LaChance v. Ross MacHine & Mill Supply, Inc.
633 P.2d 570
Idaho
1981
Check Treatment

*1 P.2d Harry L. LaCHANCE and Vivian F.

LaChance, wife, husband

Plaintiffs-Appellants, SUPPLY, INC., ROSS MILL MACHINE & Supply, Inc., aka R M& Machine & Mill corporation; dissolved Oklahoma Blount, Inc., a successor in interest of Supply, Inc., Ross Machine Mill& and R Eberle, Berlin, Young Patricia G. Kad- Inc., Supply, & M Mill Machine & Boise, Gillespie, plain- Turnbow & corporation; through X, Doe I Defend- tiffs-appellants. ants-Respondents. Peterson, Ben Peterson of Baum & Poca- No. 13203. tello, defendants-respondents. Supreme Idaho. BAKES, Chief Justice. Aug. products liability per-

This is a action for injuries sonal Harry sustained LaChance. complaint premised on theories of negligent design, tort strict injured breach of warranty. LaChance was performing 1975 while maintenance on a roller mill manufactured defendant re- spondents employer, and sold to LaChance’s motion, Ralston Upon Purina. the district granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. We affirm. roller mill was manufactured re-

spondents Ralston and sold to Purina in 1969. The mill is in the used animal feed industry crimp grain to flake or steamed heavy between two cast iron rollers. The housing rollers are situated within hinged inspection has several doors located above and below the rollers. There were no apparent safety devices. When the doors open, there was access to direct rollers. complained

The accident of occurred employment in his as Purina, maintenance man for Ralston knelt inspection to reach the door located below clogs the rollers in order to clean out of wet grain. He used screwdriver an 18-inch clogs break the out and rake the material. deposition, In his LaChance stated that he operation. was not aware the was in mill Finishing task, he started to raise him- and, kneeling position self from the screw- *2 506 hand, inspec- upon open grate’s

