The question for determination is this: Does the defendant Hamlet City Board of Education now own the lot in controversy in fee absolute, or did title thereto revert tо the plaintiffs when the aforesaid Board of Education abandoned the property for school purposes and ordered it to be sold at publiс auction?
In the interpretation of a deed, the intention of the grantor or grantors must be gathered from the whole instrument and every part thereof given еffect, unless it contains conflicting provisions which are irreconcilable or a provision which is contrary to public policy or runs counter to sоme rule of law.
Cannon v. Baker,
In the case of
Triplett v. Williams,
In
Willis v. Trust Co., supra,
Adams, J., speaking for the Court, said: “Thе rigid technicalities of the common law have gradually yield
*463
ed to the demand for a more rational mode of expounding deeds. Hence, to discover the intention of the parties is now regarded as the chief essential in the construction of conveyances. The intention must be gathered from the whole instrument in conformity with established principles, and the division of the deed into formal parts is not permitted to prevail against such intention; for substance, nоt form, is the object sought. If possible, effect must be given to every part of a deed, and no clause, if reasonable intendment can be found shall be сonstrued as
meaningless. Springs v. Hopkins,
It is provided in G.S. 39-1 as follows: “When real estate is conveyed to any person, the same shall be held and construed to be a conveyance in fee, whether the word ‘heir’ is used or not, unless such conveyance in plain and express words shows, or it is plainly intended by the conveyance or some part thereof, that the grаntor meant to convey an estate of less dignity.” (Emphasis added.)
This Court has repeatedly held that when the granting clause, the
habendum,
and the warranty in a deed arе clear and unambiguous, and fully sufficient to pass immediately a fee simple estate to the grantee or grantees, that a paragraph inserted bеtween the description and the
habendum
in which the grantor seeks to reserve a life estate in himself or-another, or to otherwise limit the estate conveyеd, will be rejected as repugnant to the estate and interest therein -conveyed.
Oxendine v.
Lewis,
In our opinion, the facts disclosed by the contents of the deed under consideration are not controlled by the rule of construction laid down and followed in the foregoing decisions.
In the instant case, there can bе no doubt about the intent of the grantors. The conveyance was made for a nominal consideration, and while the reverter clause was inartfully drawn аnd inserted immediately following the description in the deed, it must be construed to mean that the grantors intended that the land conveyed should revert to the grantors or their heirs if the property should be abandoned for school purposes. Moreover, the deed .further provided that if and when the property reverted to the grantors or their heirs “that any and all im *464 provements therein (thereon) shall remain the property of the town of Hamlet, N, C. (or its successors).” The grantors did. not confine the expression of their intent alone to this reverter clause but in the habendum the grantees were “TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the aforesaid let of or рarcel of land, and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said parties of the second part, their successors and assigns, to their only use and behoof forever, for school purposes.” (Emphasis added.)
In the case of
Recreation Commission v. Barringer,
In Willis v. Trust Co., supra, Joseph S. J. Regan, for a consideration of $1,000, conveyed to Mary Regan and her bodily heirs a tract of land in Robeson County, “To have and to hold the aforesaid tract or parcel of land and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said Mary Regan and her bodily heirs, аnd to their use and behoof forever.
“And the said J. S. J. Regan covenants that he is seized of said premises in fee and hath the right to convey the same in fee simрle; that the same -are free from all encumbrances, and that he will warrant and defend the said title to the same against the claims of all persons whatsoever, to his daughter, Mary Regan, and the heirs of her body and if no heirs, said lands shall go back to my estate.”
On 1 October 1914, Mary Regan conveyed said land to Joe Willis, reserving a life estate, and on 3 December 1921, these two entered into a writtn agreement to convey to the defendant fifty acres of the land аt a price of $3,400-, The defendant refused to accept the deed tendered *465 on the ground that the grantors could not convey the premises in fee simple. Mary Regan at the time was more than seventy years of age and had never married. The court below held that the grantors could convey a gоod title to the premises. On appeal to this Court, among other things, the Court said: “ * * (W)e conclude that the deed should be 'construed as if it read ‘To Mary Regan and the heirs of her body (a fee simple, C.S., 1734 (now G.S. 41-1) ), and if she should die not having such heirs or issue living at the time of her death, then to the heirs of the grantor.’ ” The Court then held that “* * * Mary Regan acquired, under the deed of her grantor, a fee simple, determinable upon her dying without having heirs of her body or issue living at the time of her death, аnd that she and her coplaintiff cannot convey to the defendant an indefeasible estate in f.ee.”
We hold that the grantors conveyed to the grantees and their successors a fee simple title to the premises described in said deed, determinable upon the abandonment of the premises fоr school purposes. We further hold that the reverter clause >and the purposes for which the property was to be held as expressed in the habendum, are not irreconcilable with or repugnant to the granting clause. Hence, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.