92 N.J.L. 375 | N.J. | 1918
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was deliveied by
The defendant-appellant, a garage keeper in Atlantic City, stored the automobile of the plaintiff, furnished supplies for, and did work upon itj at the special instance and request of the plaintiff, who owned the machine. The hill thus contracted amounted to $74.49, and default being made in its payment defendant retained possession of the automobile, asserting a lien under the act for the protection of garage keepers and automobile repairmen. Pamph. L. 1915, p. 556. Plaintiff brought replevin in the Atlantic Circuit Court, setting up that he was an infant twenty years
The case was tried in the court- of first instance upon an agreed state ■ of facts, as follows: That the amount claimed by defendant is due and owing to him from plaintiff; that at the time of storing the car and purchasing the supplies, &c., plaintiff was an infant and would not be of age until October, 1917 (the items running over a period from September 16th, 1916, to January 17th, 1917); that at the time mentioned plaintiff had the appearance of being of full age, and then, and prior thereto, represented himself to defendant as being of full age, and before that time executed a chattel mortgage to defendant on the automobile, and, in the acknowledgment of the execution of the mortgage, recit.ed the fact that he was of full age; that plaintiff held a state license to drive an automobile in Atlantic City for hire — to operate a car commonly called a “jitney;” that the plaintiff’s father, who is acting as his next friend in this suit, knew that the plaintiff was engaged in the business of operating an automobile for hire and that the car was stored in the defendant’s garage and that plaintiff was purchasing gasoline, &c., from defendant, and consented thereto; that plaintiff lived with his father and irregularly contributed money to his household.
Counsel for plaintiff urges that neither in Parker v. Hayes nor Pemberton Building and Loan Association v. Adams did the Court of Chancery say that infants were bound by their contracts, but that enforcement'of the contracts was denied on the ground of estoppel — equitable estoppel. But this doctrine is not now one of exclusively equitable cognizance; for, as this court, in Central Railroad Co. v. MacCartney, 68 N. J. L. 165, speaking by Mr. Justice Pitney (at p. 175), said, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, although 'the creature of equity and depending upon equitable principles, is recognized and enforced alike by courts of law and equity.
That the contracts of infants are voidable by them generally must be conceded; but there is nothing in either of the cases just mentioned which suggests that they fell under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, nor that that doctrine cannot be invoked against an infant in a proper case — even one at law.
In Hayes v. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq. (at p. 631), there is, however, an observation that at law a person within the age of twenty-one is conclusively presumed to be unfitted for business, and that every contract into which he enters is to his disadvantage, and that he is incapable of fraudulent acts which will estop him from interposing the shield of infancy against its enforcement. But this is obiter dictum. The case before the court was one in equity, calling for the application of equitable principles, and the observation concerning a different situation at law was, as stated, obiter dictum. And this is true of the similar observation of "Vice Chancellor Van Fleet in the same case. We are, therefore,'at liberty to adopt jn the case sub judice the rule which we think is most consonant with reason and therefore the better law.
The stipulation in the record that the plaintiff’s father was aware of his son’s transactions with defendant and consented thereto, and that the boy, who lived with his father, irregu
Defendant in this case pleaded that what was furnished to plaintiff were necessaries, and that therefore he was liable. In the view I take of this case a decision of these questions of emancipation and necessaries is not called for. I prefer to put my vote to reverse solely on the ground of estoppel in pais —equitable estoppel. It seems anomalous, indeed, thar youths of sufficient age and capacity, although less than twenty-one years old, may be convicted of crime, and be held liable for their torts, and yet not be liable on their contracts when ap■parently of sufficient capacity to make them, and when they procure their making by fraud.
Let it bo remembered that the contracts of infants are not absolutely void, but only voidable. An illuminating discussion of this question will be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stanley, in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Hall v. Butterfield (1879), 59 N. H. 354. At p. 357, he quotes Lord Mansfield as follows: “‘Great inconveniences must arise to others if infants were bound by no act. The law, therefore, at the same time that it protects their imbecility and indiscretion from injury through their own imprudence, enables them to do binding acts for their benefit * * *. A third rule, dedueible from the nature of the privilege that is given as a shield and not a sword, is, that it never shall be turned into an offensive weapon of fraud or injustice.’ ” And the learned judge further says (at p. 358): “* * * no reason appears why the wise and just principle enunciated by Lord Mansfield should not be given its full force, and the rights and obligations of lunatics, persons non compos mentis, drunkards when in such a state as to be en
As applied to the facts in .the case at- bar, the law, as I view it, is, that if a-youth under twenty-one years of age, by falsely representing himself to be an adult, which he appears to be, for the purpose of inducing another to enter into a contract with him, and, thereby, through such representation and appearance the other party is led to believe that such infant is an adult, and makes a contract with him, the benefit of which he obtains and retains, then, in a suit on that contract, the minor will not be permitted to set up the privilege of infancjr, because by his fraudulent conduct he has estopped himself from so pleading; and this in a court of law as well as in a court of equity.
The judgment will he reversed, with costs.
Concurrence Opinion
I find myself unable to concur
in the reasoning of the opinion. My vote to reverse rests on the ground that the parties have stipulated that the amount claimed by the defendant is due and owing to him from the plaintiff. This is legally possible, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s infancy, and must, therefore, be accepted as a fact. It is conclusive of the controversy.
For affirmance — None.
For reversal — The Chancellor, Swayze, Trenchard, Bergen, Minturn, Black, White, Heppenheimer, Williams, Taylor, Gardner, JJ. 11.