driver in into the presence using reached lied the tion give support. inspection give sup- door to himself This open door himself inspection port.1 candidly door was located above the LaChance admitted that screwdriver, pass- rollers. The of the grate blade the removal of the and his reliance on open through pointing injuries. door presence and its caused his nip toward point of the became upon deposition plaintiff’s tes- Based caught them. between The rollers then timony, summary moved for defendants pulled the screwdriver and LaChance’s hand judgment. They argued that the removal inward, severely injuring his hand. grate of the Purina Ralston had compensa- installed, together LaChance signed received worker’s and with the injuries. job-related tion his plaintiff’s benefits for re- mistaken and unfortunate He also upon presence, commenced instant suit. Dur- was liance its either the sole ing discovery, proximate the defendant manufacturer accident cause of the or an inter- deposed plaintiff vening LaChance. The testi- cause. The district mony revealing. motion, granted was holding LaChance indicated that that, shortly after machine was re- of material there no issues fact ceived, grate Ralston Purina had installed a grate removal of homemade upper above the rollers and behind the in- the roller unknown from mill Ralston spection grate door. The was employees installed both Purina was a purposes prevent and to debris which insulated defendant sticks, going such as any liability. straws and stones from from into days the rollers. Several before agree with district court’s We deci accident, the rollers were removed for re- sion, upon mindful of motion course corrugation. grate was removed. The also summary judgment, all facts and infer replaced, gap The rollers were and the be- favorably ences are to be construed most properly adjusted tween the was rollers whom against toward gauge. with a feeler When the work was sought, any genuine issue of and if material completed, replaced LaChance himself unresolved, summary judg remains 56(c); inappropriate. I.R.C.P. ment however, grate Sales, Inc., place, was not Smith v. Boise Kenworth place (1981); when the took days accident several v. Idaho 625 P.2d 417 Palmer apparently Kooskia, later. It been had removed Bank Idaho & Trust of Idaho another employee employees (1979). of Ralston Conversely, 603 P.2d 597 Purina, probably operator most to a definite dis uncontroverted facts lead roller position summary judg mill. LaChance unaware that as a matter of grate According had removed. appropriate. been ment is v. Boise Ken Smith deposition testimony, Sales, specifically Inc., he re- supra. worth following excerpts 1. The LaChance’s deposition: grate And it’s the absence “Q. you relied cause of accident? on that’s the . . . hard for me “Q. to understand [I]t’s Right. your “A. intelligence experi- how a man of put ence his hand in would there he you turning had not relied on “Q. You think if didn’t know rollers were there, put being you explanation screen wouldn’t have not. You must have some your that. hand there at all? my I hand hurt. “A. would never have put “A. I did the screw not driver there You have? never would “Q. intentionally. (Witness head.) more there or less it in “A. shakes pull myself up, assuming you was still thought And that the screen would “Q. there, way roller, was no there in the world that you you? be between didn’t my go hand could into that roll. grate— “A. The you be between “Q. My thought “... at the time was the roller? in, my Had the in. Right." “A. hand have went— would never were a su- principles Ralston Purina is controlled set This case injuries, forth in Mobile Sales & Inc. perseding Mico Skyline Corp., Idaho relieving respondents defendant thus In we criterion found liability. summary judg- and all *3 (Second) in of Torts the Restatement respondents. ment is affirmed. Costs to intervening determining whether an superseding should be considered a cause of JJ., SHEPARD, concur. McFADDEN and harm to another. Restatement See (1965). (Second) Justice, Torts As we BISTLINE, of 440-453 dissenting. §§ key inquiry recognized in straightforward: Can a The issue here intervening whether the acts foreseea- reasonable mind find it to be foreseeable stated, question “Ordinarily, ble. of We unreasonably dan- of an foreseeability is a of . . question fact. . gerous will install device However, the undisputed facts can employee an will remove conclusion, one lead to this warning that device other em- without upon of rule the issue foresee- ployees.1 ques- believe answer to this ability Mico as a matter of law.” Mobile “yes.” tion is evidence such is Some Corp., Skyline Sales & Inc. v. split answering true is the 412-13, Idaho at 546 P.2d at 58-59. See question. holding A that a reasonable mind Kinch, Gamble v. 102 Idaho 629 P.2d suggest could not so will to some mem- find bers of the trial bench and bar that a ma- Applying principles those to the instant jority of this Court intimates that other facts, we conclude uncontroverted members of this do not have reasona- particularly those established ble minds —a conclusion which all members deposition testimony, lead to but one con- of bench bar endorse. rush to intervening employees clusion: acts of of Ralston Purina were unforeseeable as a I. matter of The law. defendant manufactur- er expected initially clarify should not foresee the what this essential following occurrence of each of the four case involves what it does not involve. events: Ralston Purina’s alteration of the The granted summary trial court grate; roller mill addition of the because “the acts and conduct of the Ral- grate by an unknown Ral- employees removing ston Purina employee; ston Purina the failure of that was, grate fact, screen employee replace either any negli- negligence act of which insulates removal; warn employees and, other of its gence of The raised defendants.” sole issue finally, the plaintiff conduct of the in in- parties appeal by both on this serting a handheld 18-inch screwdriver into whether the court was in this trial correct door, open looking, while relying finding. product “unrea- Whether upon mistakenly grate’s presence. To sonably dangerous” LaChance and whether hold otherwise concept would stretch the recovery negligent was so as to bar his as a foreseeability much too far. questions presently matter of law are not Court, Accordingly, uphold we before and it assumed district must be court’s conclusion purposes appeal that the acts of this that the 1. The question of LaChance not have accident would occurred. is not involved in this removal of Moreover, installation and appeal. is whether argument possible relieve the the defective machine Ralston Purina should e., begs though did not “cause” the accident i. manufacturer even question. liability, missing grate, leading design was one of defective the factors were causes of the accident. Neither was both were the so accident, to the events cause; the sole if the been there, had should be extraordinary accident would not have occurred; if the ma- liability? relieved of dangerous, chine not been and that La- should not public immunize him. The any, negligence, Chance’s was not such as assuring interest recovery.2 to bar his are installed demands more from the permit than to him to leave here, then, The issue is whether the acts phase manufacturing such a critical of his installing Purina in of Ralston process haphazard to the conduct of removing highly were so purchaser. only way ultimate to be extraordinary as to be unforeseeable as a certain that such devices will be installed e., whether no reasonable matter of i. public all clearly on machines —which mind could find these acts to be foreseeable. requires place interest on —is generally and Leas- See Mico Mobile Sales the manufacturer where it is feasible for Skyline Corp., 97 Inc. v. Idaho 290 A.2d at 285. him to do so.” Id. (1975); (Second) P.2d 54 Restatement *4 Accord, Co., way, Supply Put another Pust v. 38 Colo. Torts 442 Union § 435, 355, (1976) (“It subsequent App. af- 361 is whether the acts 561 P.2d anomalous, indeed, 402A, adopt fecting the condition were so ex- would be to machine’s yet permit insulate traordinary and unforeseeable as to relieve a manufacturer to liability manufacturing] [by from for manu- itself from . . . the manufacturer facturing defectively designed product delegates and unrea- it to the a for which sonably dangerous duty designing where La- or purchaser either the devices”), injuries safety of that incorporating Chance suffered his because affm’d Un Pust, 162, design.3 defective 583 Supply Co. v. 196 Colo. ion 276, (“In (1978) strict P.2d disagree the method with both Since cases, with who had we are not concerned analysis, I will result of the Court’s provide [safety] guards, but duty to analysis, present my first own to be fol- conveyor was in a rather with whether opinion. critique lowed unreasonably dangerous condition defective provide safety of the failure to because II. the ultimate user guards before it reached outset, emphasized it At the should be Corp., consumer”); v. Harsco Minert dealing that well reasoned cases with a 686, (1980) Wash.App. 614 P.2d safety de- duty manufacturer’s to install dangers (manufacturer’s duty to warn of is duty non-delegable. vices hold that such non-delegable). Bexiga As v. Havir Manufactur- stated (1972): holdings of these ing Corp., agree I would with the 60 N.J. 290 A.2d 281 has a non-dele- that the manufacturer cases places into the “Where a manufacturer safety gable to install product channels of trade a finished necessary to make the such is feasible which can be to use and which should “unreasonably dangerous.” In machine not provided safety with devices because case, then, the manufacturer present without such it creates an unreasonable devices, the Court harm, installed no such safety risk of and where such have it could and should assume that feasibly must vices can be installed be re- manufacturer, expects that he done so. Should purchaser in- liability because someone else will install such devices lieved of and that installation altered involved, 2. To what is not a discus- emphasize held liable. No should not be manufacturer sion of the status of this case at the time of the argument made, facts presented, motion summary required. stages was not the machine The case was still in the initial of dis- show that negligent objecting with defendants or that LaChance covery, interrogatories, set of based on when, second some extent. defendants moved the deposition -judgment. Defendants summary Again, to state that LaChance’s it is incorrect that” the sole cause of the accident was accident. See the cause of the actions were to La- notice III infra. at part discussion Chance, materially the machine had “ ‘(f) safety degree culpability device which was subse- stalled of a quently I think not. If removal removed? wrongful act of a third which sets ” safety of a installed device is intervening force in motion.’ Id. at intervening cause as a matter of an 412, 546 P.2d at 58. non-delegable duty of a manufacturer factor, harm, As to the first being devices would be a hollow caught between the is the same with duty indeed. I would not find it to be intervening or without the acts. As to the unforeseeable that a device would be factor, provides second for determin- installed, totally nor unforeseeable that hindsight whether it would be might such be removed without notice. highly extraordinary for the superseding When an occur, given act to neg- manufacturer’s sold, appears it obvious to me that the ligence, expect should see Comment b to § safe, try to act to to make the machine and minds could well differ as to whether it might partly that such actions even cause expected could be party third an accident.4 install a device which later was re- moved without guidelines determining notice. As to the third fac- tor, act was a a reasonable mind could well find that of harm to another are set forth in the perfectly it is normal for a third *5 (Second) (1965), Restatement of Torts 442 § attempt to install a device in an quoted and were in Mico Mobile & Sales unreasonably dangerous machine. It is Skyline Corp., Inc. v. 97 Idaho clear that the installation of the (1975), as follows: “independent” danger- vice was not of ous condition of the but rather

