court dis- tricts concerning whether the Structural Work Act ap- plies solely devices that are used to support workers or whether the Act also includеs within its de- coverage vices that are used to support materials. (See generally Urman v. Walter (1981), 101 Ill. 3d App. 1085.) ap- pellate court concluded that the intent of the Act was to provide a cause of action for recovery for injuries caused by failure of those in of construction charge to pro- vide support for work materials as well as for workers, or for caused injuries by of the inadequacy support 185 Ill. provided. 3d at 207. App.
Further, court appellate concluded that whether a device is specific included within scope Struc tural Work Act is determined by use to which the de (See Prange vice is being put the time of the incident. v. Construction Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. Kamar 1128.) court found that at the time of the inci dent the endloader here being used as a for support construction mаterials. Based on its conclusions Act applies for materials supports and that endloader here was being used as a device contemplated the Act, court appellate held the device was a mechanical contrivance within the meaning the Act. Because it believed that the issue was beyond of the trial judge’s ruling, appellate declined to consider whether a violation of the Structural Work Act was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The Structural Work Act was enacted to provide pro- tection to work.” workers extrahazardous “engaged (St. John R.R. Co. 54 Ill. 2d Donnelley & Sons Section of the requires: ladders, scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, supports,
“All contrivances, or other mechanical erected constructed or firm any person, corporаtion this State erection, alteration, use in the removal or repairing, viaduct, any house, building, or other painting bridge, structure, constructed, safe, shall in a be erected and *6 manner, proper suitable and and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and as to and operated give proper adequate person to the life and limb of or protection any persons employed thereon, engaged or or under passing same, by or and in manner prevent such as to falling any may material be deposited that used or (Ill. 1987, 48, 60.) thereon.” Rev. Stat. ch. par.
Section 9 the Act “in on those imposes liability charge of” the construction to or person any prop- “[f]or occasioned erty, by any wilful violations of this or wilful failure with of its Ill. comply provisions.” 1987, 48, Rev. Stat. ch. par. 69.
In our rеcent decision in v. Meyer Trac- Caterpillar tor 1, Co. 135 Ill. we (1990), determined Structural Work Act devices used for applies sup- port of as materials well as to devices the sup- used for port of workers. focused on Meyer, language we of the statute requiring that device “be so erected constructed, and placed operated and as to give proper and life protection to the and limb of adequate any per- son or engaged or persons employed thereon, passing same, under or and in such manner prevent as of any material that be used or falling may deposited Ill. (See 48, thereon.” Rev. Stat. ch. Be- par. cause the Act contemplates injuries “passing to persons hoists, under or cranes whose by” stays primary function for we con- provide materials, is to support injuries the Act caused Meyer applies
eluded in ma- of the failure to work provide support as a result workers, and for caused injuries as for terials as well Meyer, 135 provided. inadequacy support 13. 2d at the use to then determine whether only
We need time of the oc- being put which endloader was machine into a mechanical con- currence transformed the of the Structural Work Act. trivance within meaning here their below that be- argument Defendants renew used rather cause the endloader was being transport, section, it not a than mechanical pipe support, at the time within the of the Act meaning contrivance Plaintiff contends that the occurrence in be- question. pipe suspended cause the endloader elevated used the endloader was against being sup- gravity, for construction materials. port should liberally the Structural Work Act Although workers construed to to construction provide protection activities, this court hazardous engaged particularly intended to cover has was not recognized En- (See all construction work. McNellis Combustion 151; 58 Ill. 2d Vuletich v. Inc. gineering, *7 417, Ill. 2d 422.) 117 Corp. (1987), United States Steel that the Act, terms, its requires The Structural Work hoist, crane, scaffold, stay, the use of a involve injury or other mechanical contrivance before ladder, support 1987, Rev. Stat. of the Act See Ill. apply. provisions 48, ch. 60. par. is covered by
In whether a device particular analyzing the intended use of the de- must ascertain “we 117 (Vuletich, at the time of the injury.” vice question use a mechanical contriv- Further, Ill. 2d at must be such that de- ance at the time of thе injury hoists, scaffolds, similar to vice exhibits characteristics (See Farley ladders or cranes, supports. stays, 355 60 Ill. 2d 436 (1975), (ap- Marion Power Shovel Co. Thus, if the in- doctrine of ejusdem generis).) plying time of use of the mechanical at the plain- tended device support tiff’s was to elevate or injury provide or materials, engaged or for persons employed device, it the characteristics that would cause possessed it to considered a mechanical contrivance within the statute. meaning
