25 W. Va. 760 | W. Va. | 1885
The errors assigned in the petition for an appeal in the próceedings in this cause, which, if they be errors, are all carried into the last decree entered by the court, helow in this cause, are, first: 'That the court authorized interest to be charged upon the estimated value of the lands conveyed to the several daughters of Hlery Conrad from the date of his death; second: That interest on the money-value of the lauds was not, as it should have been on the theory of a moneyed hotchpot, charged only from a period twelve months after Ulery Conrad’s death; third: That the children of the different daughters of Hlery Conrad, to whom jointly with their mothers lands had been conveyed, ought to have been made parties, though their mothers were still living, whereas none of these children were made parties except in cases where their mother was dead; fourth: That the daughters of Hlery Conrad were charged with the full value of the land conveyed to them by their father as an advancement. They should have been charged only as an advancement and be required to bring into hotchpot what the father had given to the daughters individually, and not what he had given to them and their children jointly. These daughters had from five to thirteen children, as the record shows, and therefore they had in the land deeded to them and their children only from one fifth to one thirteenth part of the land given to the daughters individually, and thej^ should have been charged only from one fifth to one thirteenth part of the value of these lands instead oí being charged with the full value of the lands as an advancement. These are all the errors assigned or re
It is claimed by the counsel for the appellees, that this Court can not consider these assigned errors, because, as the last report of the commissioner was not excepted to, the parties waived all objections to it, even though they had filed exceptions to previous reports containing the assigned errors; and they rely upon Kees, Executor v. Kees’s Creditors, 2 Grat. 117, syl. 2, and Simmons v. Simmons’s Administrator, 33 Grat. 451, syl. 2. These cases certainly establish the position, that, unless errors appear upon the face of a report, they can not be taken advantage of for the first time in the Appellate Court, when no exceptions were taken to the report in the court below ; and that air error in a commissioner’s report not appearing on its face, and to which no exception was filed in the court below, will be disregarded by the Appellate Court, even though the identical error had been .committed in the making of a previous report, and it had then beeu excepted to, and the cause had been remanded to the commissioner without deciding on this exception; for in such a case this error not being excepted to in the last report of the commissioner will be regarded as waived by the parties, who on account of it had excepted to a former report. But this principle has no application in this case. For the court itself in the decree of April 8, 1879, had expressly decided, that the daughters of TJlery Conrad, to whom and their children jointly lands had been given and conveyed, were chargeable with the whole value of such real estate, and not with the value of the undivided interest of the daughters. It is of this decision carried into the last decree, that the appellants complain in their fourth ground of eiTor, and not of the commissioner’s report; for he could not’commit error in following the directions of the court. The same is true of all the other supposed errors, of which the applicants complain.
Thus their first assignment of error, that the court erred in authorizing interest to be charged on the estimated value of the lands'advanced to the daughters from the date of the death of ITlery Conrad. Now this was no error of the com
The most important of these alleged errors is that contained in the plaintiff’s fourth assignment of error, that is, that the value of the entire tracts of land were regarded as advancements to the daughters, when they were not conveyed to them, but to them and their children as joint-tenants, which gave them a very small interest in the land, and they should have been held to have been advanced only to the extent of the value of their several interests, and not to the extent of the whole value of the land. To sustain this position they rely solely upon the wording of our statute on the subject, which is: “ When any descendant of a person dying intestate as to his estate or any part thereof, shall have received from any intestate in his lifetime any estate, real or personal by way of advancement, and he or any descendants of his shall come into the partition and distribution of the estate with other par-ceners and distributees, such advancements shall be brought into hotchpot with the whole estate real and personal, de-
