108 Ala. 62 | Ala. | 1895
This is the third appeal in this case. On the former — (92 Ala. 204; 104 Ala. 241) and especially in the latter — the law as applicable to the facts of the case was fully settled. In that decision, the following propositions were announced : 1. That mere drunkenness which does not take away consciousness and the power to consider and understand the danger to which one is exposed, nor deprives him of physical capacity to take care of himself and to avoid danger, does not relieve ■him-from the- responsibility of exercising due care to escape the danger, and if killed in consequence of such
The counsel for appellant in a lengthy and elaborate review of the main question at issue — the drunkenness of deceased and the consequences following — invites are-consideration of some of our conclusions as announced on the last appeal. His contention, is, that to make the defendants liable, deceased must have been drunk to a degree to render him unconscious of attending perils, at the time and place he was ejected; that the conductor must have known of his condition; that, as a matter of law, under the evidence, the court below should have held, that deceased’s intoxication was self-imposed,, was.
The conductor testified, that the deceased acted like he had been drinking, but he did not know the fact. He refused, in a very non-sensical way, to pay his fare, and used rude, obscene language to the conductor, — at which the latter says he did'not become offended, — such, as no one but a crazy or drunken man would employ. Such language and conduct evidenced a want of rationality. All this tends to show, that the conductor knew deceased’s condition ; and that he knew when, and where he put him off, and the horrors and perils of the situation, cannot be disputed. The fact too, that deceased was run over and killed by an approching train, in a very short
We notice only those errors assigned, which have been insisted on in argument. There was no error in allowing plaintiff’s witness, Smith, to answer the questions as to how the track was ballasted at the point where deceased was killed, and its character as to roughness ; and if the field, nearby, was overflowed with water, and how deep, the morning after the accident. These questions related to tlie character and condition of the place where the deceased was killed. The state of the weather, as well as the kind of night and place he was put off, were facts relevant and proper to be considered by the jury, in determining the question of the negligence of the conductor and its character.
The appellant requested eleven written charges, each of which was refused by tlie court. Some of them, it may be, assert correct, abstract principles of law; but, as applicable to the facts of this case, the charges are either incorrect in principle, are abstract, or ignore important facts in evidence, or are calculated to mislead the jury, and were properly refused. Some of them, improperly require the court to pass upon the facts of the case, and to withdraw them from the consideration of the jury. From what we have said, the vice of each, without taking the time and labor to discuss them sep-'paratelv, will be apparent.
Affirmed.