L.W. v. Dee Grubbs, Thomas Nelson Marlin Hutton Richard Hill James NansonL.W. v. Dee Grubbs, Thomas Nelson Marlin Hutton Richard Hill James Nanson
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- Goodwin
L.W., a registered nurse employed by the State of Oregon at a medium security custodial institution for young male offenders, was raped and terrorized by an inmate. She sued under
Defendants are state employees who served as L.W.’s supervisors at the custodial institution. According to L.W.’s complaint, which, for
In her complaint, L.W. alleged that the foregoing facts constituted conduct, under color of state law, which deprived her of her right to liberty without due process of law. L.W. sued on the theory that the government actors violated her constitutional rights by intentionally placing her in a position of known danger, that is, in unguarded proximity with an inmate whose record they knew included attacks upon women.
Defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, arguing that no due process right of L.W. was affected because she was not in custody. The district court granted the motion, agreeing that only a person in official custody could state a
I.
To state a
Relying on DeShaney, the district court ruled that victim custody was a prerequisite to L.W.’s claim. In so ruling, the court misread DeShaney and overlooked circuit case law to the contrary.
As a general rule, members of the public have no constitutional right to sue state employees who fail to protect them against harm inflicted by third parties. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004; Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.1987).
This general rule is modified by two exceptions: (1) the “special relationship” exception; and (2) the “danger creation” exception. Although some cases have blended the two exceptions together, see, e.g., Ketchum, 811 F.2d at 1247, the distinction is important.
After the state has created a special relationship with a person, as in the case of custody or involuntary hospitalization, cases have imposed liability under a due process theory, premised on an abuse of that special relationship. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-325, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457-2463, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), (patient in custodial facility for the mentally retarded denied protection from violence); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), (prisoner denied Eighth Amendment right to medical care).
The “danger creation” basis for a claim, by contrast, necessarily involves affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588-90 (9th Cir.1989) (plaintiff not in custody but state officer created the danger), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 341, 112 L.Ed.2d 305 (1990); cf. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 (plaintiff not in custody and state officer did not create the danger). DeShaney did not rule that custody was required where the state affirmatively causes the harm. In addition to pointing out that Joshua DeShaney was not in state custody when injured, the Court noted that “[wjhile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. (emphasis added). DeSha-ney thus suggests that had the state created the danger, Joshua might have recovered even though he was not in custody.
In the Ninth Circuit, the law concerning the “danger creation” exception begins with
Wood, supra.
In
Wood
(decided after
DeShaney),
we held that a woman who was raped by a third party could hold a police officer liable under
Similarly, in the present case, the actions of the Defendants created the danger to which L.W. fell victim by elevating Blehm to cart boy status. According to the complaint, the Deféndants knowingly assigned Blehm to work with L.W. despite their knowledge that: (1) Blehm was not qualified to serve as a cart boy; (2) Blehm had an extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women and girls; (3) Blehm was likely to assault a female if left alone with her; (4) L.W. would be alone with Blehm during her rounds; and (5) L.W. would not be prepared to defend against or take steps to avert an attack because she had not been informed at hiring that she would be left alone with violent offenders. The Defendants, like the officer in Wood, thus used their authority as state correctional officers to create an opportunity for Blehm to assault L.W. that would not otherwise have existed. The Defendants also enhanced L.W.’s vulnerability to attack by misrepresenting to her the risks attending her work.
Because custody is not a prerequisite to the “danger creation” basis for a
B. Employment
Defendants next argue that L.W.’s status as a state employee should bar her claim. Defendants mistakenly rely on Collins, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1061.
In
Collins,
city sanitation employee Collins died of asphyxia after entering a manhole. Collins’ estate subsequently sued the city under
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of Collins’
In rejecting Collins’ claim, the Court held that Collins had not alleged affirmative culpable acts by the city. According to the Court, Collins’ complaint alleged merely that “the city deprived him of life and liberty by failing to provide a reasonably safe work environment.” Id. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1069 (footnote omitted). The Court pointed out that Collins had not alleged that “his supervisor instructed him to go into the sewer when the supervisor knew or should have known that there was a significant risk that he would be injured.” Id.
Under Collins, we cannot dismiss L.W.’s claim against Defendants merely because she was an employee supervised by them. Moreover, the shortcomings identified by the Court in Collins’ complaint do not exist in L.W.’s complaint. Unlike Collins, L.W. alleges that the Defendants took affirmative steps to place her at significant risk, and that they knew of the risks. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Collins actually supports L.W.’s claim.
C. “Mere Negligence”
Finally, Defendants argue that L.W.’s claim is barred because it alleges “mere negligence” and
D. L.W. Has Stated a Claim Under
L.W. has alleged that she was deprived of her liberty because Defendants, acting in their capacity as state correctional officers, affirmatively created a significant risk of harm to her, and did so with a sufficiently culpable mental state. Accordingly, we hold that L.W. has stated a claim under
II. Res Judicata
In addition to arguing that L.W. has not stated a claim under
REVERSED and REMANDED.