Plaintiff contends that the endloader was used to sup- material, a port against structural pipe, gravity therefore of a me- exhibits characteristics required chanical contrivance the Act. He likens the under endloader, here, as it was used to a being stationary crane, the sole difference being mobility not endloader. Plaintiff the Act does distin- argues the vertical of material 75 feet a guish transportation crane Panteleo v. (cf. Gamm (1969), App. that was to roof of (hoist elevating roofing material the time of device un- building plaintiff’s injury der the from Act)) the horizontal of that transportation same material for the same distance in the in which way endloader here. transported by
Defendants concede that the endloader lifted pipe section above the and therefore ground provided support Defendants, however, for the material. to the stat- point the device be erected utory provision requires “for erection, or constructed the use in the al- repairing, teration, house, via- building, removal painting duct, or other structure” and cites v. Lester B. Crafton Associаtes, Inc. 46 Ill. 2d for the Knight & that a device workers or mate- proposition transporting rial from one area of a construction site to horizontally Act. engaged another is structural work under the under the Crafton, plaintiff sought recovery for an he sustained after off tractor falling time of with 30-foot side boom hoist. At the equipped *8 356 accident, the tractor was being used transport
bundles from of structural steel a to a storage yard The site. bundles were to a building fastened cable hoist the tractor lifted attached to and nine inches two feet ground. above the helped load bundle of plaintiff hoist, steel onto and was tractor injured when lurched as he was climb onto back of attempting the tractor to ride to the site. In addition to building that a finding violation of the Act was not proximate cause of the the court in plaintiff’s injury, con- Crafton cluded: is clear from “It plain statute wording the Allis-Chalmers tractor does fall simply no[t] statute, within the nor it the was intent of legisla- ture such to cover a situation. It is for us difficult to un- how, from the statute, derstand plain wording Allis-Chalmers tractor was ‘erected or constructed by *** for in the any person erection, the use al- repairing, ” *** teration, removal or structure.’ 46 painting Ill. 2d at 537-38. Crafton, Prange
Without addressing plaintiff cites Kamar Construction Corp. 109 Ill. App. argues this court should the appellate follow court’s decision there. Prange, In court concluded Work Act Structural to an sus applied tained driver of a tractor awith forklift equipped while the tractor transporting was several used in poles the construction of a barn from storage area to pole their Each 18 installation. feet place pole long 300 to wаs in weighed pounds. jured when several slid from the forklift onto the poles he operator’s raising while was forklift compartment device. believe that our
We defendants misapprehend holding tractor in- this analyzed Crafton. Crafton volved device that engaged transport workers and that to be with a happened hoist equipped As we recently *9 of steel. and to be bundle carrying on structural stated, are certain hazards present “[t]here the construction in are to work sites which not unique fall within the purview These hazards do not dustry. fact virtue of the merely by the Structural Work Act site.” (Meyer, are on a structural work present they of workers from 13.) 135 Ill. at The routine transport site to another would one location on the construction to the sufficiently unique considered an activity construction industry. hand, transport
On the other we believe that of the here, poles section like the pipe transport sufficiently would be considered an Prange, activity In determining to the construction unique industry. whether device is covered under Structural Work Act, a court should the mere elevation of the past look worker material and whether the hazard cre- consider ated the elevation was one the Act designed was Vuletich, 117 Ill. 2d at sec- prevent. (See pipe tion involved in the accident here was approximately feet several hundred A eight long weighed pounds. device was used special being transport unwieldy at- section; the section was a cable pipe suspended by Plaintiff tached to the of a endloader. moving bucket to prevent to walk the endloader assigned alongside considerations, All of these tilting. section from combination, here activity us to believe that prompt that the of a hazardous nature and one particularly General to alleviate when it Assembly was attempting the Structural Act. See Louis v. Baren- passed Work 39 Ill. 2d fanger (1968), 450. attempt distinguish
Defendants nevertheless that the Prange noting device here from the device to install the tractor involved there was used poles upon dug which had for previously arrival into holes been reason that The defendants because purpose. endloader was not used in the installation of the pipe sections in the sewer it was not used in the con- system, believe, however, struction of the structure. We danger inherent in which the endloader was way used had a connection the construction peculiar with the structure. The of the section from the transport pipe stockpile where it was to be installed was place crucial to the installation and suffi- system sewer to a construction site to fall within the ciently unique Moreover, of the Act. coverage here and plaintiff Prange were to the same risk inher- exposed ent in the construction the time of the re- industry incidents. We do not believe that the General spective meant of the Act Assembly coverage depend *10 how the device was to be used after the accident oc- curred. reasons,
For we that hold foregoing endloader, case, as used in was a mechanical contriv- this ance in within the engaging activity contemplation Structural Work Act.
