— In an action to recover damages for false imprisonment and defamation, (1) the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burke, J.), dated February 7, 1985, which granted the motion of the defendants North Shore University Hospital (hereinafter North Shore) and Dr. Ezra Feuer (hereinafter Feuer) to reargue and renew a prior order of the same court, dated August 24, 1984, and, upon reconsideration, vacated that branch of its prior order which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to enter a default judgment against them for failing to answer the complaint, and (2) the defendants North Shore and Feuer appeal from so much of the order of the same court, dated August 24, 1984, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to enter a default judgment against them.
Appeal from the order dated August 24, 1984, dismissed. The portion of the order appealed from was superseded by the
The respondents-appellants are awarded one bill of costs.
Contrary to Special Term’s finding in its prior order, the failure of North Shore and Feuer to serve an answer does not, within the context of the facts peculiar to this case, constitute a default. Following service of the complaint, the law firm representing the plaintiffs dissolved. There was no evidence in the record of compliance with CPLR 321 (b), which sets forth the requirements for a change of counsel. Due to the confusion created by the apparent gap in the representation of the plaintiffs, we cannot say that North Shore’s and Feuer’s reliance upon an oral extension of their time to answer granted by one of the partners of the dissolved firm was unjustified. Although we recognize that CPLR 2104 requires a writing subscribed by the attorneys to such an agreement, a party is precluded from invoking CPLR 2104 to avoid an oral stipulation if it appears that the stipulation was made and the adverse party relied thereon (see, Bates Real Estate v Marquette Land Co.,
We view the motion of North Shore and Feuer, which led to the order being appealed from by the plaintiffs as a request for reargument of the court’s prior order (cf. Gulledge v Adams,
