133 Ky. 652 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1909
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
Tn 1871 the appellees, Erasmus L. Mottley and Annie E. Motley, his wife, were seriously injured in an accident occurring to 'one of appellant’s passenger trains while they were being transported as passengers from their home, in (Bowling G-reen) to Louisville, Ky. In full settlement of all claims for damages on the part of the appellees, the 'appellant agreed, in writing, to furnish them free transportation over its line for the remainder of their lives. The contract is as follows: “Louisville, Ky., Oct. 2, 1871. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, in consideration that E. L. Mottley and wife, Annie E. Mottley, have this day released said company from all damages or claims for damages for injuries received by them on the 7th of September, 1871, in consequence of a collision'of trains on the road of said company at Randolph’s Station, Jefferson county, Ky., hereby agrees to issue free passes on said railroad and branches, now existing or to exist, to
The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company is a icommon carrier engaged in the business of interstate and intrastate commerce, and the specific performance of the contract in question involves both inter
“Section 1. * * * No common carrier subject to the provisions of this act 'shall, after January 1,1907, directly or indirectly, issue or give any interstate free ticket, free pass, or free transportation, for passengers, except to its employes.
“Section 2. * * * No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this act, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers, or property, as defined in this act, unless the rates, fares and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of the act; nor shall any carrier charge, or demand, or collect, or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs," than the rates, fare's .and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrier refund or remit in any manner, or by any device, any portion of the fares, rates and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities in the transportation of passengers or property, except such ias are specified in such tariff's. * * *”
The violation .of these sections of the statute is punishable by heavy fine.
The rule is well settled that statutes will always be construed to be prospective, and not retrospective in their effect, unless the language so plainly expresses a retrospective intent as to preclude a reasonable doubt that the Legislature meant it to be prospective. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, in speaking of this rule'of construction (page 529), says: “Nevertheless, legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have &, prospective operation only, unless its terms show dearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” And Endlich, in his work on the Interpretation of Statutes (section 271), uses this language: “Upon the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. * * * They are construed as operating only on cases or facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended.” There is nothing in the language of the en
Passing now to the second question, we are of opinion that the contract between the appellant ¡and the appellees does not fall at all within the meaning of the language used in the statute. The statute inhibits the issuance by common carriers doing interstate commerce of free tickets or passes for transportation, except to employes. The tickets or passes issued to the appellees in execution of the contract
It may be admitted, for the purposes of the case, that Congress could have framed the statute so as to abrogate the contract under discussion. There is no constitutional inhibition upon Congress passing laws to impair the obligation of contracts as there is against the states passing such laws; but the same moral obligation against such unjust laws rests upon the general government as upon the state government, and we must presume that the general government never intends to impair the obligation of existing contracts, unless an imperative necessity exists for so doing, and a clear intent to do so is expressed. It would be a great hardship upon appellees to invalidate the contract between them and appellant. The time has long since passed under the operation of the statute of limitations, when they could institute or maintain an action against the railroad for the injuries received by them in 1871, so that if the contract is invalidated now, they would lose absolutely what remaining value it has. This property right will be taken from them without any. consideration and we would 'be justified in reaching the conclusion that Congress intended to invalidate the 'contract and thus take from appellees their property rights without remuneration only because the language used precludes any other construction.
In the case of United States v. Kirby, 74 U. S. 486, 487, 19 L. Ed. 278, the, Supreme Court said: “All laws should receive d sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd con
As we have said oefore, the very ease we have here was decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky in favor of the appellees. Mottley v. L. & N. R. R. Co., supra. It is true, the judgment was reversed 'by the Supreme Court of the United States because of want of jurisdiction in the federal court to entertain the cause of
For these reasons we are of opinion that the contract under discussion does- not fall within the terms of the federal statute!, and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.