Defendants also here a violation of the argue Structural Act was not a cause of plаin- Work proximate tiff’s in injuries. Although raised defendants both courts, trial neither court decided is- appellate sue. Because this issue was not decided lower courts, decline to reach the merits of the argument we here. The is affirmed. judgment appellate
Judgment affirmed. RYAN, JUSTICE dissenting: I falls within the do not agree plaintiff’s injury 1987, (Ill. of the Structural Rev. Stat. scope Work 60 et seq.). I has need- 48, ch. feel that par. majority of this stat- confusion into the injected application lessly ute.
Just terms ago, two this court decided v. Meyer Cat erpillar (1990), Tractor Co. 135 Ill. 1. 2d We there held in order for a to fall plaintiff’s within the of the Structural Work it must from result the failure of one of the enumerated devices support while in one engaged enumerated structural work activities. 135 Ill. 2d at (Meyer, 13-14.) We defined the limits of the Act’s coverage accordance with its ex press (135 Ill. 2d at language. 14.) ignores majority the crux of our opinion Meyer, well as the sound principles a series of our developed Structural prior Work Act decisions. has majority blurred thereby the distinction between those activities fall which within coverage the Act and those which do not.
This court has repeatedly observed that while the Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose protecting workers engaged hazardous particularly activities, the Act was not intended to cover and all construction activities and the hazards attendant thereto. (See, e.g., Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1990), 135 1, Ill. 2d 7-8; Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp. (1987), 117 Ill. 417, 422; 2d Long New City Boston (1982), 456, 467-68; 91 Ill. 2d v. Lester B. Crafton 46 Ill. Associates, Knight & Inc. (1970), A brief review of this pertinent court’s Structural Work Act decisions will highlight flaw in the majority opin- ion here. v. Lester Associates, B. Knight & Inc. Crafton 46 Ill. 2d which the discusses, here majority
the plaintiff was injured when he fell off a tractor which was transporting material a construction site. The tractor had hoist, been equipped with a side boom and at the time of the it plaintiff’s being was used bundles of transport structural steel from a storage yard to a site. After building load a bundle of helping steel hoist, onto the the plaintiff attempted to climb onto the of building back the tractor to ride to the site. plain- tiff fell In ad- and was when the tractor lurched. injured dition that violation of Structural Work finding Act was the plaintiff’s not the cause of proximate injury, this court observed:
“If that interpret we Structural Work Act so in- facts the instant case such an of are within terpretation riding would cover the necessarily on tractor a trailer the bаck of the Allis-Chalmers with to the hauling attached to this tractor the structural steel the use construction site rather than with of a side boom *** hoist. an interpretation We further believe that such might truck an driving pickup well cover the very of the defendant some considerable distance employee attempt from work in an materi- gather the actual site bring als and them back to the construction site itself. chang- Such reached without interpretation an cannot be ing meaning of the Structural Work Act. plain *** wording It is clear from the of the statute plain that fall simply the Allis-Chalmers tractor does no[t] statute, legislature nor intent of within the such a situation. It is difficult to understand cover how, statute, Allis- plain wording from by any per- Chalmers tractor ‘erected constructed *** erection, alteration, repairing, son the usе ” *** 46 Ill. 2d at removal or structure.’ painting 537-38. New City Boston 91 Ill. 2d Long while volunteer, a civic fell from ladder plaintiff, a New from a
stringing lights utility pole Christmas Boston this occurrence did street. This held fall the Structural Act. Work within This the Act not applica- court there “is emphasized any work ble to the use of a ladder. requires lad- Rather, Act’s limited to the use of is application structures, upon ders in activities specified performing alteration, re- ‘erection, repairing, listed the statute: ” (91 moval or ***.’ (Emphasis original.) painting
361 466.) 2d at This court found that the in combina- lights, with tion erected for the utility pole previously pur- of pose transmitting electrical did not constitute power, a structure under the Act. Ill. 2d (91 467.) at We thus concluded that in plaintiff was not one of engaged the enumerated work at structural activities the time of his at 91 Ill. 2d 467-68. injury.
