178 Iowa 920 | Iowa | 1916
The claimed defect in the notices has no reference to the substance or form thereof; but to the fact that they were typewritten, and some of' them became illegible soon after they were posted. The statute provides that not less than 10 days’ notice (of the election) be posted, in at least 5 public places. Code, Section 2746. As a matter of fact, the secretary of the board, on March 27, 1915, posted 8 notices: one at the post office in the town of Martelle, another on the town hall in said town, another on the door of the Hopewell schoolhouse, one on the schoolhouse in the Cherry G-rove district, one on the Cottage Hill schoolhouse, one at District No. 6, Fairview Township, one on’the Dumont school, another on the schoolhouse in School District No. 5, and another he kept, and upon this, he made his return. Two of these notices were posted in territory outside thq proposed consolidated district. It is claimed that all were distinctly leg
Testimony w'as also adduced, to the effect that the one posted on the Dumont schoolhouse, within the district, could not be read the next day after it was posted. It is claimed that this amounted to no posting at all, of 3 of the 8 notices; and, as two of them were outside of the"proposed district, the necessary number of postings was not made; and that all subsequent proceedings are void.
As already stated, 'these notices were all written on a typewriter, and it appears that three of them were original, or ribbon copies, and the others were carbon copies; and it is conceded that one of the original ones was used for making the return. There is no claim that the notices were not legible when first posted, or that the secretary was guilty of any negligence or want of care in preparing or posting the notices, save as this may be inferred from the fact that three of them became illegible a few days after they were posted. This, in itself, does not prove negligence or want of care, and there is no suggestion of any purpose of the secretary to mislead the public, or to use a machine ribbon or carbon which would or might fade in a short time after being exposed to the elements.
Appellants claim that, to meet the requirements of the law, the notices must remain legible during the entire period for which they must be posted, and if, for any reason, they become faded so that they cannot be easily read, there is no posting. Such is not the law, as we understand it. Of course, the officers must exercise some care in the matter; but they are not held to insure the continued legibility of the notices as posted. The adoption of such a rule would mean that, if the notices, as posted, were destroyed by a storm, or removed by a third person without the knowledge of any of the officers of the school district, proper care being used in the first instance, still the notices are ineffective, and all proceedings based thereon are void. Neither logic nor the law requires any such holding. Indeed, the cases generally announce the rule that, if proper notices are posted in the first instance, it is not necessary to prove that they remain posted each and every day thereafter. People v. Lodi High School District, 57 Pac. 660 (124 Cal. 694). In 29 Cyc. 1122, the following rule is announced:
“The fact that a'portion-of an advertisement was blurred, or otherwise illegible, does not operate to vitiate the publication, where due proof of publication as required by law is made. ’ ’
Aside from this, while the 'testimony is in some confusion, we are constrained to believe that all of the sub-district known as "Hopewell,” was included in the new district. The claim at this point is that part of the land in this Hopewell subdistrict was not included. We think that the whole of it was, and this finding eliminates this entire proposition from the case.
It should also be stated that there were not to exceed 140 electors in the new consolidated district, and that 114 of them appeared in response to -the notice's, and voted at the election. Lacock and Peet, the plaintiffs and interveners herein, were both present and voted. ' It also appears that, at the election of officers, which immediately followed, Lacock was a candidate for the office of director, and that he was present and voted. It further appears that, at an election held in June of the same year, both Lacock and Peet were present and voted.
These facts are recited, not for the purpose of showing an estoppel, for none was pleaded by defendants, but to demonstrate that the equities are not with the plaintiffs and interveners.
On the whole record, we conclude that the judgments and decrees entered herein were each correct, and they are each — Affirmed.