L.J.S., Petitioner, v. STATE ETHICS COMMISSION, Respondent.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Jan. 13, 2000.
744 A.2d 798
¶5 In Lord, the supreme court noted the importance of
¶6 Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Argued Oct. 6, 1999.
A. Tedd Hudock, Punxsutawney, for petitioner.
John J. Contino, Harrisburg, for respondent.
Before DOYLE, President Judge, and COLINS, J., McGINLEY, J., SMITH, J., KELLEY, J., FLAHERTY, J., and LEADBETTER, J.
McGINLEY, Judge.
L.J.S. (Petitioner) seeks declaratory judgment and an injunction.1 The State
On February 5, 1997, the investigative division of the Commission initiated a preliminary inquiry3 into the activities of Petitioner.4 Petitioner challenged the Commission‘s jurisdiction and asserted that an investigation of a judicial officer seriously trespassed beyond the separation of powers established by the Pennsylvania Constitution. On December 27, 1997, the Commission filed a formal investigative complaint against Petitioner involving alleged violations of the conflict of interest provisions of the State Ethics Act,
In 1979, Petitioner was appointed to the position of chief adult probation officer by the president judge of the court of common pleas of the county. His duties include, inter alia, enforcing orders of court, issuing arrest warrants, conducting preliminary probation revocation hearings and reviewing applications to conduct personal and property searches of parolees. Petitioner also has authority to determine a defendant‘s eligibility for a court appointed attorney in criminal cases, to establish, modify and/or waive payment of court ordered fines and fees, and to make recommendations to the court regarding sentencing, parole and furloughs.6
The issue before this Court is whether a county‘s chief probation officer is a judicial employee, and as such, under the exclusive jurisdiction of our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or whether Petitioner is a “public employee” which means Petitioner would be subject to the provisions of the State Ethics Act.7
Separation of Powers
The Constitution of Pennsylvania establishes three separate, equal and independent branches of government: the General Assembly, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is clothed with certain exclusive rights and powers. Neither the General Assembly nor the executive branch of government, acting through an administrative agency may constitutionally infringe upon the powers or duties of the [county] judiciary. The courts of this Commonwealth under our Constitution have certain inherent rights and powers to do all such things as are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice. The
In Gardner v. Thomas G. Peoples, Jr., President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, 506 A.2d 479 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), this Court held that it was constitutionally impermissible for the commissioners of Blair County to impose a mandatory retirement age upon court employees. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated that, “[a] non-judicial agency‘s involvement in running the courts can never survive constitutional scrutiny, for no matter how innocuous the involvement may seem, the fact remains that if an agency... instructs a court on its employment policies, of necessity, the courts themselves are not supervising their operations.” First Judicial District of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 556 Pa. 258, 727 A.2d 1110 (1999); citing Eshelman. In First Judicial District, our Supreme Court held that the prior practice of permitting an agency‘s [Human Relations Commission] involvement into some aspects of the court‘s policies and practices to determine whether any violation exists would no longer be acceptable because an agency has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any complaints against the judiciary. Id. at 262-263, 727 A.2d at 1112.
Recently, this Court, in Jefferson County v. Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, 738 A.2d 1077 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999), reviewed a dispute over the disbursement of money from a county offender supervision fund (Fund) established pursuant to Section 477.20 of the Administrative Code of 1929 (Code),
Our Supreme Court has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Judicial Employees
The Pennsylvania Constitution gives the Supreme Court the supervisory and ad
(c). The Supreme Court shall have the power to proscribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court... including the power to provide for... the administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch....
It is clear that the General Assembly is precluded from exercising powers entrusted to the judiciary. Kremer v. State Ethics Commission, 503 Pa. 358, 363, 469 A.2d 593, 595 (1983). Because our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the sole power and responsibility to supervise the practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, the General Assembly is precluded from exercising powers which limit the powers entrusted to the judiciary. Maunus v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Ethics Commission, 518 Pa. 592, 544 A.2d 1324 (1988).