In Vuletich v. Corp. (1987), Unitеd States Steel 117 Ill. 2d 417, the was when he plaintiff injured slipped fell a on set stairs were covered which temporary ice and snow. rejected This plaintiffs argu- ment that his injury was under the Struc- compensable tural Work Act. We there noted that though even were stairs used to “elevate” workers a site, on work plaintiff not work that could engaged be described as of a hazardous nature being particularly the time of his injury. (117 2d at We further ob- served that under the plaintiff’s un- theory recovery Act, der the “a mailman who and is on the slips injured front icy steps one’s home would have a cause of action under the as would or domestic janitor help falls who on stairs while broom a closet. returning of the Act protection should confined to activities to which it was intended to and should not be con- apply strued so every injury suffеred on stairs will fall within its purview.” Ill. 2d at 424. Meyer, plaintiff working around bundles
of steel storage racks which were ground resting on their narrow long, edges. Following unbanding and unbundling racks, the racks were to be in- stalled in a warehouse. A bundle of racks fell over and struck the causing him plaintiff, al- injury. legéd failure to provide for the racks support during the unbanding and consti- unbundling process tuted violation the Act. We disagreed, concluding the devices the plaintiff claimed should have been unhanding the racks un- during used support have been thereby engaged would bundling process one work activities enumerated structural noted, cases, the Act. we had repeatedly prior We hazard on a structural work site every that not present *13 at 13.) Act. Ill. 2d falls of the purview (135 within that of the Structural Work We stated boundaries “[t]he the Act itself. Act language are circumscribed one in must in in acti- The device be use question of the in the Act the time injury." vities enumerated a different 14.) Ill. 2d at We further observed that (135 had plaintiff’s result have warranted might well been a which was ac- resulted from the failure of device along into the walls of lifting the racks tually position But we emphasized Ill. 2d at (135 warehouse. of the statute that “were we to stretch language other than coverage order draw its activities within itself, the Act we expand those enumerated would Act what intended. beyond legislature of the exceedingly would dif- necessary As be consequence, which fall within the ficult those activities identify A that not. mul- coverage Act’s and those do [Citations.] out than those set Act titude of activities other we site. But find on a construction may performed legislature intended to proposition untenable of the common such activities from the realm sweep all into the boundaries of the Structural Work law and Ill. at 15. Act.” 135 2d Meyer, of the appellate we cited the opinion Homart Co. Rayfield Development and history purpose which summarizes
App. Act, well its relation to the Work as Structural Act Act. Structural Work Workers’ Compensation a rem- designed provide was enacted in 1907. It was in certain extra- engaged while injured workers edy the common law and insured occupations, hazardous doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption the risk preclude recovery. would worker’s later, Workers’ enacted four Compensation years also afforded without regard contribu- compensation therefore, In that tory negligence. respect, Workers’ Compensation Act served thе same as the purpose Rayfield Structural Work Act. The court observed: background “This Structural Work Act demon- strates that the Act is injured intended to afford workers remedy exists, the construction where none trades remedy rather than to an where other provide additional *** satisfactory reason, remedies are For available. this we believe that Act should Structural Work be liber- ally interpreted where the for a interpreta- need liberal tion reasonably protect exists to and to in- afford relief jured However, workers. should not be so interpreted it is unnecessarily extended to cover neoteric theories of liability existing where the work- compensation men’s tort give remedies protect satisfactory reasonable and relief construction work- *14 (100 ers.” Ill. App. 622-23.) 3d at Meyer, (See 135 Ill. 15-16.) 2d аt It also should be noted that the of in genesis negligence this State comparative (see Alvis Ribar 2d Ill. (1981), 1; 85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. par. 1116) harsh, has removed all- 2— or-nothing sting of from com- contributory negligence mon negligence law actions. this
