180 N.W. 963 | S.D. | 1921
Plaintiff was in possession of, and living upon, 160 acres of defendant’s land under a written lease upon the crop-sharing basis, expiring October 1, 1917. In July, 1917, negotiations were had concerning a renewal of the lease. It is contended by plaintiff that these oral negotiations constituted a completed leqse for the next year. It is contended by defendant that these arrangements were merely tentative, and that a letter- written by him to, and received by, plaintiff, terminated such tentative agree
Respondent testified that on or about October x, 1917, there were negotiations looking towards -a settlement between them; that he wanted $2 per acre for about 40 acres of plowing he had done; that if that had been paid he was willing to give up all claim to the place; that appellant was only willing to pay 75 cents per acre for the plowing; that appellant told him that, if he did not take the 75 cents, he “could go on and have the place;” that he refused to accept the 75 cents per acre for the plowing; that appellant promised to bring out a written contract the next day, but that appellant did not do so then, nor at any time thereafter.
Respondent thereafter did plowing to the extent of about 3 or 4 acres. In the latter part of October, the “shack” being uninhabitable, he, with his family and belongings, removed from the premises to a quarter section three miles distant,, which he had rented. He also rented another quarter section to farm -with the one to which he moved. He testified that he could also have farmed the land, in question. He never, after the conversation of October 1, 1917, intimated to appellant that he claimed a right to farm this land until March, 1918, after appellant had leased a part of the premises to' another. He never asked for the written lease. Although the parties met in -January, X918, and- had a talk .concerning matters arising under.the lease for 1917, viz. “about the cattle and the bill dor pasture,” nothing wa's said
For the reason that the cause was submitted to the jury under the former measure of damages, and for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.