Statutes requiring heirs and distributees of a person, who dies intestate, to bring into hotchpot in the distribution of the estate, what had been received by them as advancements from such person in his lifetime, have always been construed very liberally to carry out the purpose of such acts, to produce equality in the distribution of the intestate’s estate among those bearing the relation to him, which in the absence of a will must be presumed to have been the wish of the deceased person. And if by following closely the letter of the statute this its object will be defeated, the courts have never hesitated to disregard th& letter of such statutes and to require that to be brought into hotchpot, which the. letter of the statute does not require, but which its spirit does require. By the word advancement used in the statute is meant a gift by a parent to a child or descendant for the purpose of advancing him or her in Ufe. Barber v. Taylor, 9 Dana 84, is a good illustration of the liberality which the courts have always exercised in construing such statutes, in order to carry out their spirit, even though in so doing the letter of the statute is disregarded. The Kentucky statute was copied from the fifteenth section of the act of Virginia of 1785, directing the course of descents, and was thus woi’ded : “ That when any children of the intestate
It will be seen at a glance, that, so far as the question before us is concerned, our statute is worded almost exactly, as was the act of 1785, and as was the Kentucky statute; yet under these statutes in Barber and others v. Taylor’s Heirs, 9 Dana 84, it was decided, that a conveyance made by. the father to the husband of his daughter by way of advancement to his daughter, was to be regarded as an advancement to the daughter. As this amounts-to a construction of our statute, I will quote at some length the reasoning of the court, which led to this construction of our statute. The court say on page 85:
“ Except as to the period of valuation these enactments of the Kentucky statute are substantially like the 5th section of the statute of distributions, enacted in England in the 22d and 23d Car. II, ch. 10, and therefore the judicial interpretation of the latter, established when the former was created, should be deemed equally applicable to these cases. In Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 435, which is the leading case on the subject, it was decided, that in determining all questions concerning advancements the object and intention of the father who gave are to be chiefly considered; that a provision to take effect after the death of the father or in reversion or even contingently, whenever it can be deemed of value, may be considered as an advancement fro tanto ; that equality was the great object of the statute, which should therefore be considered as a parliamentary loill,’ and consequently, that a settlement, secured before marriage and in consideration thereof, upon a then unborn first daughter of the party making it should after his death intestate be deemed an advancement, which should be brought into hotchpot.
“And in Wayland v. Wayland, 2 Atk. 635, Lord Hardwick decided, that a settlement on a son for life, remainder to his wife and then to his children, should be considered as an advancement to the son to the whole extent of the value of the
“A gift of money or other personal property to the husband of the donor’s daughter, though the husband by wasting or loosing it might prevent his wife from deriving any benefit from it. So land given in frank marriage to the husband and wife and to the survivor of them and their issue in tail, the wife being the daughter of the giver, would be an advancement to her, to the full extent of the value of the entire estate, although the husband might survive her, and might also dock the entail, and thereby monopolize the whole estate, 'yet in distributing the intestate father’s estate, her children would be charged with the value of the estate, thus enjoyed and converted by their, father, because their grandfather so intended and provided, and because the object of the statute was to distribute his estate as he himself would have done or may be presumed to have intended. Nor could we doubt that a conveyance of land to the husband of the conveyor’s daughter, in consideration of his being her husband, should be considered as an advancement to her, just as much as if the conveyance had been to herself alone, or to her and her husband as tenants of the entirety. ********=1= It is not material to enquire whether the fee should be an advancement to Mrs. Barber or to her children, or to all of them in succession. Her children only represent her, and
Judge Lomax in his work on Executors vol. 2 page 367, treats these two English decisions above cited as properly construing the Virginia statutes with reference to hotchpot, which were substantially the same as the English 22 and 23 Car. IT, eh. 10 sec. 5, and as our statute above quoted (Code of West Virginia, eh. 78 see. 13 page 486)' We regard these English cases as authoritative constructions of our statute and entirely approve the quotations above given from 9th Dana, and adopt them as our construction of our statute.