Against background, deci- particularly prior I court, sions of this see plaintiff’s cannot how in the present case can be said to fall within the parame- of ters the Structural Plaintiff here Work Act. was in merely engaged transporting concrete from one pipe of area the construction site to another. Defendants here on this in rely opinion court’s I heavily agree Crafton. with defendants is similar to the strikingly Crafton however, The present attempts case. to distin- majority, guish routine trans- by simply stating “[t]he Crafton on the construction from one location workers
port an suffi- activity not bе considered site another would Ill. 2d industry.” (137 to the construction ciently unique The is without a difference. 357.) at This a distinction routine be made same observation can validly fact, In in of construction materials. transport Crafton as in being transported just construction materials were Crafton, in The is this case. difference only whereas, on the tractor worker was ride attempting case, in this he was beside it. walking on majority rely appellate opin- opts Corp. v. Kamar Construction Prange ion in while in which the was plaintiff injured App. site to be used across a construction transporting poles case, in in the of a barn. As our pole construction Prange while were injured poles in In Prange, site. in barn merely transport pole however, transported once the tractor-forklift which site, barn it was then actually reached the poles pole into setting poles position used assist This did constitute dug erecting holes. previously this within the did meaning a structure Prange holding. fact court’s (See form a basis for the Prange, Prange, So, 109 Ill. 3d at App. in the construction “mechanical device” was used it was structure, injury, being the time though, Prange not point is be- used to transport poles. to trans- cause, case, only the endloader was used in our It to install used concrete port pipe. “structure.” distinction. has overlooked this majority
Prange, a dual func performing the tractor-forklift was *15 the trac constructing. In our case tion, transporting Another mechanical device tor was solely transporting. is, in There our the installation of pipe. was used for in named activities case, breaking a between point clear Act and other construction-related activities not .the nаmed in the Act. A line between covered activities and noncovered activities must be drawn at some point. There is a clear line where this should be breaking point in drawn this case. has overlooked this majority clear has breaking point and construed transportation and construction as one it be said could activity, been have in Prange. its reliance on majority attempts justify
Prange here by observing that “the and the plaintiff in Prange were to the same risk inher exposed ent in the construction at the time of the re industry spective incidents. We do not believe General meant Assembly coverage of the Act depend how the device was to be used after the oc accident curred.” (137 This is a observation, valid but it is not relevant here of the rationale because Long New Boston 91 Ill. City 2d 456. The risk inhеrent in the ladder to Christmas ascending string in lights Long was no different the risk from inherent in ascending ladder In paint Long, house. this court in recognized assessing scope is not sufficient abstract, focus risk in the merely upon apart from the which context in the risk itself presents in a particular Meyer, case. we further clarified our constant recognition that not every construction hazard is covered the Act by merely virtue of fact that it is on a site, construction or is in some present fashion related to structural are work. There risks inherent certain construction site activities not enumerated Act which to, are identical or even virtually greater than, risks inherent activities named specifically Such Act. activities are not drawn within the the Act virtue of the they fact that involve risks iden to, tical than, those greater activities enumerated in Indeed, the Act. all Crafton, Long and teach that Meyer *16 it is in the Structural Act usually helpful, not Work very to focus the abstract “risk” to which the analysis, terms, Act its the does not plaintiff exposed. By was It in only to risks or hazards. speak speaks abstract court, This in terms of certain structural work activities. terms, that those in has activities descriptive recognized risks. well fairly peculiar volve certain Such risks be may activities, are no means they to the enumerated but is that lan enough to structural work. It clear unique in to the Act covers our decisions the effect that guage and that the hazardous activities” certain “particularly Act hazards are fairly peculiar addresses risks or which in the work activities enumerated structural unique definitional, the Act is rather than merely descriptive, in the of this-statute. fоcus the Struc proper ac therefore, tural Act is on the type Work analysis, tivity engaged in, to which the not “risk” particular at the time of the The court injury. was plaintiff exposed activity then may recognize, consequentially, involves certain risks which question legislature sought eliminate. case, is nothing
