delivered the opinion of the court:
These appeals involve similar questions and were consolidated for argument and opinion. The questions relate to the character of the estate that a school board may acquire through an eminent domain proceeding and to the effect of the condemnation judgment.
The appeal in No. 47284, La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County et al., is from a judgment of the appellate court (
The Board under its eminent domain authority (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 122, par. 10 — 22.35A) filed a petition in the circuit court of Du Page County to condemn a 30-acre tract of land, title to which was held by La Salle as the trustee. On September 21, 1970, the circuit court entered an order, based on a stipulation between the parties, awarding La Sallе $360,000 and vesting title in fee simple in the Board. There was no appeal from this judgment. The intention of the Board to construct a school on the site was defeated when the voters of the school district voted against the propоsal. Subsequently the Board, under its statutory authority (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 5 — 22), determined that it would be in the best interests of the school district to sell the land at a public sale. At the sale the Board accepted the bid of Mac Diarmid-Palumbo, Inc., а defendant here, of $425,000. A bid of $360,000 by La Salle was rejected. La Salle filed suit in August 1972, in the circuit court of Du Page County in behalf of the former beneficial owners of interest in the parcel seeking to restrain the Board from transferring title to Maс Diarmid and contending that the Board did not have title in fee simple to the land. La Salle alleged that it had retained a reversionary interest in the land. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and La Salle appealed to the appellate court. That court, without reaching the issue of the estate that the Board acquired, held that La Salle was barred under the doctrine of res judicata from challenging the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County which vested title in the Board. (La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees,
The circumstances of No. 47477, Pullman Bank and Trust Co., Trustee, et al., v. Trustees of Schools of
Since the questiоns raised and the arguments presented by the plaintiffs La Salle and Pullman are similar, we may consider them together. The plaintiffs argue that their contentions are not barred under the doctrine of res judicata because they are different from those raised in the original condemnation proceedings. They contend, too, that in an eminent domain proceeding a school board acquires not fee simple title but rather a base or determinable fee and when the acquired land is no longer used for school purposes, there is a reversion to the land’s former owner. However, because of the disposition we make of the plaintiffs’ first contention we shall not reach thеir second claim.
“To the owner or owners of and party or parties interested in said real property for the fee simple title to said property, which is legally described as follows: *** аs full compensation to the owner or owners *** for the fee simple title to said property *** the sum of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND AND NO/lOO DOLLARS ($360,000).”
In the Pullman action the order declared that the court awarded to Pullman “for the taking of the fee simple title to said land, thе sum of Forty Eight Thousand ($48,000.00) and no/100ths Dollars.” There is nothing to show the plaintiffs sought to retain any reversionary interests and nothing to indicate that the parties and the trial court were concerned with any estate less than a fee simple. The quеstion is whether the plaintiffs can now attack in collateral proceedings these judgments which declared the condemnors were acquiring titles in fee simple.
A fundamental statement of the doctrine of res judicata was made by this court in People v. Kidd,
“*** a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving thе same claim, demand or cause of action.” See People ex rel. McAllister v. East,409 Ill. 379 , 383; Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co. v. Alquist,415 Ill. 537 , 541.
And in People ex rel. McAllister v. East,
“*** however erroneous the decision maybe, it is binding upon all parties until it is reversed or set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose. In other words, the court having jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide erroneously as well as correctly.”
The doctrine of res judicata extends not only to what actually was decided in the original action but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit. This was illustrаted in Harvey v. Aurora and Geneva Ry. Co.,
“*** The previous decisions of the court concerning the right to take the property of plaintiffs in error settled every question which might have been raised and every objection that might have been made, whether then raised and made or not. The doctrine of res judicata embraces not only what has been actually determined in the former suit, but also extends to anyother matter which might have raised and determined in it.” Harvey v. Aurora and Geneva Ry. Co., 186 Ill. 283 , 294; see also Bell v. Mattoon Water-works and Reservoir Co.,245 Ill. 544 , 548.
More recently, this was illustrated in People ex rel. White v. Busenhart,
“*** That [the earlier eminent domain judgment] judgmеnt is not subject to collateral attack since the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties. (Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Alquist,415 Ill. 537 ; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Springfield and Northwestern Railroad Co.67 Ill. 142 .) Cоnsequently, these points were improperly pleaded inasmuch as they constitute a collateral attack upon the judgment of the court vesting title in the School Trustees.” People ex rel. White v. Busenhart,29 Ill.2d 156 , 162.
In the eminent domain proceedings here judgments were entered that the school trustees who had instituted the actions were to take fee simple estates. The jurisdiction of those courts is not disputed. La Salle and Pullman had the opportunity to contend in the eminent domain action that the school authorities would take less than a fee simple estate but did not do so. No appeals were taken from those final judgments. The judgments are not now subject to collateral аttack. Pullman and La Salle cannot
La Salle argues that a former judgment cannot bar a right not yet in existence and that since it had only a possibility оf reverter until the parcel of land was put up for sale, its action is not barred by res judicata. However, in making this argument La Salle of course is gratuitously assuming that the Board received a determinable fee and not a fee simрle. As we have pointed out, La Salle is precluded from collaterally challenging the judgment vesting a fee simple in the Board.
Another contention of La Salle is that the title was never vested in the Board, as the referendum which wоuld have allowed the Board to construct the school was defeated. A consequence of the defeat, La Salle says, was that the public purpose for the taking of the land, the construction of a school, never came into existence. However, the right of the Board to condemn the property for use as a school site was not dependent on the approval of the voters for the construction of the school. The Bоard, under the statute, had an independent authority to acquire the land. County Board of School Trustees v. Boram,
There is no substance to La Salle’s complaint that the Board’s sale of the land may cause damage to the remainder held by La Salle. As the holder of title in fee simple the Board, upon the failure of the contemplated public purpose, was free to convey the land, regardless of complaints by other landowners. We have а statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 122, par. 5 — 22) which specifically authorizes sale when the property has become “unnecessary” for school use.
For the reasons given, the judgments of the appellate courts in both appeals are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.