“ ‘(a) the fact that brings its intervention dependent upon was that condition. It fol- about harm different in kind from that subsequent lows that removal of the which would otherwise have resulted dependent upon device was also the exist- from the negligence; actor’s ence of the machine and defect therein. “ ‘(b) the operation fact that its or the factor, Under the fourth that the interven- consequences appear thereof after ing person’s force is due to a third act or event to be extraordinary rather than omission, par- this force was due to a third normal in view of the circumstances ex- factor, ty’s act. Under the fifth the act in isting at the time operation; of its removing party of the third “ ‘(c) the fact that the intervening force LaChance, perhaps wrongful toward and operating is independently situa- perhaps subject did that third to lia- tion or, created negligence, actor’s LaChance; nonetheless, bility to this re- hand, on the other is or is not a normal jury. mains of fact for the Fi- situation; result of such a “ nally, factor, under the sixth there is a ‘(d) the operation fact that the degree medium culpability at most in intervening force is per- due to a third installing safety device and act; son’s act or to his failure to “ removing it warning. without Balancing ‘(e) the fact that the intervening force factors, these six these acts were not so is due to an act of person a third which is extraordinary, wrongful so wrongful culpable, toward the other and as such subjects person the third reasonable mind could not find that him; this was not a cause. A su- analogy situation, 4. An can be drawn to who and he remains liable for the starts a fire in a house. It is foreseeable that foreseeable acts of would-be rescuers. passerby try will run into the house to and save screaming specifically supersed- infants. If Section 442 the actions of the deals with actions, passerby damages, cause in cause further not strict liabil- this does not Nonetheless, ity liability. actions. this Court relieve the arsonist from He created this test in strict actions in Mico. perseding cause be can determined as a The second fact listed highly matter of law ain extraordina- grate. Again, removal of the there noth- Sales, ry such as Mico Mobile ing surprising grate, in the removal of this poured one defendant necessary antifreeze pur- as such was for maintenance line keep factor, water of a trailer to poses. Skipping the water fourth act, freezing. Such nothing violated conduct of this has to do state industry mobile home analysis. standards with The Court practices, plumbing totally apparently confusing trade comparative negli- unforeseeable and gence Moreover, relieved manufactur- with cause. liability. degree er of culpability drawing favor, all inferences LaChance’s wrongfulness present deposition case is placed not state he does simply not great. his hand in the door because of the Rather, he states that had been Where a manufacturer sells a machine injured. there he would not have been defectively designed so that it is unreasona- it While be true that he would not dangerous, bly as it must be assumed injured there, have been was, certainly machine here isit foreseeable does not mean that the absence will attempt grate caused his accident. LaChance could devices, that such placed have simply well his hand there prove to be inadequate, they may or that thinking. Regardless warning. removed without It is the that LaChance’s actions not at issue in to build a machine that is appeal, even if it is he dangerous, not unreasonably cannot it solely his hand there on reliance escape duty automatically, as a matter grate still jury question there is a as to law, simply because someone else has it was foreseeable that attempted to make the machine safe. would be installed and removed without instructions, jury, proper under *6 notice. manufacturer, decide whether this who at stage presumed this must be to have de- That leaves the third act —the failure to signed unreasonably dangerous and sold an replace or warn of its removal. machine, liability should be relieved of be- only is the This amount to a attempt cause of the of Ralston Purina to cause, spite of the Court’s make this machine safe. Thus I not would listing smoke-screen of four actions. hold, aas matter of these acts bottom line here is whether the failure to negligence. constituted a act of replace extraordinary this was so that no action reasonable mind could find it