Petitioner is a Judicial Officer
Section 11.1(v)(A) of the Pennsylvania Code of Regulations (Pa.Code),
In Matter of Antolik, 93 Pa. Cmwlth. 258, 501 A.2d 697 (1985), this Court determined that the position of chief juvenile probation officer was a judicial position and that a county‘s [nepotism] rule was constitutionally inapplicable to judicial personnel, because it affected the power of the judiciary to hire, fire and supervise. See P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 555 Pa. 149, 723 A.2d 174 (1999).
The Salary Board
The Commission contends that because the alleged violations generated compensation in excess of the amount approved by the county salary board, Petitioner is subject to its scrutiny. The limited function of the salary board is set out in The County Code11 (Code). It has been described as a watchdog to act as a restraint, or check, so that county commissioners do not exercise an unbridled power to appoint at any salary they may determine. Penksa v. Holtzman, 153 Pa. Cmwlth. 94, 620 A.2d 632 (1993). Under Section 16 of the Code,
In the present controversy, the Commission contends that the investigation centers on the Petitioner‘s receipt of unauthorized compensation from a fund created by the General Assembly and generated from offender-paid fees for use of the county adult probation and parole department. In his affidavit the president judge attested:
4. That during my tenure all actions taken by [Petitioner] which are alleged by the State Ethics Commission to have been taken in violation of the State Ethics Act were taken with my prior knowledge and approval.
Affidavit of the President Judge, September 9, 1999, No. 4 at 3; Certified Record.
Our Supreme Court has countenanced legislative intrusion into the judicial realm if it does not interfere directly with the judiciary‘s authority and responsibility to control its own functions and duties. See Lavelle v. Koch, 532 Pa. 631, 617 A.2d 319 (1992). In Lavelle, the esteemed president judge of Carbon County sought to compel the salary board to fix court employees’ salaries at a judicially recommended pay schedule. Our Supreme Court held if a genuine threat is established, and not a mere encroachment, to the administration of justice, the judiciary could have compelled funding by the salary board. Citing Beckert.
Here, of primary importance is whether the Commission‘s investigation is an impermissible intrusion into the judiciary‘s exclusive authority to supervise court operations. It is well settled that the General Assembly has the power to promulgate substantive law through the exercise of its police power but “even a statute enacted pursuant to the General Assembly‘s police power which furthers a laudable public policy must be struck down if it interferes with another co-equal branch of government.” Commonwealth v. Stern, 549 Pa. 505, 701 A.2d 568 (1997), citing Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa. Cmwlth. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983), affirmed, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d 1291 (1984).
A Judicial Officer is not Immune from Criminal Prosecution
Additionally, the Commission contends that throttling its investigation effectively immunizes Petitioner from criminal charges. We disagree. Our unified judiciary has provided an administrative means of supervision and regulation. A judicial officer is subject to the supervision and discipline of our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and in the past the Court of Judicial Discipline has suspended a judicial officer without pay subject to resolution by the Judicial Conduct Board.13 In the case, In re: Strock, 727 A.2d 653 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1998), judicial disciplinary proceedings were brought against Gloria M. Strock (Strock), a district justice, for alleged mishandling and personal use of monies received by the district justice office. After a determination that Strock appropriated public funds, she was removed from office and declared ineligible from holding a judicial office in the future. Id. at 664. Furthermore, a judicial officer is not immune from criminal prosecution, and like any citizen is subject to investigation by the proper authority for any criminal activity. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 547 Pa. 752, 692 A.2d 564 (1997).
As yet our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refrained from promulgating any rule or regulation regarding county probation officers, however, this does not mean it has forfeited its exclusive jurisdiction. Here, Petitioner remains under the direct supervision of the president judge. The Commission lacks jurisdiction.
Accordingly, because the Commission lacks jurisdiction, we grant Petitioner‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and deny the Commission‘s motion for summary judgment.14
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2000, the motion for judgment on the pleadings by L.J.S., petitioner, is granted, and the State Ethics Commission‘s motion for summary judgment is denied.
President Judge DOYLE dissents.
COLINS, Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the result reached by my learned colleague. However, I must dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that the petitioner is a judicial officer.
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.
Therefore, while the petitioner is a public employee, and an employee of the judicial branch of government, he is not a judicial officer, as he has no judicial powers. Those who may be considered judicial officers are clearly delineated above. While petitioner is certainly an officer of the court, pursuant to
Further, I would grant fees to petitioner against respondent, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
