Pursuant to § 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, Title 29 U.S.C. § 160, the petitioner, L. C. Cassidy & Son, Inc., seeks to review and set aside an Order of the National Labor Relations Board issued June 4, 1968, reported at
The proceedings before the Board began with a complaint issued July 28, 1967, on charges by Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local 503, AFL-CIO, that the petitioner had interfered with, restrained and coerced its emplоyees in violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act, discriminatorily discharged two employees in violation of § 8(a) (3) and refused to bargain in violation of § 8(a) (5).
After a hearing on February 2, 1968, the Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the § 8(a) (3) and § 8(a) (5) allegations. The Trial Examiner’s decision covers the two discharges in great detail and concludes that both employees were discharged for cause and not in violation of the Act. He found, over several serious objections by petitioner, that when the demand to bargain was made on March 2, 1967, the Union had ■obtained valid authorization cards from a majority of 17 of the 32 employees in the unit. He recommended a bargaining order.
On March 2, 1967, the Union had written petitioner’s president, Donald Cassidy, that a majority of the installation employees had authorized Sheet Metal Workers’ International Associatiоn, Local 503, to represent them in collective bargaining, offering to prove this majority status through a disinterested third person and requesting recognition and a meeting to negotiate a contract. The following day the Union filed a petition for certification by the Board.
Under date of March 7, 1967, the petitioner’s attorney, Willis K. Kunz, replied that petitioner did not believe that the Union represented a majority. As an elеction which would settle the issue had already been requested by the Union, Mr. Kunz thought it would serve no purpose to attempt proof of representation by other means.
The Board conducted an election on May 5, 1967, at which 10 votes were cast for and 18 against the Union. One ballot was challenged. The Union filed objections to the election charging improper offer of benefits to employees individually and as a group in addition to withholding of work from other employees all allegedly to discourage Union membership. The Trial Examiner found that petitioner’s unlawful conduct during the pre-election period caused the dissipation of the Union’s majority and invalidated the election.
The Trial Examiner found several violations of § 8(a) (1). It was the custom for petitioner to hold meetings with employees on Monday mornings at leаst twice monthly to discuss working problems and complaints. From March 13, 1967, until the election, the Union was a subject of discussion at these meetings. Six of the employees testified to various statements made. The Trial Examiner credited that testimony. He found that most of the comments attributed to Donald Cassidy, although unfavorable to union organization, were within the protection of the Act. He found no unlawful threats of reprisal. He did find impliеd promises of benefits conditioned on renunciation of the Union.
Although Mr. Cassidy did say several times that he could promise no benefits because of the Union campaign, he' once stated he could give the employees “more” than the Union. In connection with a complaint on “Electric heat batt rates,” he said he could not promise anything, but would look into it. On March 14, 1967, three employees vis *1361 ited Mr. Cassidy in his officе to ask what benefits they might receive if they “dropped the Union action,” and were told he could not promise them anything until the union action was officially dropped. At the March 20, 1967 meeting of employees, Mr. Cassidy mentioned the visit of the three employees and when one of them said the employees wished to meet elsewhere without management present, to determine whether they wanted the union, Mr. Cassidy offеred the petitioner’s conference room for this discussion. He also reminded them at one point that some months before he had suggested their forming a grievance committee and expressed regret that a third party, the Union, had to come in to do what the employees could do for themselves. After the employees met alone, they reported that they did not really want the Union if they could secure some benefits and correct existing problems. Mr. Cassidy replied that he could not promise anything but that they knew he was a man of his word who acted in good faith. The Trial Examiner found that Mr. Cassidy’s remarks as a whole held out a promise of benefits if the employees rejected the Union and that his statements were tantamount to suggesting a committee as an alternative to the Union.
Petitioner argues that these statements at worst are only ambiguous and should be construed as within the protected area of § 8(c) in the light of the facts that the employees themselves initiated many of the discussions, there were continual assurances that the employees were free to vote as they wished and there was an absence of any threat of reprisal. However, the context of Mr. Cassidy’s comments at the meetings also included referеnces to possible closing of the plant for economic reasons and statements that in the event of a strike the employees could stay out till “hell froze over” before he would give any of his profit to anyone and that strikers would be replaced and would “no longer have employment.” In the light of all of the circumstances we do not consider the Board s construction of the statements as implying an offer of benefits unreasonable.
As petitioner argues, mere interrogation of employees without threat or intimidation concerning union membership is not per se a violation of the Act (absent anti-union background and not associated as part of a pattern of conduct hostile to unionism) and standing alone will not support a finding that § 8(a) (1) has been violated. National Can Corp. v. NLRB, 7 Cir., 1967,
The Board found that a majority had been achieved by the Union. The majority was a small one and resulted from resolution of a number of close questions in favor of the Union. It was stipulated that there were 32 employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. Signed cards of 18 employees were received in evi *1362 dence. Sixteen of the cards were printed as follows:
AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION BY AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR and CONGRESS of INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
I desire to be represented by a Union which is part of the AFL-CIO and I hereby designate the AFL-CIO and/or its appropriate affiliates as my Bargaining Agent in matters of wages, hours and other cоnditions of employment.
Two read:
SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Affiliated with AFL-CIO
AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION
I, the undersigned, hereby authorize the SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, or any affiliated Local Union thereof, to represent me for purposes of Collective Bargaining, and in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of labor, wages, and other conditions of employment.
The petitioner argued that the 16 general AFL-CIO cards did not validly designate the Union as the collective bargаining agent of the employees. The testimony of Felix McCartney, the Regional Director of Region 10 of the AFL-CIO, comprising the State of Indiana, indicated that at the time of the hearing 129 international unions were affiliated with the AFL-CIO and that he had the authority to decide with which affiliate a group of employees would be identified after they signed AFL-CIO authorization cards. Mr. McCartney had previously testified that he asked employee Virgil Harris, who telephoned him requesting an organizer be sent, to find out what union the employees desired and that Mr. Harris had later told him the employees preferred the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Union.