III. to be foreseeable. While this be a question, Some comment must also be on the made close I state no cannot rea- listing of four it be- events which sonable mind find this to could be foreseea- no lieves to be purchased could find ble. Ralston Purina an unrea- analysis, sonably foreseeable. dangerous attempted Such an which total- machine and ly ignores six-part grate. test by installing to make it safe removed, serves to confuse the issue central The fact that thus accident, causing here. first listed is perhaps partly event the alteration does of the roller mill necessarily addition not relieve the manufacturer of surprising (or producing It is not selling unforesee- this un- able) employer attempt reasonably Upon me dangerous that an would machine. fur- type development to install some on an device ther it could de- velop order manufacturer had a other, devices,6 protect safer, its employees, as was done here. and would system whereby oper- possible machine would not 6. Other devices here be a open, spring warning, grate-inside when the door or a ate bolted door with a door open. that has to door instead of be held over an interlock

5H Gen., Boise, Leroy, Atty. not hold as a matter of law that the actions David H. David duty. ques- Robinson, Jr., Raeon, here relieved it of that Deputy K. James A. jury tion of fact for the as to whether the Gen., d’Alene, Attys. Coeur for defendants- warn- of a device without appellants. has been such installed d’Alene, McGregor, plain- Marc Coeur purchaser unreasonably on an tiff-respondent. extraordinary is so as to be un- A reasonable well foreseeable. mind could purchaser

find that it foreseeable PER CURIAM. attempt will make an dan- appeals These consolidated are both from safe, gerous attempt that that attorney’s against the awards of fees state another, including will fail for one reason or In defendant. neither case the record does for the that the device reason was removed judgment. appeals final contain a warning. The manufacturer therefore dismissed. escape should not be able to as a purchaser’s matter of law because of the

attempt safe, to make the machine which is

something have should place.

done in the first Nor should the penalized or its an attempt making at safe. the machine

I respectfully dissent.

DONALDSON, J., concurs.

633 P.2d 576 Idaho, STATE of on the relation of R. Roark, Prosecuting Attorney Keith County, Idaho, Plaintiff-Appel Blaine lant, v. KOESTER, Katherine Plaintiff-Respondent, HAILEY, Idaho, municipal CITY OF corporation, Dietrich, Emory Hailey City Mayor; Lyle Breneman, House, Bill KLEIN, individually Milton G. as Director Ivie, Verbon, Murphree, Hailey David *7 Department of Idaho of Health of Idaho City Councilmen; and Constance Ell Department Welfare, of Health and way, Hailey City Clerk, Idaho, Department Defendants-Re State of of Health spondents. Welfare, Defendants-Appellants. McATEER, No. Plaintiff-Respondent, Maudie 13451. Supreme Court of Idaho. Idaho, Department

STATE of of Health Aug. Welfare, 1981. Defendant-Appellant. Nos. 13219. Supreme Court of Idaho.

Aug.