These views were approved in Stevenson, &c. v. Martin, &c., 11 Barb. 485, where it was decided that “the intention of the donor to advance his daughter will be 'presumed from the fact that he conveys to the husband upon the sole consideration of the existence of the marriage-relation between them. But if she be dead at the time of the conveyance no such presumption will be entertained as a against her children.” See syllabus 2. These views were again approved in Bowles v. Winchester, £c., 13 Barb. 1, and they were there applied to a case where the devise (and it was stated to apply equally to a conveyance) was made by a father to his daughter during her natural life and at'her death to her living issue; and if. she died without leaving issue, then the property was to revert to the heirs of the father. The court held that this was an advancement to the daughter of the whole land, as if she had been given a fee simple and not a life-estate, and she was charged with the fee simple, value of the land as an advancement to her. The land was in that case devised by the father to his daughter, Mrs. Winchester, for life and then to her children, and the father died intestate as to a part of his estate worth $100,000.00. The question was what Mrs. Winchester should bring into hotchpot in the partition and distribution of .this $100,000.00, as to which her father died intestate. The court says on page 9: “A devise was made to Mrs. Winchester giving her an estate for life and then to her
• The principles laid down in these English and Kentucky cases acted upon in Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, and in Ditten’s administrator v. Cluney’s executors, 22 Ohio St. 436, and in Wagner’s Appeal — Duval’s estate, 8 Pa. St. 122, syl. 2, where it was said, that a deed to a daughter for life only remainder to her children was an advancement to her. On page 127, the court say : “ Such a settlement to Mrs. Wagner for life remainder to her children is regarded as an advancement under our intestate laws, as it was in England under the statute, Car. 22 & 23, ch. 10, sec 5.”
The counsel for the appellants insists, that as the deeds made by Ulery Conrad to his daughter, Timna Hammer, and her children, Asenith Davis and her children, and to Delilah Davis and her children, were made in “ consideratou of
The case of Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 435, and Wayland v. Wayland, 2 Atk. 635, show, that a deed to a daughter and her children or a deed for their use will be regarded as an advancement to the value ia. fee simple of all the land conveyed, whatever may be the form or conditions of the deed, provided it was intended as an advancement of the daughter, and this will be presumed, unless the lands conveyed were purchased. Even though they were thus settled at the time of the marriage of the daughter and might in a certain sense have been considered as conveyed for a valuable consideration, marriage being a valuable consideration, yet lands so settled in a marriage-settlement on a daughter and her children or any of them is considered as an advancement to the daughter to the full value of the fee simple in the land so settled. I am therefore, of opinion, that the conveyance to the four daughters of Ulery Conrad, and their children, by their father must be regarded as an advancement to the daughters of the fee simple value of the land so conveyed, and that the circuit court of Pendleton county did not err in its decree of April 3, 1879, in declaring that “ TJleiy Coni'ad intended the real estate conveyed to his daughters and their children to be advancements to each of them to the extent of the value of such real estate so conveyed to each daughter.”
The next enquiry is : As of what date ought advancements whether real or personal estate to be valued ?” Unless under peculiar circumstances, as when perhaps the advancement is a remainder, (See Chein et al. v. Murray et al.-) the rule is established in Virginia as well as elsewhere, that all advancements. are to be accounted for as of the value they bore when received, and that during the life of the intestate, rents, issues and profits should be charged against the heir or devisee. (Beckwith v. Buller, 1 Wash. 224; Hudson v. Hudson’s Executor, 3 Rand. 120; Williams v. Stonestreet, 3 Rand. 559; Christian v. Coleman, 3 Leigh. 30; Knight v. Oliver, 12 Grat. 33; Puryear v. Cabell, 24 Grat. 260.) The reasons for valuing advancements as of the time they were received and not as of
The circuit court in this cause by its decree of January 19, 1882, properly directed, that “the advancements to each of the sons and daughters of TJlery Conrad deceased, either in money, or lands should be charged as of the value at the time the advancements were made.” It only remains now to enquire whether in this decree the circuit court erred in adding, that each child was to be charged “with interest on the said value from the death of their father TJlery Conrad.”. It seems to me as quite obvious, that, if we would carry out the spirit of our law requiring advancements to be brought into hotchpot, interest must be charged on the value of all advancements whether in real or personal property from the death of the intestate. The spirit of the law is, that by this hotchpot equality shall be produced on the death of the intestate, it being very properly presumed, that, if a will had been made those, who stood in the same relation to the deceased, would at his death be made equal in the distribution and division of his estate both personal and real. To effect this at the
