L. SINGER & SONS ET AL. v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
No. 34
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 14, 15, 1940. Decided December 16, 1940.
311 U.S. 295
*Together with No. 35, Kansas City, Missouri, v. L. Singer & Sоns et al., also on writ of certiorari, 309 U. S. 653, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Section 125 of the Criminal Code makes no distinction between the false assertions of the fact of prior statements and the false assertions of any other fact. Nor can we see any reason to make one. As the Government points out, the denial of the fact that certain statements have been made may be equally as clear, deliberate, and material a falsehood as the denial of any other fact. And since statements made to government agents are generally one of the bases upon which criminal proceedings are instituted and indictments returned, such a distinction might substantially impede effective administration of criminal law.
The facts stated in the indictment are clearly sufficient to charge a violation of the perjury statute. Accordingly, the orders quashing the indictments are reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed.
Mr. William E. Kemp, with whom Mr. John M. Cleary was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 35.
Mr. Henry N. Ess, in No. 34, and Mr. Thomas W. Bockes, in No. 35, with both of whom Mr. A. C. Spencer was on the briefs, for the Union Pacific Railroad Company, respondent.
MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Undertaking to proceed under Paragraphs 18, 20 and 21, § 402, Transportation Act, 19201 (41 Stat. 456, 477,
“Plaintiffs are engaged in the business of buying and selling at wholesale and retail, fruits, vegetables and other food products within and adjacent to the so-called City Market of Kansas City, Missouri, located at and near the intersection of Fourth and Walnut Streets in said City, or are directly interested in or connected with said business. Said market has been in existence at said location for more than seventy-five years serving greater Kansas City and vicinity as a wholesale and retail produce market, and also serving numerous territories in other states to and from which perishable and other produce bought and sold in said market is transported. The City of Kansas City, Missouri, is now engaged in the construction of new wholesale and retail market buildings and facilities in said vicinity at a cost of approximately $500,000.00. Said market is now and for a long period of time has been served by existing transportation facilities of various trunk line railroads, and said existing transportation facilities are suitable, convenient and adequate to meet the requirements of the market. The market is easily accessible to its customers through the facilities of said railroads and also by the use of streets and hard-surfaced highways radiating in every direction therefrom.”
Answering, the respondent alleged that petitioners were not parties “in interest” within Paragraph 20, § 402, Transportation Act and had no right to sue. The District Court sustained this defense and dismissed the bill. 26 F. Supp. 721. Upon appeal its action was affirmed. 109 F. 2d 493. The matter is here by certiorari.
The Circuit Court of Appeals made the following summation of the bill—
“The complaint of the plaintiffs shows that they are commission merchants doing business on the Kansas City, Missouri, produce market, an old and well-estab
It is not alleged that the respondent has ever served the produce market in Kansas City, Missouri, or that petitioners make or receive shipments over its lines or that the proposed extension will deprive them of any shipping facilities. Evidently the real purpose was to obstruct construction of a competitor and the theory upоn which the proceeding rests would permit petitioners to sue if any railroad should extend its lines to any market competing with the market at Kansas City, Missouri.
Concerning the purport of the allegations of the bill, the Circuit Court of Appeals rightly said:
“It is obvious that the only basis for the plaintiffs’ claim that the alleged extension of the lines of the defendant to the Kansas City, Kansas, market will particularly injure them is that they do business upon the Kansas City, Missouri, market, and that if the proposed rival market in Kansas City, Kansas, functions, it will divert business from the market upon which they operate and will thus hurt them, their business, and their investments in Kansas City, Missouri, and that, since the proposed extension of its tracks by the defendant is necessary to enable the rival market to function, such extension will therefore injure the plaintiffs. It seems equally obvious that, except for the fact that the pro
It declared thаt the question whether petitioners were “parties in interest” within Paragraph 20 must be determined upon consideration of Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47, and concluded—
“The plaintiffs have no definite legal right which is threatened. They are, however, persons whose welfare may be adversely affected by the bringing about of a material change in the transportation situation, in the sense that the extension proposed by the defendant, if built and operated, will enable a competitive market to function to their detriment. In that sense, we think it may safely be said that the proposed extension of defendant‘s lines may adversely affect the plaintiffs’ welfare. We are of the opinion, however, that their complaint discloses that their welfare cannot be directly, but only indirectly and consequentially, affected by the proposed extension. They are not in competition with the defendant. They are not engaged in the transportation business. Their only peculiar interest in that business is in the effect which changes in it may have upon the market where they do business and upon rival markets now or hereafter established in the territory which the plaintiffs serve. . . . We conclude that the statute is not to be so liberally construed as to enable
A dissenting opinion by Judge Stone likewise relied upon Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., but took the view that the challenged action might directly and substantially affect petitioners’ welfare since their financial interests would suffer from the proposed rival market which could not come into existence without the proposed extension.
