70 Iowa 568 | Iowa | 1887
The provisions of the Code to he construed in determinining the questions presented are as follows: Section 543 provides that the police conrt shall have the powers and jurisdiction of justices of the peace. “Sec. 544. The police judge holding the police court shall be entitled to receive, in all criminal cases prosecuted in behalf of the state,
By an ordinance of the city of JDes Moines, passed March 25, 1879, it was provided that' the police judge should receive a salary of $1,000 per annum, which should be in full compensation for his services, but that the fees allowed by statute or ordinance should be collected as before, and, when collected, should be paid into the city treasury. Section 5 of the ordinance is as follows: “Any officer receiving any such fees shall pay the same into the city treasury on or before the first day of each calendar month after the same are received by ham; provided, that all fees and costs paid
The first point insisted upon by appellant’s counsel is that the plaintiff, the police judge, cannot recover the fees for his own term, because (1) he has been paid a salary for all his services in lieu of fees; (2) if the fees are collected, they are to go to the city treasury, and he is therefore not the real party in interest; (3) the law authorizing the payment of fees from the county treasury is unconstitutional.
The statute authorizing the city council to fix a salary for the police judge expressly provides that it was not intended to abolish fees then allowed by law, but to require'the same to be paid into the treasury. It is the policy of the state to provide for the expense of enforcing its criminal laws. To some extent it does so by making provision for the payment of fees to justices and police judges, aiding in the enforcement of such laws. If the cities provide for salaries for the payment of its officers for duties performed in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state, it is competent for the legislature to make provision for the reimbursement of the cities. This is just what the statute provides.'
It is insisted, however, that the payment of such fees in criminal cases to the city isj to that extent, the imposition of a tax on the people of the county to be expended for the benefit of the city, and is therefore unconstitutional. We do not think this position tenable. The fees are provided, as before stated, to pay for the service of officers in the execution of the laws of the state, and it was intended by the legislature to reimburse the city for compensation paid by the city to its officers for services done on behalf of the state. We think the law is not in conflict with the constitution. These views are in harmony with Des Moines v. Hillis, 55 Iowa, 643. While it is true that the fees, when collected, are to be paid into the city treasury, yet the law makes it the duty
A part of plaintiff’s claim is for fees accruing during the administration of Police Judge Hillis, the predecessor of plaintiff, but it appears from *the agreed statement of facts that Judge Hillis did not make the certificate and affidavits required by law. Appellee contends that, as the successor of Judge Hillis, he can make the certificates and affidavits required by sections 3806 and 3843 of the Code. Can he do so in the absence of a statute authorizing it? When the legislature enacted section 3806, it was intended to secure to the justice compensation for his services as justice, and we think, in the absence of any statute to that effect, his successor was not authorized to collect the fees from the county for him. The legislature intended that he should make the certificate and affidavit, and collect for himself the fees which were thus to become due him, and they constitute a personal claim against the county for his compensation. When the legislature used these words, “the facts being certified by the justice, and verified by affidavit,” it meant some certain justice; and that could have been none other than the one
It appears from the agreed statement of facts that, during the term of office of plaintiff, there was due from Polk county, defendant, the sum of $1,508.50, for which he made the proper certificates and affidavits, and for which he made proper demand on the board of supervisors of said county. For this amount he should have judgment. But we think he is not entitled to recover for the fees which accrued and were earned during 'the term of his predecessor in office.
Modified AND Affiemed.