In the there present suggest of the failure of de as the result injured vice which these into setting pipes position As here noted, merely trench. the endloader sewer from the where were they transported pipes place sewer set near ground and them on stockpiled into the A then a pipe trench. would lower backhoe not engaged any trench. The endloader was noted, then, as Act. This is activities enumerated case and present between valid distinction Prange. it draw necessary case will every the Act those line activities covered by between I this decisions prior covered. court’s emphasize, no to deline clear, is reason make there absolutely ate the of the Structural Work boundaries other fashion than that chosen when legislature this statute. In Prange, enacted bound example, would be at the the mechanical ary point device picked them up transport to and install them in poles structure. The majority, apparently, misapprehends actual function the the time of serving endloader was plaintiff’s overlooks the fact that the injury. majority endloader was not in the actual installation of engaged the sewer While I the actual installa pipes. agree that *17 tion of the Act, would fall within the I do not pipes con sider the function served the endloader here to one of the activities enumerated in the Act. I believe this mistaken view of the of case facts this formed the basis of the The cites majority’s holding. majority and Crafton and does not Meyer profess to overrule those decisions. It has, however, the clear distinctions defined misapplied in those cases and in Long. concerned,
I however, am deeply the majority’s to failure the clear of The grasp import Meyer. appellate court had not clear always holding followed the of Craf- ton to and the Long limits on the of the Struc- scope tural Work Act. we Meyer, attempted to restate the of of holding prior opinions this court and end the and contrasting broad narrow of the Act’s interpretation Focusing on the clear the language. language Act, of wе held, in in Meyer, that order to within fall the of scope the the plaintiff’s must result injury from a failure of one the of enumerated devices while support engaged in of one the enumerated activities. has majority overlooked clear the boundaries the of Act’s coverage, which we identified in Meyer and which in the appear of the Act. language essentially reasons,
For two the majority concludes that plaintiff’s in the case at bar falls within the First, Structural Work Act. majority posits that inherent in the in “danger which the way with the endloader was used had connection peculiar Second, the majority construction structure.” was “crucial states that transport pipes and system sufficiently unique installation sewer coverage a construction site to fall within I this an (137 type Act.” Ill. 2d at thought Meyer in because fails tо had been abandoned analysis between meaningful guidance distinguishing give any coverage those activities which fall within Act’s Now, later, the ma- just those which do not. two terms all resurrects this of its attendant with jority approach Meyer chaotic de- previous Under consequences. court, cisions of this the relevant is not whether inquiry work, or em- to construction activity “unique” connection” con- braced danger bearing “peculiar work, work, struction or was “crucial” to construction similar to those inher- or to a risk exposed rel- ent in activities enumerated Act. only is whether the activity evant this inquiry respect enumer- specifically was one of those activities question however, this ignores ated the statute. The majority, which are of issue, critical and addresses instead factors resolution of this little no consequence proper *18 case. the