Petitioner contends that with two exceptions Mr. McCartney in fact, and not the individual employees, selected their bargaining representative. A number of the employees testified at the hearing that they designated the AFL-CIO as their bargaining agent. One employee testified that he had never heard of the Sheet Metal Workers’ union until after he had signed the card. The General Counsel for the Board notes that there could have been no question at the time of the election which union was under consideration and that there was ample time for any objections and renunciations of authorization, none of which were made. In reply petitioner points to the number of employees who voted against the Union.
The Trial Examiner in rejecting petitioner’s objection to the 16 cards (one of which he eliminated from the count on other grounds) relied on Nubone Company, Inc.,
In
Nubone
the Board referred in a footnote to the same two cases cited by the General Counsel here for the proposition that designation of a parent organization is a valid designation of its affiliate: (1) NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n,
Although we do not decide this point, we think these instances are a far cry from designating the AFL-CIO with its 129 affiliates.
With respect to the two cards secured by reprеsentations that they were designed to obtain an election, the testimony of the two employees involved presented a narrow border-line case, on the facts of which the Board might have held either way.
As stated in NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 7 Cir., 1968,
Lowell Glen Maynard testified that he read the card which he signed, that he had never been in a union before, that he told Virgil Harris who asked him if he was “for the union” that he was and would sign a card. He also testified that Virgil Harris said there would be an election, that just signing the cards would not bring the union in, and that he did not know there might be bargaining without an election. He did say that Virgil Harris told him the purpose of the card was to have a union represent the employees.
William Elmer Floyd testified that he received a card from Virgil Harris which he signed and turned in at a latеr *1364 meeting. He said he did not read the card at the time he signed it, that Virgil Harris told him efforts were being made to get a union, that better than 50% of the employees must sign the cards before there would be any need to have an election. Mr. Floyd had previously been a member of a union, whose name he did not know, at the Ford Motor Company for two or three months. He said he never heard of the Sheet Metal Workers beforе and did not know what union he would be under when he signed the card, that he didn’t pay that much attention to it. Later he said that he thought the purpose of the card was to see whether there would be a need to have an election and he signed it because he “thought that if they wanted an election, let them have one.” He later attended a number of meetings, however and discussed the union with others. He made no effort to withdraw his card. Subsequently he was promoted to a supervisory position and did not vote in the election.
Benjamin F. Underwood was shown one of the general AFL-CIO cards which bore the name “Bennie Underwood.” It was dated January 30, 1967. Mr. Underwood testified that he had signed one card, and only one card, around that time but not the one shown to him, that he never spelled his name that way. Walter G. Gallagher, who was stipulated to be a hаndwriting expert, testified that this card was “very probably” signed by the same hand as other signatures known to be by Mr. Underwood and it was his opinion that it was “more than highly probable” that one writer wrote all the signatures, that he did not render a positive opinion because no signature provided him for comparison showed the name “Bennie” as written on the card in question. The Trial Examiner excluded this card from the count although he thought that Mr. Underwood was probably mistaken in his testimony. The Board took the position that Mr. Underwood’s unequivocal testimony that he had signed a card was a valid authorization of the Union to represent him. In a similar situation, Du-bois Fence & Garden Co., Inc., 1966,
The petitioner invites our attention to NLRB v. Midwestern Mfg. Co., Inc., 10 Cir., 1968,
*1365 In Midwestern, the Tenth Circuit felt that the Board’s conclusions with respect to the critical date could not be permitted to rest on such flimsy evidence and speculation and that the Trial Examiner had properly rejected the card. Enforcement of the Board’s order was declined.
However, we consider counting Mr. Underwood’s card (apart from the fact that it was a general AFL-CIO card) in this case to be at worst harmless error. The testimony of the expert consisting of a highly detailed analysis of the signatures available for comparison, letter by letter, would havе formed an adequate basis for a finding that this was in fact Mr. Underwood’s signature.
As stated, that portion of the complaint charging the petitioner with an unlawful refusal to bargain in violation of § 8(a) (5) of the Act was dismissed by the Trial Examiner, unlike the situation in the Gissel cases cited above. The Board there contended that a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy for a § 8(a) (5) violation where the employer cоmmits other unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union’s support and render a fair election improbable. In Gissel the Court held that the employers’ refusals to bargain in each of the cases was accompanied by independent unfair labor practices which tended to preclude the holding of a fair election. These included threats of reprisal and wrongful discharges, which do not exist here.
The Union majority found in this case, in our opinion, rests on a doubtful foundation. We find little evidence that there was in fact a majority which was dissipated by the actions of the petitioner which have been found to be § 8(a) (1) violations. The Trial Examiner found the discharges were for cause. He found no unlawful threats of reprisal prior to the election and apparently considered the allegedly ambiguous general statements after the election only as casting light on the prior statements.
It is conceded that the Board has wide discretion in fashioning remedies. NLRB v. Strong, 1969,
An affirmative bargaining order has been recognizеd as an appropriate remedy for § 8(a) (1) violations where the employer has engaged in flagrant unfair labor practices so outrageous and pervasive and of such nature that the resultant coercive effect cannot be eliminated by traditional remedies. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 2 Cir., 1965,
To the extent that the Order imposes a present duty to bargain, enforcement is denied. In all other respects, to the extent that the order remedies violations of § 8(a) (1) enforcement is granted.
Enforcement of the Board’s order granted in part and denied in part.