The purpose and effect of Paragraphs 18, 20 and 21 were much considered in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 and Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47.
In the first of these causes a railroad sought to prevent another from building an extension. The meaning of the term “party in interest” was not discussed. But the opinion asserts that by the Transportation Act of 1920, “Congress undertook to develop and maintain, for the people of the United States, an adequate railway system. It recognized that preservation of the earning capacity, and conservation оf the financial resources, of individual carriers is a matter of national concern; that the property employed must be permitted to earn a reasonable return; that the building of unnecessary lines involves a waste of resources and that the burden of this waste may fall upon the public; that competition between carriers may result in harm to the public as well as in benefit; and that when a railroad inflicts injury upon its rival, it may be the public which ultimately bears the loss.”
Also “the prohibition of Paragraph 18 is absolute. If the proposed track is an extension and no certificate has
In the second cause it was claimed that the Westеrn Pacific was not “a party in interest” within the statute. The Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that view, 46 F. 2d 729; we concluded otherwise but did not undertake to announce an inclusive and exclusive definition of the term. The circumstances disclosed a special interest in that complainant with probability of direct loss from what the defendant—not another—proposed to do. The portion of the opinion, presently specially important, follows—
“If, as the court below seems to have assumed, a ‘party in interest’ must possess some clear legal right for which it might ask protection under the rules commonly accepted by courts of equity, the paragraphs under consideration would not materially aid the Congressional рlan for promoting transportation. On the other hand, there was no purpose to permit any individual so inclined to institute such a proceeding. The complainant must possess something more than a common concern for obedience to law. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488. It will suffice, we think, if the bill discloses that some definite legal right possessed by complainant is seriously threatened or that the unauthorized and therefore unlawful action of the defendant carrier may directly and adversely affect the complainant‘s welfare by bringing about some material change in the transportation situation.”
The Transportation Act, 1920, was designed to protect the public against action which might endanger its interest. In order to aid that general purpose, Paragraph 20, § 402, provides that suit for an injunction may be instituted by the United States, the Commission (I. C. C.), any Commission or Regulative Body of the state or states affected, or any “party in interest.” Such
We cannot think Congress supposed that the development and maintenance of an adequate railway system would be aided by permitting any person engaged in business within or adjacent to a public market to demand an injunction against a carrier seeking only to serve a competing market by means of an extension not authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The right to sue under the statute is individual. Petitioners are not helped by uniting.
The Circuit Court of Appeals after reviewing all the facts reached the conclusion that the welfare of petitioners could only be indirectly and consequentially affected by the proposed extension; that their interest in the transportation situation “is in the effect which changes in it may have upon the mаrket where they do business and upon rival markets now or hereafter established in the territory which the plaintiffs serve.” It held this was not enough. We agree. A mere extension to the plant of a competitor which in no other way affects the complaining parties in no proper sense brings about a material change in the transportation system directly affecting their peculiar interest which they have the right to prevent by suit.
The challenged judgment must be affirmed.
The City of Kansas City, Missouri, sought to intervene in No. 34. The District Court denied its motion. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In view of what we have decided in No. 34 this denial necessarily must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER:
I quite agree with my Brother STONE that unfair loss may be cast upon a community by the unjustified extension of a railroad line, and that such loss is one consequence of the evils of unregulated railroad building which the Transportation Act was intended to check. But our immediate problem is to determine how a community can challenge such a proposed improper extension. Can a city, in other words, come into a Federal Court and urge its special relation to an alleged violation of
A city deeming itself adversely affected by a proposed illegal extension would naturally turn to its state commission to assert its interests. If, for any reason, the state agency does not employ its power under
But it would indeed be strange to find that while the city was not given power to resort to a court, a private and more limited sufferer from the same economic threat may have such legal standing. Such a paradox exposes the appropriate scope of “party in interest” in
Who then is a “party in interest“? As a part of the very system through which the national policy is to be achieved, a railroad has been deemed by this Court a “party in interest” to effectuate the railroad policy intro
Therefore, the court below made proper dispositions of these cases.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, having concurred in the Court‘s opinion, also join in these views.