Further, way the inherent danger more connec- “peculiar endloader was used here bore no to the structural work activities tion” of enumerated any of or forklift to stack bricks than does the use a crane a of a construction site or other materials in the vicinity their in the construction of weeks to use prior perhaps the Act by ascertain the of scope to building. Attempting had a “peculiar involved danger into whether the inquiry structural work to of enumerated any connection” the bounda- more than to obscure does nothing activities terminology such of Act’s Use of coverage. ries in convulsions remarkable this court sanctions virtually of I fail of the Act. further interpretation scope to see materials, how mere of whether trаnsport otherwise, are or one they construction materials from use is in place to another of an endloader way any of the activities enumerated in the statute. unique As this court and stated in simply Meyer, aptly “[similar devices in serve similar functions of contexts myriad other fact, than structural work.” (135 with an any farmer endloader similar material transports in a manner similar relies regularly. Finally, majority on the fact of the transport “crucial” pipes is, the installation It however, of sewer system. also true that the and obviously manufacture of shipping were pipes crucial installation of the sys- sewer tem, as at the stockpiling pipes construc- tion site. unbanding unbundling the steel in storage racks were Meyer crucial the installation of racks the warehouse there. The transport worker and materials in was crucial to con- Crafton struction work in that case. The ascent and decent of the steps Vuletich was crucial to the performance proper of the construction worker’s tasks there. The manufac- ture, lumber, shipping stockpiling shingles, siding, gutters, bricks, trusses, etc., are all “crucial” to con- struction activity. Many these activities also be may said to fairly unique to the construction industry. activities, however, None of these fall within Act. is Structural Work This so not acti- because the vities do not risks involve bearing connec- “peculiar tion” work, to structural not are not “cru- they because cial” to construction “unique” and not activity, because they do not involve risks similar or identical those inherent the structural work activities set out the Act. These activities are not encompassed by the quite because do constitute the “erec- simply they *19 370
tion, alteration, of a painting” removal repairing, 60). Rev. ch. (Ill. par. structure Stat. however, no the there is approach, Under majority’s Act not construed logical why reason the should of driving cover “the truck an pickup by employee of ac the defendant some considerable distance from the and tual site materials attempt gather work an (Craf site itself.” bring them back to the construction ton, short, there is no limit logical 46 Ill. 2d Meyer, on the of As noted the reach this statute. we Act, did not the Structural Work legislature, enacting site injuries intend to all construction sweep thereby into reach of from the of the and realm common law Meyer, at 15. the Act. Ill. 2d above, coverage As Act’s noted the boundaries I think point. prudent must be fixed at some clearly Long Meyer, Crafton, and to iden- continue to follow and them, set legislature limits where the tify precisely those of the of the Act itself. The language language Crafton, Long Meyer of- holdings statute and test, certain fer a which is much more objective clear above, which than nebulous tests discussed subjective were by majority. applied are If of the relied majority none factors upon in- plaintiff’s relevant of whether determination then sum of of the falls within jury reached those result justify factors does certainly Plaintiff here had benefit here. majority an for common law workers’ action compensation, stated for his As we was available negligence protection. Meyer, reason, through no guise is just “[t]here construction, sweep' protection liberal within in this activities plaintiff’s Structural Work 2d аt case.” 135 Ill. 17. of sub- adoption consequences majority’s how injured are I fail to see tests manifest.
jective *20 worker, construction of” his anyone “having charge work, matter, determine, or for that is any with any degree of whether or not a in- accuracy, particular is covered Act. into the ac- jury Inquiry whether work, tivity unique structural question fairly whether it was crucial to structural or whether work, bore a to struc- danger involved connection peculiar work, tural or whether the risk involved similar to those inherent structural work clouds dis- merely tinction drawn legislature. Such clearly inquiry unnecessarily contorts and confuses the relevant in- only in this device quiry respect: Was the which caused the plaintiff’s engaged in one enumer- activities not, ated the Act at the time If further injury? inquiry is neither necessary nor warranted. above,
For all the set I reasons forth dissent. JUSTICE STAMOS in this dissent. joins .
(No. 69258 WOMICK, JOHN PAUL Adm’r the Estate John Hatley, William Appellee, JACKSON COUNTY HOME, NURSING Appellant.
Opinion May Rehearing filed 1990 . denied October 1990.