318 Mass. 166 | Mass. | 1945
This is a complaint under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 93, § 4, alleging in substance that the respondent has created and maintains a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of machinery for making shoes, and praying for the appointment of a master in accordance with the provisions of that section. The Superior Court issued an order to the respondent to show cause, and the trial judge reports for our determination the correctness of his refusal to vacate or quash the order. The only question presented and argued is whether the procedure set up by §§ 4-7, inclusive, is unconstitutional as an attempt to impose nonjudicial duties upon the Superior Court in violation of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights.
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 93, § 2, provides that every contract, agreement, arrangement, combination, or practice in violation of the common law whereby a monopoly of the kind described is or may be created, established, or maintained is .against public policy, illegal, and void. Section 3 authorizes the Attorney General or by his direction
Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights is the familiar constitutional provision for the separation of powers. It reads,, "In the government, of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either
The respondent insists that the procedure above described is not judicial in character in that it leads to no judgment of any kind, determines no rights, and imposes no liabilities; that its sole end is the bare finding of facts, a result which amounts to nothing except as it furnishes information to the Attorney General which he may discard if he sees fit; and that the courts are used only as investigating agents for an executive officer.
We concede the force of the argument and might be inclined to follow it if we felt that the statute imposed upon the court merely the duty of supplying information to an executive officer to aid in the performance of purely executive duties not associated with judicial action of any kind, as did the statute dealt with in the highly illuminating case of Matter of Richardson, 247 N. Y. 401, cited by the respondent. But we think that the statute in the present case goes beyond that. We think that it authorizes the courts to perform a function so closely connected with and so far incidental to strictly judicial proceedings that the courts in obeying the statute would not be exercising executive or nonjudicial powers. The statute was designed as a means of obtaining information for the purpose of instituting civil or criminal prosecutions in court, if the information secured should warrant that course. The master’s report is transmitted to the Attorney General as the chief prosecuting officer of the Commonwealth solely for that purpose. He is not at liberty to disregard it. We need not decide whether a master’s report might so plainly demonstrate the existence of an unlawful monopoly and the possibility of proving it that the Attorney General could be compelled to prosecute. Whatever may be left to his judgment in this respect, § 5 is mandatory at least to the extent that he is under a statutory obligation to proceed if in his judgment the report warrants such action.
The procedure under the statute is therefore both in the • nature of a bill of discovery and in the nature of an inquest.
We think that in discovering the facts the court performs a judicial duty even though there may be a break in the technical continuity of the proceedings, owing to the necessity of subsequent action by the Attorney General. It is true that in the instances of the statutory inquests herein-before mentioned the investigating judge may himself issue process against a person whose probable guilt is dis
Although the doctrine of separation of powers is clearly and emphatically expressed in the Constitution and must be maintained to its full extent, the exact line between judicial and executive or legislative powers has never been delineated with absolute precision. Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, 377. Various powers which, regarded by themselves in the abstract, might be deemed legislative or executive have been considered proper to be exercised by courts because they were intimately connected with and necessary or auxiliary to the exercise of strictly judicial powers. See Dow v. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 267, 273. In this class might be mentioned the power to make rules, including for some purposes the power of this court to make rules governing other courts (G. L. [Ter. Ed.[ c. 221, § 27; c. 223, § 16; c. 233, § 57; c. 235, § 22), the power of this court over the admission and disbarment of attorneys (Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607), and the power to appoint or to remove certain officers whose duties are closely connected with the judicial work of the court, although in general powers of appointment and removal are executive powers. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 211, § 4; c. 221, §§ 1, 4; c. 276, § 83. Catheron v. County of Suffolk, 227
The respondent relies upon Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, where a statute providing for judicial investigation of elections was held invalid in so far as it applied to elections to the Legislature on the ground that under the Constitution the legislative bodies were themselves the sole judges of the due election of their members. As applied to such elections the findings of the court would be wholly futile, since the entire subject matter remained in other hands, and the findings would not lead in ordinary sequence to any further judicial proceedings. In other words, the judicial departí ment was to be employed solely to aid the legislative department in the performance of a duty wholly withdrawn from judicial cognizance. We think that case distinguishable from the case before us on the grounds just stated. The statute there involved has been upheld in its application to other elective officers. Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81.
Federal decisions seem to depend largely upon the limitation of the grant of Federal judicial power to proceedings coming within the definition of “cases” or “controversies” (Constitution of the United States, art. 3, § 2) and upon distinctions between courts established under the Constitution and other so called courts whose duties are of the nature of those performed by administrative officers or boards — a distinction not applicable in passing upon a statute that relates only to this court and to the Superior Court, both of which are clearly parts of the judicial department of the government under art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights. We have found no Federal cases where, as in the case at bar, inquisitorial duties were placed upon courts solely in aid of prospective judicial proceedings. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409, 410; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697; In re Sanborn, petitioner, 148 U. S. 222; Interstate Commerce
It has not been argued, and we think it could not be successfully argued, that the incidental provision under which the master may make recommendations, which however may be expunged by the court, affects the constitutionality of the statute. That provision is scarcely more than a recognition of the propriety of such suggestions designed to end further controversy as may in proper circumstances and with suitable precautions be made by any judge hear-, ing litigation. Harrington v. Boston Elevated Railway, 229 Mass. 421, 432-433.
Order denying respondent’s motion to quash affirmed.