MR. JUSTICE STONE:
I think that the complainants, petitioners in No. 34, are proper parties to maintain this suit, that the decree should be reversed and, on the remand, the petition of Kansas City for intervention should be considered in light of that conclusion and of
On the pleadings it stands conceded that the proposed extension of respondent‘s line is unauthorized and unlаwful, and the sole question we have to decide is whether the interest of petitioners in maintaining this suit, as disclosed by their pleadings, satisfies the requirement of the statute which authorizes it to be brought by “any party in interest.”
Section 1 (18) of the Transportation Act of 1920,
The interest of petitioners in maintaining the suit as shown by the pleadings is derived from the injury to the рublic which, it is specifically alleged, will result from the proposed extension through the injury to the community in Kansas City, Missouri, and vicinity, of which community petitioners are a part and in which they are property owners, and the consequent injury alleged to affect them individually. The public injury, it is alleged, will be caused by (a) the loss or serious impairment in utility of the Kansas City public produce market and the destruction or serious diminution of values of property and business and of financial investments in and about the market, which will be brought about by the extension, through the creation of a rival market and the diversion of traffic to it at a point in Kansas City, Kansas, far removed from the center of population of Kansas City, Missouri, and to the inconvenience of the great majority of the citizens of both cities who are served by the existing market, which is adequate to the needs of the community; (b) by the
Special injury is shown to complainants (petitioners in No. 34) by the allegations that they are owners of business property and investments in the existing market area and vicinity, and that their property will be reduced in value in consequence of the diversion of traffic to the rival market. The petitioner, Kansas City, Missouri, in intervention, in No. 35, alleges the like injury to the public which it represents and sets up specifically the threatened loss in value and utility of a large public market structure which it is now building at great cost, and the threatened loss to it of taxes through diminution in property values in the city.
The statute does not define the “parties in interest” whom it permits to sue to restrain an unauthorized extension. It cannot be assumed that the phrase is meaningless or that the statute should be read as though the words were omitted. Obviously the parties intended must have, as do petitioners, an interest in the outcome of the litigation other than the “common concern for obedience to law.” See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488. And as the language of the statute рlainly indicates, and as we have held, they may be, as are petitioners, others than the public bodies named in the statute as appropriate plaintiffs. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U. S. 380, 393, 394. And they may maintain the suit although the injury which they allege is not strictly an actionable wrong independently of the paragraphs in question.
The statute draws no distinction between direct and indirect injury as the test of plaintiff‘s interest. Nor is any reason advanced for saying that his interest is more significant because the injury which he suffers is labeled “direct” rather than “indirect.” In any case, that suffered by petitioners does not seem to be any the less direct than that which an extension may inflict upon a competing railroad which admittedly may sue to enjoin it. Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; cf. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382. If the statute imposes any requirements other than those indicated by the phrase “party in interest,” they must be implied from the purposes of the statute, its context, and from the reasons for permitting others than the public bodies named in it to bring the suit. Cf. New York Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24. On the other hand if maintenance of the present suit by petitioners is consistent with those purposes and aids them and is in harmony with the reasons for allowing any party in interest to sue, the conclusion would seem inescapable that petitioners are proper plaintiffs.
It is not denied that the statutory language and the legislative history of the paragraphs in question require consideration by the Commission of the interests of cities, towns and communities which are adversely affected by a proposed extension of a line of railroad, in order to dеtermine whether “public convenience and necessity” require the extension. The phrase “public convenience and necessity” has long been used to signify the final result of the balancing of the consequences which flow from the proposed action to all those matters of public concern which are affected by it. Cf. Chesa-
In determining who may bring the suit to restrain the proposed construction as provided by
If the proposed construction is an extension the injunction must issue as of right, but its only effect is to compel the railroad before proceeding further to apply to the Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity which is the public purpose of the Act.
