L.C., a child, appeals the trial court’s order withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing her on probation for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of section 784.021(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). L.C. argues that the State failed to prove the essential elements of the charge. We agree and reverse.
At the adjudicatory hearing, the State’s only witness, D.J., the alleged victim, testified that on August 19, 2000, she was in her apartment watching her younger brother and sister, when, at approximately 10:00 p.m., she heard a loud knock on her bedroom window. She ran to the living room, looked out the locked sliding glass door and observed L.C. and several other people. L.C. waived a gin bottle in the air and told D.J. to “come out the door ... I’m going to beat your ass.” Although no one tried to enter the locked apartment,
At the close of the State’s case, L.C. moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that the State had failed to prove the essential elements of the crime. The court denied the motion. A motion for judgment of acquittal is designed to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. If the State presents competent evidence to establish each element of the crime, a motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied. State v. Williams,
To prove aggravated assault, the State must prove that:
1. L.C. intentionally and unlawfully threatened, either by word or act, to do violence to D.J.
2. At the time, L.C. appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat.
3. L.C.’s act created a well-founded fear in the victim’s mind that violence was about to take place.
4. The assault was made with a deadly weapon.
See § 784.021(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).
L.C. argues that because D.J. was inside a locked apartment, L.C. did not have, or appear to have, the ability to carry out the threat. We agree. To commit an assault, there must not only be a threat to do violence but there must be an apparent ability to carry out that threat. See § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). No evidence was introduced to indicate that L.C. attempted to enter D.J.’s apartment or that D.J. ever came outside. The threat in this case, that D.J. would be beaten if she came outside, was at best, a “conditional threat to do injury at some unspecified future time based upon a possible eventuality.” Butler v. State,
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
