Riсky LaBrew appeals the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal, raising claims of error pertaining to sentenсing. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
LaBrew’s judgment of conviction and sentence stemmed from his pleading guilty to 56 counts of sexual exploitation of children.
LaBrew then sought from the trial court an out-of-time appeal. In his motion, he recounted what had occurred during the 60 days after entry of the judgment: LaBrew had filed what was captioned a ‘Motion for Reconsidеration,” which post-conviction motion asserted that his punishment was too harsh, asked that his sentences be modified and reduced, and requested a hearing thereon. The state had then opposed the “Motion for Reconsideration,” countering that no such сhange was warranted, but claiming entitlement to a hearing pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) prior to the entry of any order modifying or reducing a sentence. And thereafter, the trial court had denied LaBrew’s motion without a hearing.
that the Defendant was denied a hearing for the Motion for Reconsiderаtion which was recognized by the State as a Motion for Modification of Sentence pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f); and that the Defendant’s counsel was ineffective by not entitling the Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for Modification of Sentence.
In its order thoroughly addressing the foregoing “grounds,” the trial court denied LaBrew’s motion for an out-of-time appeal. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal for an abuse of discretion.
It is well established that a criminal defendant has no unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea, and an appeal will lie from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in thе record. The ability to decide the appeal based on the existing record thus becomes the deciding factor in determining the availability of an out-of-time appeal when the defendant has pled guilty.5
Moreover, where, as here, the “issue raised by a dеfendant in a motion for out-of-time appeal can be resolved against him based upon the existing record, there is no errоr in denying the motion.”
1. The trial court did not err in rejecting LaBrew’s ground concerning entitlement to a hearing pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f). Even construing, for the sаke of argument, LaBrew’s motion captioned “Motion for Reconsideration” as a motion pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), LaBrew has failed to show that he was entitled to a hearing thereon. That Code provision states, in pertinent part:
Within one year of the date upon which the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the sentencing*867 court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment after direct appeal, whichever is later, the court imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and authority to corrеct or reduce the sentence and to suspend or probate all or any part of the sentence imposed. Prior to entering any order correcting, reducing, or modifying any sentence, the court shall afford notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the prosecuting attorney. Any order modifying a sentence which is entered without notice and an opportunity for a hearing as provided in this subsection shall be void.
Here, the trial court entered no order “correcting, reducing, or modifying any sentence” imposed upon LaBrew. As the trial court explained in its order dеnying LaBrew’s motion for an out-of-time appeal, the aggregate “thirty year period of incarceration imposed was within the law’s statutory parameters, and did not need to be corrected.”
Consequently, LaBrew’s reliance upon OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) as providing for an out-of-time appeal is misplaced.
2. It follows then that LaBrew’s second ground — that his counsel was ineffective by not entitling the Motion fоr Reconsideration as a “Motion for Modification of Sentence” —• was unavailing as a basis for an out-of-time appeаl.
3. Finally, LaBrew asserts other arguments to this court that he claims entitles him to an out-of-time appeal. But because he failed tо present those arguments to the trial court, they are not properly before us.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA§ 16-12-100 (b).
OCGA § 16-12-100 (g) (1) (any person who violates OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years”).
OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (a nоtice of appeal must he filed within 30 days after entry of appealable decision or judgment complained of); see Cody v. State,
Brown v. State,
Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
Id. at 321 (2) (citation omitted); see Gibson v. State,
Although LaBrew has аlleged that his punishment was too harsh, he has not alleged that any sentence imposed upon him was void. See Crumbley v. State,
See Rowland v. State,
Anderson v. State,