Ladetto v. CommonwealthLadetto v. Commonwealth
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- Reardon
The petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and appealed under the provisions of
We refer to the findings of the single justice. The assignments of error pressed by the petitioner relate to the excusing of certain jurors over the objections of Ladetto’s counsel and to the denial of Ladetto’s motion to have the court ask a certain question of prospective jurors.
The petitioner’s present assignments of error were considered on the appeal in Commonwealth v. Ladetto, supra, which had been tried in 1964. In essence, the petitioner is requesting reconsideration of those assignments of error in the light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, decided June 3, 1968. While, the petitioner claimed that a sizeable number of veniremen were improperly excused, he limits himself presently in that assertion to the cases of but three. Colloquy on voir dire of the three jurymen is set out in the margin. 1
*543 Prior to questioning the individual veniremen the judge stated to the entire venire: “It is an ancient practice in this Commonwealth that during the selection of the panel of the jurors, we deal with one juror at a time, and the result is that when I finish what I have to say you will be excused . . . and you will then be brought back here one at a time and at that time questions will be put to you. These questions that will be put to you will require from you the answers imposed upon you by your conscience in the discharge of this high and sacred duty ....
“These questions which I will put to you I am going to state now, so that, as you leave, you may consider what the true answer is ... . ‘Have you any opinion that would prevent or preclude you from finding a defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death? ’ . . . Now the last question that you will be asked is whether or not you hold views which would prevent or preclude you from returning a verdict of guilty of an offense punishable by death.
“Here I must state to you that it is the law of this Commonwealth that murder in the first degree is puúishable by death. Later on, when a jury has been chosen, I will have to expound upon certain aspects of the law; but for our present purposes ... I want to repeat again that it is the law in this Commonwealth, that murder in the first degree is punishable by death.
“If you have any opinion against capital punishment, then you must ask yourselves whether that opinion would conscientiously preclude — and let me stress that — conscientiously preclude. In other words, would such a con *544 scientious opinion prevent you from finding the defendant guilty should you be convinced of his guilt on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Here there may very well come the necessity on the part of all of you to search your hearts and your conscience in order that you may answer this question forthrightly, for it is only a stern and conscientious objection which would justify your saying that you would be precluded by such a belief . . ..”
The question which Ladetto now contends should have been put to the prospective jurors was as follows: “Have you any opinion that would preclude or prevent you from recommending life imprisonment for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree”?
The single justice found that the trial judge anticipated the basic holdings of the Witherspoon case, carefully instructed the venire, and properly concluded from his observations that those who were excused would be unable to “reach an impartial decision as to the guilt of the defendant.” He further noted that the Commonwealth was entitled to forty-two peremptory challenges but employed only nine of them, and that the reasonable inference was that if the judge had not excused the three jurors in question the Commonwealth would have employed the necessary number of challenges to exclude these individuals from the jury.
1. As the single justice stated, “
. We agree with the single justice that the trial judge was warranted “in concluding that the veniremen who were excused would be unable to reach an impartial decision as to the guilt of the defendant.”
2. Nor is there error in the denial of the motion to have the judge ask prospective jurors the question set out above. We have previously stated in Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 245, that “it would have been a wise exercise of discretion for the judge to inquire of veniremen on the voir dire whether they had any opinion which would prevent their making ... a recommendation” that the death sentence be not imposed. It is not our view, however, that failure to ask this question or others similar to it constitutes an error of constitutional proportions under the Witherspoon case. As the single justice observed, the Witherspoon decision “explicitly preserved the people’s right to have a jury that would not work a de facto abolition of capital punishment.” See Commonwealth v. Nassar, 354 Mass. 249, 252-254, and cases cited.
Exceptions overruled.
Notes
Venireman Stapleton. Q. “Have you any opinion which would prevent you from finding the defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death”? A. “Well, sir, since His Excellency the Governor has made an issue of that, it’s caused a little doubt in my mind as to whether it should be so, whether the law should be changed or not.” Q. “Well, is your state of mind — ” A. “It isn’t settled, Your Honor. I haven’t quite — I can’t say that it is settled. I’ve discussed it with or thought of it a good many times and I haven’t really come to any decision on it as to whether I think it should or should not be changed.” Q. “So at the present time you cannot say that you have an opinion one way or the other”? A. “That’s right.” Q. “Isn’t that true”? A.- “That’s right.” The Court. “This juror in my opinion is not indifferent and may be excused.” *543 Venireman Lesser, Jr. Q. “Have you any opinion wMch would prevent you from finding a defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death”? A. “I do, Your Honor.” Q. “What is that opinion”? A. “Well, I haven’t shot a rabbit since I was fifteen, sir.” Q. “Are you opposed to the.death penalty”? A. “I am sir, Your Honor.” The Court. “You may be excused.”
Venireman Carbone. Q. “Have you any opinion which would prevent, you from finding a defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death”? A. “I don‘t believe in the death punishment.” Q. “You don’t believe in the death penalty”? A. “No.” Q. “This would prevent you from returning a verdict of guilty even if you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt”? A. “Well, for punishment of death, I don’t believe in it.” Q.- “You don’t believe in it”? The Court. “Mr. Carbone, I will excuse you.”