We have seen that interest on advancements is not to be charged from the time the advancements were made. If any interest is to. be charged at all, there remains no other period, from which interest can be charged, except the death of the intestate. Though owing to the brevity of the opinion in certain Virginia cases it does not appear very distinctly, that this was the date fixed upon, and though for like reasons it is sometimes said in general language, that no interest should be charged on advancements, yet the true meaning in
The case relied upon by the appellants’ counsel as not in accord with the views which I have expressed, is Barrett & wife v. Morris’s executors et al. 33 Grat. 273. In that case the father did not die intestate but left a will, in which he sets out the advancements he had made to each of his four children : to one $31,000.00; to the second, $32,891.00; to the third, $34,000.00, and to the fourth, $35,112.00. The will directed, that no sale of his real estate should be made during the life of his widow, who was to receive an annuity of $2,000.00 a year out of the rents, profits and income of his estate. He further directed, that after his debts, devises and bequests should have béen paid and satisfied, the remainder of his estate should be divided into four shares, so that the first share together with the $31,000.00 advanced to the-first child, the second share together with $32,891.00 advanced to the second child, the third share together with $34,000.00 advanced to the third child, and the fourth share together with $35,121.00 advanced to the fourth child should be equal, giving the first of these shares to the first child, the seeond share to the second child, thethird share to the third child, and the fourth share to the fourth child. The testator died in 1867. The widow died in 1872. During her lifetime a suit was instituted by one Davis against the executors of Morris for a large and unascertained debt, and the amount of this debt was not ascertained till-December 11, 1875, so thatit was impossible to make a division of the estate among the children until that time. The court held in that case, that the proper time to charge the children, to whom advancements had been made, with interest on their advancements was December 11, 1875, because, as they very properly construed the will ot
My conclusion therefore is, that the circuit court did not err in its decree of April 8, 1879, in directing that “the daughters of TJlery Conrad (who had been advanced) should not be charged with rents and profits prior to the death of their father upon the real estate conveyed to them severally and to their children.” Nor did the court err in this decree in directing these daughters to be “charged with the value of these lands, when the deeds were made, with interest from the death of their father.” Nor did the commissioner in his last report confirmed by the decree of the court made June 15, 1883, err in charging all the children of TJlery Conrad with the value of personal as well as real estate advanced by their father at the time it was advanced and with interest on such value from Nov. 11,1867, the time when TJlery Conrad died.
It is complained of by appellant’s counsel as very unjust, that the sou Laban B. Conrad, who has had possession of all the father’s land since his death in 1867, is only charged the-rents and profits of these lands, which do not exceed three per cent, on their market value, while the daughters, to whom advancements had been made, are charged from the time of their father’s death six per cent on the. value of the lands deeded to them. I confess, that I am unable to see any injustice, which is done these daughters to whom advancements have been so made. On the contrary they seem to me to have great advantage over the son and daughter to whom no advancements were made. They are by the decrees of the circuit court and by law allowed to hold the tracts of land conveyed to them for more than twenty-two years from the date of the conveyances to their father’s death free from all charges for rents and profits. And after the expiration of this period of more than twenty-two years they are not charged" with the value of these tracts of land but only with their value in January, 1855, the time of the conveyances, probably not much if any more than one half the
It is insisted by the appellants’ counsel, that the twenty-four children of these daughters, who are still living, and to whom advancements have been made, ought all to be made defendants. I can not see that they have any interest "whatever in this suit except the interest, which every child may have in the success of its parents in a litigation. They have no more interest in this cause than have the children of their brotherLabanB. Conradortheir sister Mrs.Nyle, theplaintiff.
I have now considered all the objections urged by the appellants’ counsel to the decree and proceedings in the circuit court; and my conclusion is, that there is no error in these proceedings; that the decrees of April 8,1879, and of June 15, 1883, must be affirmed; and that the appellants must pay to the appellees their costs in this Court expended and $30.00 damages.
Ambtrmed.