In considering the scope of the application of the statute this Court has recognized that the public interest which the Commission is to protect includes the publiс interest in the maintenance of an adequate transportation system and that a railroad whose welfare, although not its legal right, is adversely affected by an unauthorized and therefore unlawful extension of the line of another is a “party in interest” entitled to maintain suit to enjoin the extension. Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; cf. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, supra. And it has held that one other than a carrier (a municipality), who has “a proper interest in the subject matter,” may institute a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 1, paragraphs 18 to 22, to obtain a certificate of public convenience, so as to enable a railroad to build an extension to a new station which a state commission has ordered it to build. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra, 393, 394. Compare De-
But it has never held, unless it has done so now, that the public concern in protecting large communities from destruction of their business and financial interests by diversion of traffic to rival communities by railroad extensions, is not included in that public convenience and necessity which the Commission must consider in granting or withholding a certificate; or that one not a railroad who is a member of a community adversely affected and whose own business or property interests are so adversely affected is not a “party in interest” within the meaning of the statute.
If the statute permits some protection through commission action of the public interest in the preservation of communities adversely affected by the construction of railroad extensions, no plausible reason has been advanсed for saying that an individual member of such a community whose property or financial interests are adversely affected by the proposed unauthorized extension, and who would be a proper party to the proceeding before the Commission on application for a certificate,2 is not a party in interest, entitled to bring suit quite as much as a competing railroad whose property interests are likewise affected. On the contrary, petitioners have a special and peculiar interest in preventing the
True, the statute is concernеd with the protection of the public interest but in order that the public interest might not suffer, and that private injury might not be inflicted through a public wrong, the construction of an unlawful extension, Congress did not restrict the authority to bring suit to public agencies—the United States, the Commission or state commissions. Congress by providing that applications for certificates of convenience need not be made for local spur or side tracks, recognized that such constructions are too trivial to require a proceeding before the Commission. Instead it gave authority to bring the suit to private parties in interest, who because of the injury especially inflicted upon them through the adverse effect of the unlawful extension on the public, have a peculiar incentive to protect the public interest with which the statute is concerned, see Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477, and who by restraining an unauthorized “extension” insure the expert consideration by the Commission in the situation in which Congress required it.
Just as Congress gave authority to a railroad to sue to enjoin an unauthorized extension by its competitor in order to effect the railroad policy of the Act, it gave like authority to complainants to effect its public policy with respect to a community injuriously affected by an
Maintenance of the suit by complainants is thus within the fair meaning of the words of the statute. It aids rather than obstructs the administration of the Act; it effectuates the public policy of the Act and is within the reason for permitting others than public agencies to bring the suit. They are “parties in interest” to which the statute refers.
Since the suit was properly brought the district court should entertain and decide the petition of Kansas City for intervention in the light of
The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REED concur in this opinion.
Notes
“Paragraph (18) . . . no carrier by railroad subject to this Act shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad . . . unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a сertificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction . . . of such . . . extended line . . .” Paragraph (19) The application for and issuance of any such certificate shall be under such rules and regulations as to hearings and other matters as the Commission may from time to time prescribe, . . .” Paragraph (20) . . . Any construction . . . contrary to the provisions . . . of paragraph (18) . . . may be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction at the suit of the United States, the Commission, any commission or regulating body of the State or States affected, or any party in interest. . . .” The fact that, in order to raise the bare legal question of petitioner‘s right to sue, the illegality of the proposed extension was conceded by the pleadings, does not touch the force of the argument. See Aroostook Valley R. Co., Construction, 105 I. C. C. 643; Minnesota Western R. Co., Construction, 111 I. C. C. 377; Northern Oklahoma Rys., Construction, 111 I. C. C. 765; Construction of Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co., 138 I. C. C. 363; Western Pacific California R. Co., 162 I. C. C. 5. And in balancing the public conveniences and necessities involved, that is to say the public interest in an adequate transportation system and the public interest in protecting local communities from undue injury from extensions of relatively small transportation importance, the Commission has sometimes found the injury to existing community interests persuasive ground for refusing the certificate. Construction by Aroostook Valley R. Co., supra; Construction by Minnesota Western R. Co., supra.
The broad scope of the Commission‘s inquiry is evidеnced by the questionnaire which applicants for an extension must answer. Among the data required is the nature of the population, the territory, the industries involved, the names and character of towns near to but not served by the extension. See In the matter of Applications under Paragraphs (18) and (21), Inclusive, Section 1, of the Interstate Commerce Act for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for the Construction or Extension of Lines of Railroad, January 22, 1924. III-A Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 333-335, 351.